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The success of the Venus space probe, Mariner R, in late 1962
demonstrated most dramatically the feasibility and great value ofa weIl-
organized planetary research venture. Another important step in the
continuing schedule of scientific investigations of the solar system will
be taken in the latter half of 1964 with the Iaunching of the Mariner Mars
spacecraft, whichwill follow a planned trajectory that assures a near-
Mars encounter. This spacecraft will be equipped to collect scientific
data in interplanetary space and in the vicinity of Mars, and will be pro-
vided with the capability of taking television pictures of this interesting
planet. The Mariner projects constitute an important segment of the
vast space research program being conducted by the Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory of Pasadena, California.
Reliability has been an important consideration in the design of the
Mariner vehicles, anda formaI reIiabiIity assessment of the Mariner Mars
spacecraft was undertaken in March 1963 by Planning Research Corpora-
tion. The assessment was authorized under cont!_act950445 issued by
Jet PropuIsion Laboratory, and this report, which presents the findings
of the assessment in numerical terms, completes the contract work.
Previous contractual associations of Planning Research Corpora-
tion and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory have been marked by a high de-
gree of cooperation and mutual assistance. This spirit has continued
throughout the period during which this assessment was conducted, and
Dr. Eiizabeth Baxter, of the Systems Design Section of JPL, has fulfilled
the important function of project liaison--without which very iittle could
have been accomplished. Cognizant engineering personnel from JPL
supplied valuable assistance in the form of direct consultation both by
telephone and in a number of conferences.
The authors are anxious to acknowledge the contributions to this
work by other members of the PRC staff, including H. B. Battey, W.E.
Faragher, J. P. Francis, R. J. Mulvihill, and R. G. Salter. Apprecia-
tion is expressed to G. E. Monroe for his helpful suggestions regarding
the preparation of the report. Credit for the arduous computational work
belongs to Mary E. Barrow and Joy K. Fort.
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ABSTRACT
The findings of a numerical exercise of the reliability model of
the Mariner Mars spacecraft are presented along with detailed relia-
bility representations of the spacecraft subsystems. Conclusions are
drawn regarding pertinent aspects of the reliability of this Complex sys-
tem, which is scheduled for launch in late 1964. A set of carefully ap-
portioned worth functions that quantitatively rank the project objectives
is presented, and these are employed to weight, in a rational manner,
the probabilities of successfully accomplishing the stated objectives.
From this a reliability figure-of-merit is derived. Selected events and
functions of particular interest and significance are separately invest-
igated, and the corresponding classical reliabilities are computed.
Complete data on failure rate estimates and parts complements are
presented. /__j
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I. INTRODUCTION
Calculation of the predicted reliability of a planetary spacecraft
is a process which, in common with the design effort, must recognize
the variety of objectives to be served during the course of the long and
complex mission. The Mariner Mars (Mariner C) spacecraft to be
launched in the latter half of 1964 will incorporate a number of inter-
dependent functiona] subsystems that must remain operable through
most or all of the spacecraft's mission time in order to achieve any
significant success in fulfilling the program objectives. The reliability
assessment described in this report constitutes an analytical approach
to the prediction of the reliability, or probability of success, of the in-
dividual subsystems and of the total system.
A° Background
An important phase of a reliability assessment is the construction
or formulation of a mathematical model of the system under study. The
model is developed in such a way that the effects or consequences of com-
ponent part failures are brought into evidence. To the greatest extent
possible, the consequences of external perturbations to the system are
also accounted for by the model. The formulation of a reliability model
for the Mariner C spacecraft was accomplished in the first phase of this
study effort, and the details of that model are fully described in PRC
R-322, Interim Report on Reliability Model Formulation for the Mariner
Mars Spacecraft. It will be necessary in the present report to make fre-
quent reference to the model formulation results, and the term "interim
report" will be used wherever that reference is intended.
The model presented in the interim report was based on a study of
the available spacecraft design documents and a limited number of con-
ferences with the cognizant design personnel. The study was initiated in
early March 1963, at which time the details of subsystem design were
reasonably well documented, at least for most subsystems. Design
changes were subsequently introduced, however, and, following the
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the publication of the interim report, a series of extended conferences
was held with the engineering groups charged with the responsibility of
the spacecraft design. In the course of these conferences, design changes
were revealed and, more importantly, many details of the subsystem de-
signs that had not previously been available were documented for incor-
poration into the model. Complete descriptions of some of the subsys-
tem designs could not be obtained, and, in a few instances, approximations
used in the model formulation could not be completely removed. Notable
among these was the necessity for excluding the data automation system
from the analysis, due to the fact that the design is of an advanced nature
and had not been crystallized to the extent required for the model.
B. Approach to the Numerical Assessment
The exercising of a reliability model involves the establishment of
a set of component part failure rates and the numerical definition of such
symbolic quantities as event times on the mission profile and the proba-
bilities of occurrence of external perturbations. In the model formula-
tion, groups of component parts, called reliability units, were defined
on the basis that these parts always function simultaneously to produce
a given effect or series of related effects. The exercising of the model
includes the computation of unit failure rates based on the failure rates
of the constituent parts. These unit failure rates form the basis for the
calculation of the probability of success or failure of any desired func-
tional subsystem or any group of units that jointly effect the occurrence
of a significant mission event. Thus, it is possible to develop a set of
numerical results that represent the reliability of the spacecraft as the
aggregate reliability of its important functions.
The model developed in the initial phases of the study was struc-
tured in a manner which would permit a more meaningful assessment of
spacecraft reliability than could be provided by the classical reliability
l
of its functions. The figure-of-merit technique, by introducing the
1
For a more complete description see PRC R-293, Reliability Assess-
ment of the Mariner Spacecraft, 17 December 1962.
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concept of worth accrual as a function of time, affords a means of ac-
counting for the partial success that might well be achieved in a mission
where some degradation of performance has occurred because of an im-
pairment which is not totally catastrophic. The approach to exercising
a figure-of-merit model demands that primary mission objectives be
clearly stated and that an assignment of worth be made to each objective.
This was done for the Mariner C spacecraft by Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
and these assigned worth functions have been appropriately integrated
with equipment survival probabilities to produce a set of results that
form the spacecraft figure-of-merit.
C. Report Organization
This report includes the information necessary to permit computa-
tion of the reliability of any significant spacecraft function using either a
classical or a figure-of-merit approach. .A summary of the more impor-
tant results is presented in Section II, and the model representations of
the spacecraft subsystems are discussed and diagrammed in Section III.
Section IV describes the derivation of the results and contains full details
of the numerical exercise. Section V discusses certain conclusions
drawn as a consequence of the study. Complete failure rate and parts
count information is given in two appendices.
D. A s sumptions
It is in order at this point to state the explicit assumptions which
have been necessary to place reasonable bounds on the scope of the study.
Many assumptions are implicit in the model representations and can be
identified in the descriptions of the subsystems. Certain general assump-
tions apply broadly to the entire study, however, and these are listed
be low:
I. Launch phase failure possibilities are not considered. All
equipment and all piece parts required for the mission after injection
are assumed to be operable throughout the launch phase, and no incipient
failures have resulted from the launch stresses.
PRC R- 36Z
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Z. Scientific experiments are completely reliable. Except for
certain hardware associated with the planet scanning function, it is as-
sumed that none of the scientific experiments fail during the mission.
Thus, loss of worth to be returned from these experiments is a conse-
quence of equipment failure outside the experimental hardware or
circuitry.
3. Engineerin_ measurement transducers are completely re-
liable. This is similar to assumption 2, but refers to the equipments
(such as temperature or position transducers) that provide the uncondi-
tioned signals for telemetry purposes.
4. The trajectory of the space probe after injection is correc-
tible by midcourse maneuvers. The two cases which are disallowed by
this assumption are, first, that the required correction is beyond the
capability of the midcourse motor and, second, that injection was ac-
complished so accurately as to obviate the requirement for a midcourse
correction.
5. The mission period is 6,213 hours. This variable, which de-
pends to a large extent on the time of launching, has been fixed at 6,Z13
hours. This places the time of closest approach at 6,000 hours after
injection.
6. Part failures are catastrophic. Degraded operation of piece
parts is not considered. It is assumed that a failed part is completely
inoperable and will remain inoperable from the time of failure through-
out the balance of the mission.
7. Part failures are random in time. This assumption is pred-
icated on the absence of "burn-in" or "wear-out" failure mechanisms,
and allows the application of the exponential failure law and the exclusive
use of random failure rates.
8. All parts are exposed to the same stress. The selected fail-
ure rates are based on the assumption that each piece part is stressed
to 25 percent of its design rating and operates in an unchanging ambient
temperature of 35°C.
With the foregoing assumptions as a background, the principal
results of the study are summarized in the next section.
I!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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II. SUMMARY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS
An important task within the scope of this study is the selection for
computation of those numerical results which will afford maximum in-
sight into spacecraft reliability. It would be neither feasible nor desir-
able to attempt to present all of the corollary or intermediate results
that are developed or could be developed in the course of the assessment.
The process of determining the specific class of results to be ex-
amined brings into evidence an apparent conflict that arises because of
the varying viewpoints which can be adopted in ordering or ranking the
importance of the many spacecraft functions. Emphasis on a large num-
ber of detailed results will tend to obscure the integrated or "big" pic-
ture, whereas overall results fail to show the interrelationships of the
many factors which entered into them. It is believed that a judicious
combination of results on interesting events and functions, together with
a figure-of-merit approach to important objectives, constitutes the most
satisfactory resolution of this conflict. The results selected for presen-
tation here represent an effort to provide this kind of combination.
A. Summary of Classical Reliabilities
The term "classical reliability," in the sense employed here, im-
plies that some minimum level of performance has been established as
a criterion of success or failure. Reliability is then the probability that
this minimum performance level will be equaled or exceeded for the ap-
plicable time periods within the mission. No gradations of operating
characteristics are recognized between the extremes of "operable" and
"failed," and the element of judgment is applied only to determining the
complement of parts deemed necessary to achieve the functional perform-
ance selected for examination.
From this rather general explanation of classical reliability, it is
possible to specify in somewhat more precise terms the functions or
events that are considered to be of interest and that have a significant
bearing on the total mission. A predicted reliability is given for each.
PRC R-362
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I. Solar array deployment: less than 1 failure in each 100,000
trials. Equipment considered for this event includes the redundant pyro-
technics for unlatching the panels, the hinges and spring actuators for
unfolding them, and the hydraulic snubbers which limit their deployment
velocity.
2. Power supply: 0.710 reliability for 6,213 hours. This includes
the scheduled generation of 400-cps power as well as continuous produc-
tion of 2.4-kc/s power for general spacecraft use and direct current for
the radio power amplifiers.
3. Command capability: 0.340 reliability for 6,213 hours. This
predicted reliability applies to the capability of executing a typical com-
mand, and includes the necessity for an operating radio receiver.
4. Radio functions:
a. Receiver: 0.675 reliability for 6,213 hours. This does
not include the ranging channel, but does encompass the antenna switch-
ing requirements.
b. Transmitter: 0.970 reliability for 6,213 hours. This
applies to the transmitter operating with either coherent or noncoherent
excitation.
c. Coherent transponder: 0.640 reliability for 6,213 hours.
This figure covers the complete radio subsystem except for the ranging
channel, with the auxiliary oscillator redundancy disallowed.
5. Central computer and sequencer:
a. Maneuver signals: 0.948 reliability for 286.5 hours.
Maneuver data registration and maneuver central functions are consid-
ered in this predicted reliability.
b. Sequencing functions: 0.672 reliability for 6,213 hours.
This is the probability of generating a typical master time signal through
the end of the mission.
6. Attitude control:
a. Sun acquisition and tracking: 0.767 reliability through
6,213 hours. This figure includes two scheduled reacquisitions and the
probability of unscheduled reacquisitions.
I
I
I
I
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I
PRC R- 362
7
bo Initial acquisition of Canopus: less than 5 failures in
10,000 trials. The probability of obtaining the prerequisite sun acquisi-
tion is included, and operating commands, needed redundantly, are cal-
culated at their normal reliabilities.
c. Celestial reference acquisition and tracking: 0.635 re-
liability for 6,213 hours. This is the combined probability of acquiring
and tracking Canopus as well as the sun.
do Inertial roll control: 0.441 reliability for the final
263 hours of the mission. This predicted reliability applies to the spe-
cific case in which the inertial control is not invoked until 50 hours be-
fore encounter. Reliability of the radio subsystem has been included.
7. Trajectory correction: 0.961 probability of an adequate ma-
neuver within 288 hours. All necessary spacecraft subsystems are in-
corporated in this calculation.
8. Data encoder:
a. Video data encoding: 0.626 reliability for 6,213 hours.
This covers the unit complement needed for tape playback data only.
b. Cruise science data encoding: 0.557 reliability for
6,213 hours. This reliability prediction applies to the portions of the
data encoder requisite for cruise science data.
c. High-rate engineering telemetry: 0.474 reliability for
6,000 hours° This is the probability of successfully encoding data through
one typical high-rate analog channel.
d. Low-rate engineering telemetry: 0.392 reliability for
6,000 hours. This predicted reliability covers all equipment associated
with the encoding of a typical low-rate analog channel.
9. Total system: 0.111 reliability for 6,213 hours. This is de-
fined as the classical reliability of the system. It is the calculatedproba-
bility of success of a mission which accomplishes all objectives except
(possibly) the return of low-rate engineering telemetry and the function-
ing of a coherent radio receiver beyond the midcourse correction point.
B. Fisure-of-Merit Summary
If the primary mission objectives can be quantitatively ranked, and
an assignment of worth made to each of them, consideration can be given
PRC R - 362
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to the possible degradations in performance which, while not meeting the
criterion established for total mission success, still provide the capa-
bility of at least partial fulfillment of mission objectives. This type of
assessment, leading to a spacecraft figure-of-merit, has been pursued
in this study.
The resultant figure-of-merit is 34.8 percent, which is to be com-
pared with a figure of I00 percent for a perfect mission in which all ob-
jectives are achieved with complete reliability. The constituent elements
of this figure-of-merit correspond to primary mission objectives. They
are tabulated below together with the assigned worth for each objective.
Mission Objective
Cruise science
Engineering telemetry
Orbit determination
Star acquisition
Trajectory correction
Planet encounter
Encounter science
Tape playback
Total worth
Assigned Expected l
Worth Worth
12.0 6.3
3.5 2.0
4.5 3.6
1.0 0.9
2.0 I.9
6.0 2.9
II.0 2.6
60.0 14.1
100.0 34.3
The figure-of-merit has characteristics in common with all sto-
chastic measures, and is not to be interpreted as the proportion of worth
likely to be obtained from a single mission. Any single mission maywell
result in complete success or failure, particularly in view of the many
"one-shot" objectives to be accomplished. The figure-of-merit provides
insight into system reliability by predicting the average worth of a signi-
ficantly large number of identically defined missions. No statistical meas-
ure can predict the degree of success of a single trial, but the figure-of-
merit does offer a realistic assessment of system reliability.
IThroughout this report, the words ':expected" and "average
interchangeably to denote a statistical mean or expectation.
" are used
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III. SUBSYSTEM REPRESENTATIONS
The reliability model of a subsystem is not a unique representation
of the equipment because the assumptions that have been necessary will
tend to emphasize particular aspects of subsystem operation. A model
is based upon a reliability-oriented description of the subsystem, and
such a description is usually clarified by more or less concise represen-
tations such as block diagrams and time profiles of the mission. These
illustrate the manner in which the subsystem is viewed for its reliability
aspects, and depict the introduction of many of the assumptions.
The interim report on the Mariner C reliability assessment con-
tains a relatively complete description of the functions of each subsys-
tem and the manner in which they are implemented. It is deemed un-
necessary to repeat these descriptions here; however, the block diagram
representations and the time profile for a normal mission are resubmit-
ted so that the basis for the numerical assessment which follows will be
absolutely clear and explicit.
It was observed in Section I that a limited number of changes in the
reliability representatives have been necessary to ensure that the most
current documentation would be reflected in the assessment. It is the
purpose of this section to discuss these changes and to demonstrate that
they have, in fact, been introduced into the subsystem representations.
Accordingly, the descriptions that follow emphasize the difference be-
tween the subsystem representations as given in the interim report and
those that are submitted here. To facilitate this discussion, a complete
set of block diagrams is included for each subsystem with the exception
of the science subsystem and the command detector and decoder. As
has been explained in Section I, only a partial assessment of the science
subsystem has been possible because of the somewhat fluid state of de-
velopment of this equipment.
The implementation of each of the discrete commands is not re-
produced here because of the similarities between them. The represen-
tation of a sufficient number of typical commands are presented so that
no ambiguities will exist in any reconstruction of the numerical assess-
ment procedure.
PRC R-362
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A. Science Subsystem
Data processing has been designated as the science subsystem for
the purposes of this study. This includes the data automation system,
together with the planetary instrument scan equipment and the tape re-
cording and playback functions. The development of much of this equip-
ment has not reached the stage that would permit its evaluation to the
extent that other subsystems on the spacecraft have been analyzed. The
interim report does not contain a model for this subsystem. Accordingly,
no changes in the model development can be discussed, but the possibil-
ity of improving the accuracy of the study has been enhanced by the availa-
bility of a limited amount of information on some parts of this subsystem.
i. Data Automation System
The data automation system constitutes the largest and most
complex portion of the science subsystem. The design of the data auto-
mation system involves the use of pelletized circuits, which is a depar-
ture from the design practices followed in the other subsystems of the
spacecraft. Decisions regarding the complement of scientific instru-
ments to be carried aboard the spacecraft have been delayed, and for
this reason it has not been possible to include the data automation sys-
tem in the subject study.
2. Planetary Instrument Scan System
Among the functions which have been grouped with the science
subsystem is the planetary instrument scan system. The reliability of
this system is depicted in Exhibit 1. It is seen that the initiation of the
scan function is dependent primarily on a successful pyrotechnic event
as shown by the presence of the pyro-firing circuits. These circuits are
activated by the CC and S through signal MT-7, with the capability of re-
dundant initiation through command DC-25. Parallel squibs are fired by
redundant silicon-controlled rectifiers shown as units 930 and 931. The
function of these squibs is to release the science cover latch unit i01. A
hinge and actuating spring, unit I02, swing the science cover out of the
way and open the optical view of the planetary instruments.
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Units 103 and 104 constitute the scan gear motor and its control
electronics. These units operate throughout the encounter phase to di-
rect the view of the optical instruments. It will be noted that the only
redundancy which has been accounted for is that which is available for
the pyrotechnic event. Circuit diagrams of the scan electronics were
not available for study, and it has been assumed that the entire parts
complement is required for the success of the scan function.
3. Tape Recording/Playback Equipment
The taping of video data and its subsequent playback through
the radio subsystem is a design responsibility separate from the data
automation system. It has been included with the science subsystem,
however, because of its close functional relationship with the equipment
which is responsible for the processing of science data. Complete doc-
umentation on the design of the tape recorder became available late in
the program and an accurate parts count of this equipment was thereby
made possible. However, it was not possible to discern specialized
failure modes, and, consequently, the parts complement was simply
divided into those portions which are concerned with recording and those
which are concerned with playback.
Exhibit 2 shows the reliability block diagram which resulted from
this very straightforward approach to the tape recorder. The mechani-
cal portions of the recorder are included in unit 105 and, as indicated,
the record and playback electronics are split between units 106 and I07.
A number of CC and S signals are required at different times to
effect the proper recording and playback of video data. These CC and
S signals are shown in the diagram as MT-7, MT-8, and MT-9, and it
will be seen that each signal is individually backed up by a discrete
command.
It is assumed that both the record and playback functions must be
successful if any worth is to be derived from the gathering of video data.
For this reason, all units are placed in series from a reliability standpoint.
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B. Data Encoder
1. Revised Representation
Further analysis of the data encoder, along with additional
documentation and some specific requests from JPL personnel, resulted
in significant changes to the model since issuance of the interim report.
Because of the magnitude and quantity of changes in the data encoder, a
new and revised set of exhibits {Exhibits 3-15) covering this subsystem
is included in this report. Changes that have been included in the new
set of diagrams are described in the remainder of this subsection.
In Exhibits 3 through 9, unit 2051, the initial commutation switch,
continues to be composed of the same parts as the succeeding switches,
units 2052 through 2107, with the exception of units 2100 and 2101. The
latter two, which are double-pole switches, are now composed of the
same parts as units 2109 through 2143, found in Exhibits 5, 7, and 10.
None of the above units contains a switch driver as these have all been
designed out of the subsystem. (Note that the number 2067 has not been
assigned to any unit. I Units 2144 through 2149 (see Exhibits 3, 4, and
7 through 10) are identical single-pole switches and equivalent to such
units as 2051.
Units 2029, 2032, and 2034 are no longer the same as units 2025
through 2028, 2030, 2031, and 2033. The former three unit numbers
are now associated with three new bucking supplies identified in Ex-
hibits 3, 4, and 8 respectively. The latter 7 unit numbers continue to
represent the sequencers or shift registers, of which there are 7 in-
stead of 10 as previously described in the interim report. In addition,
dash numbers are now associated with these seven units, as can be seen
in Exhibits 3 through i0. Each dash number represents a particular
stage in the given unit; e.g., 2025-1, 2025-2, and 2025-3 represent the
first, second, and third stages, respectively, of the given unit 2025.
Blocks identified with more than one such unit dash number represent
a series requirement for sequential portions of the shift register; e.g. ,
a block identified by 2025-1... -7 denotes a requirement for the first
seven stages of unit 2025. Note that the blocks are not independent and,
in fact, contain some of the same parts.
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In the previous representation, any failure in a sequencer consti-
tuted the loss of all channels dependent upon any part of that sequencer.
In the new diagrams, the assumption is made that any failure in a par-
ticular sequencer results in some integral number of channels from l
through 10 being unselectable, but that no failure will cause a continual
selection of one particular channel.
Exhibits 4 through 12 have also been changed with respect to the
complete sequencer units. Each of these exhibits can be seen to include
two or three paralleled sequencers in series with each deck. Referring
to Exhibit 4, note that in Deck If0, failure of unit 2026-I causes the loss
of channel ll0 only and not the remainder of the deck, but such a failure
also diminishes the probability of getting the Deck 200 channels since
failure of 2026-1 means failure of 2026 which is in parallel with 2025,
the combination being in series with the Deck 200 channels. Other con-
sequences have been accounted for as can be determined by further ex-
amination of the exhibits.
Some of these consequences can be observed in Exhibit ii. Al-
though this exhibit has been completely rediagrammed, there are no
additional subtleties beyond those already described. Thus, the digital
engineering channels are dependent on the same sequencers and sequen-
cer stages as are the analog engineering channels, and in an identical
manne r.
Exhibit 12 has been changed to account for both cruise science and
encounter science. The change involving video data is one of bookkeep-
ing only, since the unit removed was actually the data selector indicated
in Exhibit 1 5.
Exhibit 13 was changed by adding the sync circuits in series with
the analog-to-digital conversion function. Exhibit 14 was changed by
making all of the indicated data inputs dependent on the high rate synchro-
nizer, unit 2020, while Exhibit 15 was changed by eliminating the possi-
ble degraded path resulting from loss of the sync subcarrier and adding
the power supply.
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2. Identification of Unit Parts
In order to calculate a truly representative failure rate for
each unit, it has been necessary to determine exactly how many com-
ponent parts are associated with it and whether any of the parts are used
redundantly. Until late in the study, the documentation available for anal-
ysis provided no indication of component redundancy. Subsequently,
additional documentation was received which was found to indicate that
extra gate inputs to NAND type circuits were being utilized in a redundant
manner. Although time constraints precluded a searching review of all
of the new documentation, the information was used to correct the signifi-
cant misrepresentations which had arisen because of alterations in design
philosophy.
The detailed component part listing, including quantities and fail-
ure rates, canbe found in AppendixA. It is the purpose of the remainder
of this subsection to clarify exactly what the group of parts in Appendix
A actually represents with respect to the documentation. Referring to
the diagrams (or to Appendix A where the units are numerically ordered)
it is evident that many of the units do not require further clarification
other than to state that they are composed of individually well defined
functional parts of the system. Included in this category are the follow-
ing units: 2005 through 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013 through 2023, 2029, 2032,
2034, 2038, 2039, 2049 through 2149, and 2151. Part redundancy has
been accounted for where applicable in units 2005 and 2006, the PN gen-
erator. Unit 2001, the rate generator, includes the switching circuits
and the four-flip-flop toggled binary counter. Assembly drawing bills
of material were used to determine the parts complement of the circuit
modules used in these units, andtheir part redundancies are accounted
fo r.
Unit 2002 comprises all of the circuitry for changing modes. It
includes the capacitor bank with its series-parallel arrangement for
operating the relays. The bank itself is in series, and, therefore, could
have been included in unit 2001.
Unit 2003-i contains six latching relay contact sets because this is
all that must be operable for the "A" PN generator to operate successfully.
PRC R- 362
30
Unit 2003-2 contains the remainder of the switching circuits (with part
redundancy accounted for) because they must all be operable to change
to the "B" PN generator. Since switching of the "A" A-D converter re-
quires the same parts as the switching of PN generator "A", and, sim-
ilarly, A-D converter "B" switching requires the same parts as switch-
ing PN generator "B," units 2003-3 and 2003-4 are given failure rates
of zero to avoid double counting of the parts. Note that the results would
not be the same (in fact, they would be in error) if, instead, the parts
were accounted for in the A-D converter circuits and not in the PN gen-
erator circuits.
The same failure rate has been given to the PN generator OR cir-
cuits, denoted as units 2004-1 and 2004-2. Their total failure rate is
taken as the failure rate of any of the circuits handling signals derived
from the PN generator, including the PN code, and the interrogate, 2f s ,
bit sync and word sync signals. Here, also, part redundancy has been
taken into account.
Units 2012-1 and 2012-2, the A-D converter OR circuits, have also
been given the same failure rates. Their total failure rate is taken as the
sum of the failure rates of the appropriate NAND and NOR circuits han-
dling the data through the A-D converter.
Units 2025 through 2028, 2030, 2031, and 2033 are denoted as the
sequencers and each includes two individually well defined functional
parts of the system. These are a clock driver and a 10-stage sequencer.
The -i portion of each includes a clock driver, the first stage of the se-
quencer, and the sequencer parts that are common to all I0 stages. Each
of the other dash numbers, -2 through -I0, represents a particular se-
quencer stage other than the first. Each is identical with respect to parts
complement.
Unit 2035 is the module circuit that functions as a common driver
for both portions of the command detector monitor, while unit 2037 in-
cludes one flip-flop and two drivers.
Unit 2040 contains all of the functional digital word programmer
with the exception of the sync circuits, which are contained in unit 2041.
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Units 2042 through 2045, which accept the event inputs, each include two
functional parts of the system, an event register and an input conditioning
circuit.
Unit 2046 is composed of that portion of the command detector moni-
tor associated with the command detector VCO only. Unit 2047, which de-
velops the state-of-lock signal, and unit 2035 (mentioned above) constitute
the remainder of the command detector monitor.
Unit 2048 includes the event timer circuitry in addition to an input
conditioning circuit.
In all units, the parts complement for circuit modules and other as-
semblies and/or subassemblies was obtained from the appropriate high-
speed or low-speed assembly drawing bill of material. Extra diode in-
puts were considered as redundant if known to be so, or not counted at
all if the redundancy was not evident.
C. Command Detector and Decoder
1. Revised Representation
Continued analysis of the decoder portion of this subsystem
since issuance of the interim report has resulted in some minor book-
keeping revisions to the block diagrams. The changes do not affect the
model because of the general nature of the equations. Due to the sim-
plicity of the diagram changes, only revised exhibits necessary to typify
the changes have been included in this report. Changes that have been
indicated in the typical diagrams included in this report are described
in the remainder of this subsection.
Exhibit 16 shows the implementation of the series and miscellaneous
circuits to which there have been no changes. Exhibit 17 indicates the
implementation of DC-I. It is typical, with the exception of the unit num-
bers, for DC-4 through DC-8. It is to be noted that there have been no
diagram changes associated with these commands. However, DC-4 no
longer goes to the power subsystem, but only to the data encoder; DC-7
and DC-8 do not go to the data encoder, but instead go to the radio
subsystem.
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Exhibit 18 shows the implementation of DC-2. The implication of
the added unit Al is that the active portion of the decoding gate can fail
in a mode resulting in the same consequence as failure of 3054-i. More-
over, such a failure would also have as a consequence the inability to
execute DC-2 to the data encoder. The new diagram illustrates these
consequences.
With the exception of the unit numbers, Exhibit 19 is typical of DC-3,
DC-9 through DC-12, DC-15 through DC-24, DC-26, and DC-27. The re-
sult of the change to the diagrammatic portrayalofthese commands is that
the decoding gate failures are now associated with more than one unit.
However, since the added block is only involved in one path, it is not
given a unit number and its failure rate is included with the adjoining
series unit, i.e., 3055-I in the illustrated diagram. The exact compo-
sition of this unit and the others will be indicated further in the following
subsection and in Appendix A. It is to be noted that DC-3, DC-16, and
DC-24 go to the data automation subsystem, DC-9 through DC-12 to the
radio subsystem, DC-15 and DC-17 through DC-21 to the attitude con-
trol subsystem, DC-23 to the pyrotechnics subsystem, DC-26 to the power
subsystem, andDC-27 to the central computer and sequencer.
Exhibits 20 and 21 now represent the implementation of DC-13 and
DC-14, respectively. The implication of the added units, A2 and A3 is
that the active portion of the decoding gate can fail in a mode resulting
in the same consequence as failure of the -1 units. Note that the con-
sequences of failure of these "A" units are different from Al associated
with DC-2. The reason for this is that failure of the "A" units has a
different effect on IS switches than on IP switches. Actually, the con-
sequences of failure of A2 and A3 are the same as for the unnumbered
unit of Exhibit 19. However, both are common to more than one path
and are therefore given a unit number to assure that theyare not counted
more than once. Exhibit 21 is also typical of DC-25 with the exception
of the unit numbers and the fact that DC-25 goes to the power and pyro-
technics subsystems.
Exhibit 22 shows the implementation of the quantitative command
circuits. There have been no changes in this diagram.
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Z. Unit Failure Rate Definition
As in the data encoder (and other subsystems as well}, in order
to calculate a truly representative failure rate for each unit of the com-
mand detector and decoder, it is necessary to accurately determine the
component parts associated with it and whether any of the parts are used
redundantly. No component redundancy was noted within the command
subsystem. The detailed component part listing, including quantity and
failure rate, can be found in Appendix A. It is the purpose of the remain-
der of this subsection to clarify exactly what the group of parts in Appen-
dix A represents with respect to the documentation.
Referring to the diagrams and/or Appendix A where the units are
numerically ordered, unit 3000 includes all of the command detector ex-
cept the following circuits: one flip-flop, one inverter, one matched filter
amplifier, one dump circuit, two capacitors, and one resistor. Schematic
diagrams were used to determine the parts complement of the circuitmod-
ules used in the unit.
Unit 3001-i concerns those command detector circuits listed in the
preceding paragraph. These circuits are contained wholly within the sync
channel portion of the detector. Their failure, by virtue of their digital
nature, would cause either a continuous indication of in-lock or a continu-
ous indication of out-of-lock, depending on the particular mode of failure.
In general, the circuits used to implement this function have an equal
probability of failing true or false (on or off). On a single failure basis,
then, the unit has equal probability of failing with one continuous indication
as with the other. Failure in-lock would only reduce the probability of ex-
ecuting a false command that had been received via the radio subsystem,
and this is considered inconsequential. Failure out-of-lock would com-
pletely disable the command subsystem and would not allow the execution
of any further commands. Therefore, only half of the total failure rate
for the group of parts is included in unit 3001-i. (See interim report for
further comments regarding this area. )
Unit 3002 contains all of the decoder program control circuits (ex-
cept for the shift register} and their output amplifiers. The first two flip-
flops of the shift register compose unit 3003.
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A limited failure effects analysis was made on the IS and IP switches,
and NAND decoding gates, and the shift register output amplifier-inverters.
Certain failures cause t_ese circuits to assume an "on" state while other
failures cause them to assume an "off" state. The consequence of some
failures is indeterminate. For want of a better alternative, the failure
rate for the indeterminate occurrences has been divided evenly between
the "on" and "off" states. The details of the calculations can be found in
Appendix A.
Unit 3004 consists of an IS switch. Unit 3004-i has a failure rate
associated with it, where failure results in the consequence that there is
a continuous in-lock indication to the data encoder (failure "on"). Unit
3004-2 has a failure rate associated with it where the consequence is no
indication of in-lock (failure "off").
Units 3005 through 3008 and units 3009 through 3020 represent the
last four flip-flop stages of the shift register and all of the shift register
output driver-inverters, respectively. The reader is directed to sub-
section II. B. 2 of the interim report for a discussion of the significance
of the dash numbers associated with these units. The driver-inverters
are handled as described earlier in this subsection. For the flip-flops,
it is assumed by symmetry that the failure rate "on" is equal to the fail-
ure rate "off," and that the sum of failures "on" and "off" constitutes all
of the flip-flop failures.
In the interim report, it was shown that the reliability of a decod-
ing gate is given as
]5,1RDG = R S R O + 6RDo -RDo)
where R S is the reliability of components in series and RDO is the
probability that a diode does not fail open. Here R S = e -Xs and the
failure rate, k , of the series component is determined as described
s
earlier in this section (by failure effects analysis) for units 3021":-"through
3046_:_'. Appendix A provides the necessary details.
The units Al through A4 represent the second failure mode of the
decoding gates in some cases. In the remainder of the cases where this
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failure mode is of consequence, the failure rate is combined with the -l
portion of the switches as described in subsection III. C.I. Thus, the
failure rates for the following units are a combination of failure rates
associated with the decoding gate and the switch as determined from the
failure effects analysis: 3055-1, 3057-I through 3060-1, 3066-1 through
3074-1, 3077-i, and 3078-I. The -2 portion (failure "off") of these units
concerns switch failure "off" only.
Units 3047 through 3054, 3061 through 3065, 3075, and 3076, by
means of their respective dash numbers, include only the failure rates
for the switch failing "on" (-l) or "off" (-2) as described previously and
also as indicated in Appendix A.
Unit 3079 is composed of the transformer-rectifier, as titled, while
unit 3080 is composed of one NAND gate and one switch.
Unit 3081 is a complete decoding gate, unit 3082 is a single flip-
flop, and units 3083 through 3085 include two NAND's and a switch, one
NAND and a switch, and two NAND's and two switches, respectively.
D. Central Computer and Sequencer
The representation of the CC and S has not been altered significantly
from that which was presented in the interim report. Exhibit 23 shows
the configuration of the parts of the CC and S which are used during launch
and acquisition. During this time, the CC and S functions principally as a
clock with specific times being decoded by the launch matrix shown in
unit 405. The three launch commands, L-l, Z-2, and Z-3, are derived
from this matrix.
Prior to each maneuver, the CC and S performs the function of
storing the quantitative commands. Exhibit 24 depicts the manner in
which these commands are routed into the CC and S and are decoded and
registered. Equipment concerned with the registration of the pitch com-
mand only has been separated into units 412 and 413 as shown. Similarly,
units 414 and 415 comprise equipment which is concerned with the roll
command only. In a comparable fashion, unit 416 singles out that equip-
ment which is responsible for the proper registration of the velocity in-
crement command. Separate reliability calculations for each of these
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data insertion functions are not of interest inasmuch as all of them must
be operable if a successful maneuver is to be performed.
Execution of each of the maneuvers demands a large complement
of CC and S parts as illustrated in Exhibit 25. A number of parallel func-
tions must be served in order to generate the sequence of signals which
are utilized by the other subsystems during performance of a maneuver.
These signals are identified as M-l through M-7 and their complements,
and consist of relay closures. The basic CC and S clock is indicated by
the presence of units 402 and 403, and a special maneuver clock is shown
in unit 417.
The principal change in this representation is in the elimination of
unit 423, which has been previously shown in series with units 424 and 444.
Unit 423 was labeled "Pitch and Roll Start Duration Logic" and an exam-
ination of the circuit diagrams reveals that this logic was actually incor-
porated into other units. For the most part, all of these signals and their
complements are required for a successful maneuver; however, from the
standpoint of the total maneuver sequence, signals M-l and M-2 and the
turnoff of the maneuver clock are required only after the second maneuver.
For the major part of its operating time, the CC and S will be con-
figured as in Exhibit 26. Clock functions are provided by the oscillator
402 and the countdown circuits shown in units 403, 404, and 425. The
unique states of the clock are decoded by the master time matrix, unit
426, and signals from the matrix are converted to relay closures as in-
dicated by signals MT-I through MT-6. A cyclic signal, denoted as
CY-I, is derived every 33.3 hours directly from the countdown circuitry.
This cyclic signal had previously been shown as emanating from the master
time matrix, and the representation has been altered to correct this
misinterpretation.
The configuration of the CC and S does not change during the en-
counter phase; however, the particular signals associated with this phase
are shown separately in Exhibit 27. These signals are denoted as MT-7,
MT-8, and MT-9. They function to control the encounter science and data
recording. As with most of the master time signals, these CC and S events
consist of relay closures.
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E. Power Supply
Alterations in the implementation of the power supply have required
a number of revisions in the reliability block diagrams that have been used
to represent this subsystem. The power supply, as configured for the ac-
quisition and maneuver phases, now is as illustrated in Exhibit 28.
The illumination of the solar panels is potentially insufficient during
maneuvers, andthebattery, unit 502, must be relied upon as the principal
source of energy. The battery charger, unit 503, is not actually required
during the acquisition and maneuver phases; however, it is shown in the
diagram to indicate that it must have been operable during a prior phase
if an adequately charged battery is to be available. This unit, 503, also
serves as a load sharing protector, but this function is considered to be
unnecessary until the encounter phase.
Units 516 and 517 have been added to the diagram in order to make
more explicit the representation of the synchronizing source. The crystal
oscillator within the CC and S provides the primary synchronizing signal
at 38.4 kc/s but a redundant L-C oscillator within the power supply can
take over this function with no serious degradation.
Unit 505 comprises the countdown circuitry which generates the
basic 2.4-kc/s spacecraft frequency. Despite its all-inclusive title, unit
504 contains only those circuits which are common to the distribution and
switching functions or which are responsible for the control of other units
within the power supply itself.
The use of two booster regulators was recognized in previous repre-
sentations of the power supply; however, no redundancy had existed be-
tween these regulators during the maneuver or acquisition phases. A
change in the design of booster regulator number 2 now makes it possible
to introduce unit 515 which indicates a one-way redundancy whereby
booster regulator number 2 can take over the main inverter loads in the
event of a failure of regulator number i. The redundancy is one-way in
the sense that regulator number 1 is not capable of supplying the maneu-
ver loads.
During the cruise and post-encounter phases, the spacecraft will
normally be oriented so that the solar panels will be illuminated by the
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sun. Thus, unit 501 is shown as the primary source of energy in Exhibit
29. The principal function of the power supply during these extended pe-
riods is to provide a 2.4-kc/s source of power for all spacecraft loads.
Hence, it will be noted from the diagram that operation of the main in-
verter, unit 508, is the principal requirement for reliability.
Since maneuver loads are not normally anticipated during cruise,
the number Z booster regulator, unit 507, becomes switchably redundant to
booster regulator number i, unit 506. Switching is accomplished as before
through unit 515. The standby sychronizing source is shown explicitly as
unit 516, and thefrequency division function again is incorporated in unit
505. Although the main inverter is capable of free running, dependence
on a synchronization signal is indicated inasmuch as the lack of degradation
associated with uncontrolled frequency has not been satisfactorily
demonstrated.
Unit 950 represents the probability that sun orientation will not be
lost due to a noncatastrophic impact on the spacecraft. Should such an
impact occur, reacquisition must take place, andthis would require the
use of the maneuver inverter and other units such as the battery.
The added load on the power supply during the encounter phase in-
troduces the possibility that the solar panels will not be able to supply the
required energy. In such a case the battery would be required to sustain
spacecraft power. This possibility would evidently arise if the solar cells
had suffered degradation due to such effects as proton bombardment in
the earlier phases of the mission. The probability that solar panel degra-
dation will not occur is indicated in Exhibit 30 by unit 951, and the battery
and its share protector are shown as redundant to this probability. In the
previous representations of the power supply, the share protector func-
tioned as a series unit; however, it is now made clear that this unit, 503,
would be needed only in the event that the battery was called upon.
The addition of units 516 and 517 to provide redundant synchronization
sources was noted above, and they have been added to this diagram. One
further change in the analysis of the power supply during the encounter
phase is indicated by the solid line around unit 510. This represents a
decision that the 400-cycle synchronization source is not absolutely
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necessary for the operation of the single-phase inverter, and that no
degradation would ensue in the event of a failure of this source.
F. Attitude Control
The initial operation of the attitude control system is the acquisi-
tion of the sun, and the connection of reliability units for this function is
shown in Exhibit 31. Unit 602 now consists of the cadmium sulphide sun
sensors only, and does not contain any electronics as previously indicated.
Unit 604 has been eliminated and unit 605 has been assigned to the trans-
former rectifier within the attitude control logic. Unit 605 had previously
been denoted as the Canopus acquisition gate and placed in series with the
gyros; however, it is now clear that gyro control during the sun acquisition
phase will not be dependent upon the Canopus acquisition gate.
It was previously decided that gyro rate feedback would be essential
to the normal mode of stabilization during the acquisition phase. Other
possible forms of stabilization included the use of special sun sensors
which would reset the derived rate stabilization integrator; this had
been shown as a degraded mode of sun acquisition in view of the longer
time required. It has now been determined that derived rate or switch-
ing amplifier compensation, even without the action of the reset sun sen-
sors, will be considered satisfactory for normal operation of the space-
craft. Accordingly, unit 610 is shown as completely redundant to the
gyro stabilization system. Units 611, 612, and 613 represent the cold
gas valves in the pitch and yaw axes. These units, with their associated
switching amplifiers, are, of course, required for the application of con-
trol torques about these axes.
The sun tracking system is illustrated in Exhibit 32. The principal
changes which have been made in this representation are concerned with
the cruise sun sensors. These sun sensors, shown as unit 614, had
previously been associated with a certain amount of unspecified electronic
circuitry. This circuitry has now been explicitly defined as consisting of
a zener diode regulator. Unit 605 replaces unit 604 and represents the
transformer rectifier contained within the attitude control logic. The only
further change in this reliability block diagram is the elimination of
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discrete command 13, which had been shown as redundant to CC and S
signal g-3. Although this command is indeed redundant to signal L-3,
the likelihood of its usage is considered negligible, since its primary
function is to inhibit the maneuver.
Unit 615, the solar vane stabilization, has not previously been de-
fined in detail. This is accomplished to some extent in Exhibit 33, which
illustrates unit 615e, consisting of the activation relay necessary to
energize this stabilization system. The system is divided between the
pitch and yaw axes by separating it into four units, namely 616a, b, c,
and d. These units are identical and each consists of a stepping motor,
associated gear train, and the necessary control electronics. It will be
observed that they have been arranged in redundant pairs, which illus-
trates that only one solar vane in each axis is required for stabilization.
The duty cycle on these main control units has been investigated,
and it has been estimated that complete stabilization will have been
achieved after approximately 1,000 operations of each stepping motor.
In turn, it is estimated that this will have occurred after approximately
333 hours following the final midcourse maneuver. During this time,
the gear motors are considered to be operating at a 5 percent duty cycle,
and following this period it is assumed that no significant operations take
place. On the other hand, it is assumed that the associated electronics
must remain operable throughout the entire mission if a unit failure is to
be avoided.
The ultimate effect of this stabilization system is to reduce the duty
cycle on the pitch and yaw cold gas valves. Without the solar vane stabi-
lization system, a duty cycle of four operations per hour per valve is as-
surned throughout the cruise phase of the mission. With solar vane stabi-
lization operable, the valve duty cycle is reduced to three operations per
hour as an average for the first 333 hours following maneuver. After this
time, no further operations of the cold gas valves are anticipated. It
should be noted that this solar vane stabilization applies only to the pitch
and yaw axes.
Exhibit 34 shows the reliability diagram for the star acquisition
function. This does not appear to be essentially different from that which
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was presented in the interim report except that unit 605, the Canopus ac-
quisition gate, has been eliminated. Unit 617, previously designated as
the light gate, has now been retitled Canopus gate. Unit 617 now contains
all circuitry which is concerned with preventing acquisition of targets
outside the specified brightness range, as well as the logic which switches
the roll control from a search mode to an acquired mode. Although com-
mand DC-15 has been designated as the light gate override, a study of its
function indicates that it causes the logic to become fixed in the acquired
mode. Thus, the brightness gate has no function when DC-15 has been
exercised and the only way a search mode can be instituted is by the
exercising of command DC-21, the roll override.
It is important to note that the probability of acquiring the correct
target, as indicated by unit 952, becomes effectively zero if unit 617 is
not operating. In other words, without an operable brightness gate and
with the logic fixed in the acquisition mode, it is almost certain that some
target other than Canopus will be acquired. Thus; it can be seen that the
exercising of command DC-15 will require that command DC-21 be avail-
able until Canopus is acquired.
A further change in the star acquisition diagram is the addition of
unit 510 in the makeup of the 400-cycle three-phase supply. This is a
synchronization source which must be operable for successful operation
of this supply. It should also be noted that rate stabilization derived from
the roll gyro is essential to the proper acquisition of Canopus. Roll torques
are developed by the redundant valves and nozzles, units 620 and 621,
which are activated by the roll switching amplifier, unit 619.
An additional failure mode has been introduced into the model by
recognizing the cross coupling which exists between the roll valves and
the pitch and yaw valves. This coupling is illustrated in Exhibit 35, where
it is shown that common gas supplies are used for all three axes. Should
any valve fail in the open condition, it will exhaust its associated gas sup-
ply and destroy the redundancy which exists in all three axes. The pre-
vious representation had treated the roll control system as independent
of the pitch and yaw control system.
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Exhibit 36 depicts the unit configuration required to maintain roll
orientation, and it will be noted that alternative operating paths are allowed
for.
In the primary path, unit 617 (previously the light gate) now is de-
scribed as the Canopus gate as explained above. Unit 627 has been added
to account for those portions of the Canopus sensor electronics which are
concerned solely with the updating of the cone angle. This unit includes
the relay ring counter and associated driving circuits.
In the analysis which is part of this study, the inertial roll control
operating path is considered as degraded only in the sense that it will not
be called upon until 50 hours before encounter. Given that all equipment
operates as designed, inertial control is not considered to be inferior to
automatic star tracking as a means of maintaining roll orientation. It is
clear, however, that this alternative scheme is less reliable and involves
more equipment. For this reason, it has been arbitrarily excluded as an
operating means until 50 hours before encounter. It is assumed that the
operating path designated as free roll would be followed in the event of a
failure of the automatic star tracking system until 50 hours prior to en-
counter. In the free roll mode, it is assumed that science measurements
are of no value, but that engineering measurements continue to carry full
value. The possible side effects which might arise because of a free roll-
ing spacecraft, such as upset in the thermal balance or interactions with
the pitch and yaw control, have not been considered.
G. Trajectory Corrections
Nearly all of the spacecraft subsystems are required for the execu-
tion of a successful midcourse maneuver; however, the attitude control
subsystem appears to be most closely tied in with this operation. The
midcourse maneuver reliability diagram shown in Exhibit 37 has not been
altered significantly from that which was presented in the interim report.
It had been assumed that command DC-14 might have to be executed in
order to remove the maneuver inhibit; however, it was learned that this
is not likely to be true for a normal maneuver.
The more important attitude control units required for the maneu-
ver are shown in the large box in the exhibit. Other units, such as those
PRC R-362
63
I
iooi
N
1
1_2. I
_3
<
o_
<
O0
I
_D
PRC R-36Z
64
Z
D
o
<
I
p_
_ al N o"
N dO
_O C__> _ _
_ _ _"_ I_ N _ _ N
>_ ,-.1 N'_ 0
>_ _0 0
o
o
OO
L)
O
!
L)
o o
L)
_0
J
r_
I
mo
A
OD
NN
_0
° _
b-
|
I
<
t
_Z
< <
>
PQ
Z
<
0O
m
o
L)
I
t'-
r_
E_
>¢
PRC R-362
65
from the command subsystem and the central computer and sequencer,
together with the turn command generator, are shown in series with this
large box. The only two units which function specifically for the mid-
course maneuver are 701 and 702, the autopilot and midcourse motor
r e spe ctively.
The capability for execution of two midcourse maneuvers has been
designed into the equipment by the replication of the pyrotechnically oper-
ated valves which initiate and stop the propulsion. This redundancy is
indicated by the parallel paths in the exhibit. Units 953 and 954 allow
for an estimation of the operational probability that an accurate maneu-
ver will be executed.
H. Radio Subsystem
Discussions regarding the radio subsystem and an examination of the
performance margin curves have resulted in certain changes to the repre-
sentation of this subsystem.
Exhibit 38 depicts the receiver antenna control. Allowance had been
made for failure of the excitation circuits associated with the ferrite circu-
lators which accomplish this control. Such a failure is equivalent to the
loss of the isolation properties of these circulators and is likely to result
in a 3-db loss of received power. However, the predicted performance
margin for the DSIF-Spacecraft link is sufficiently high to allow this loss
to be ignored. Accordingly, unit 805, the magnetization circuits for the
circulator switches, no longer appears in this diagram.
The parallel low-gain and high-gain paths appear to indicate a re-
dundancy, and it had been assumed that such a redundancy did exist at
least for a portion of the mission. This has been verified, and it is now
estimated that the receiver can be operated from either the low-gain or
high-gain antenna during the period t17 to t20 on the mission profile.
The receiver itself is shown in Exhibit 39. A study of the circuit
diagrams has disclosed that the ranging channel, units 811 and 812, is
fed from the first IF unit (808). This had previously been represented
as being dependent only upon unit 807, the transformer rectifier. The
other units for the receiver have been regrouped for reliability purposes
and retitled.
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The two primary functions of the receiver are to supply coherent
excitation of the transmitter and to strip off the command subcarriers.
Both of these functions appear to be dependent upon all of the receiver
units and are now depicted in that fashion.
The starting point for the radio transmitter is the representation
of the redundant oscillators or exciters as shown in Exhibit 40. It will
be noted that the voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) is the primary source
of excitation, but that redundant auxiliary oscillators are automatically
switched in, should the VCO output fail. Parallel exciters are employed
for reliability purposes, and switching between them is accomplished by
ferrite circulator switch 5. The control logic for this switch has been
divided between units 816 and 820. No actual circuit diagrams of the con-
trol logic were available for this study; however, a parts count was avail-
able and, for want of necessary details, this was apportioned equally to the
various units which accomplish the switching functions.
A significant change was made in the composition of units 815 and
819. These units had previously been assigned as the exciter level de-
tectors, but no information on their composition could be made available.
Accordingly, the exciter level detectors and the redundant command DC-8
have been eliminated, a step resulting in an optimistic prediction of re-
liability. These unit numbers have been reassigned to the exciter trans-
former rectifiers. Unit 822, which had previously been designated as
the exciter transformer rectifier, has been eliminated.
The loss of excitation for the circulator switch, which could come
about through failure of units 804 or 821, would result in a 3-db drop in
the exciter output. This reduction in drive power would become signifi-
cant shortly before encounter, as is indicated by the presence of the box
marked "Before t23. "
The exciters provide drive power for the transmitter power ampli-
fiers illustrated in Exhibit 41. This block diagram is similar to that
which was constructed for the interim report, except that the power level
detectors, units 828 and 832, have been removed. The makeup of these
detectors could not be ascertained, and it was not possible to include them;
this represents another step leading to optimism in the prediction of
reliability.
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The redundancy of the power amplifiers is made clear by the dia-
gram, which also shows that switching between them is accomplished by
establishing the proper combinations of circulator switches 3 and 4. The
control logic for these switches, units 829, 830, 833, and 834, was de-
rived from an apportionment of the parts complement as previously de-
scribed. Failure of the excitation to these switches, which could arise
from a failure of units 804 or 835, is not considered significant until
time t23 on the mission profile, at which point the 3-db loss would be-
come catastrophic.
Transmitter antenna control is depicted in Exhibit 42. The principal
change in this diagram is the addition of unit 804 in series with the mag-
netization circuits for circulator switches CS-I and CS-2. This addition
is not a change, but merely makes the dependence upon the switching
transformer rectifier more explicit.
The parallel connection of a low-gain antenna path and high-gain an-
tenna path would indicate redundancy in a manner similar to that of the
receiver antenna control. A study of the performance margin on the
Spacecraft-DSIF link reveals that no such redundancy exists and that
the operating coverage of the antennas does not overlap. As shown by
the time blocks in the diagram, a communications blackout can be antici-
pated between tl9 and t20 on the mission profile.
I. Pyrotechnic Control
The basic functions of current storage and control for the pyro-
technics are illustrated in Exhibit 43. This representation does not dif-
fer from that which was previously submitted; however, a design change
has affected the makeup of units 904, 905, 909, and 910. These units,
which represent the rectifiers and capacitors, no longer have redundant
charge-limiting resistors, although the feature of redundant rectifiers
has been retained.
The pyrotechnics which are involved in the deployment of the solar
panels are shown in Exhibit 44. Design changes have caused the introduc-
tion of units 928 and 929 which serve as isolation filters for the CC and S
L-i signal. The fact that the latches and pin pullers are actually com-
bined has been recognized by the elimination of the pin puller boxes.
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In the previous representation, the firing current for silicon-
controlled rectifiers, units 913 and 915, was supplied by units 912 and
914 respectively. This dependency has been eliminated by a design change,
and the diagram reflects the new configuration. The additional function of
unlatching the science scan platform has been added to the diagram. The
hardware associated with the mechanical deployment of the panels is ex-
plicitly shown in units 934, 935, and 936.
Pyrotechnic events associated with the midcourse maneuver are
illustrated in Exhibit 45. This is essentially the same diagram as that
submitted with the interim report; however, it is now made clear that re-
dundant bridge wires rather than squibs are used for the explosive Valves.
Separate silicon-controlled rectifiers are used for each of the maneuvers,
and the additional rectifiers are identified as units 924, 925, 926, and
927. The fact that the arming relays, K-2, K-2', K-4, and K-4' are needed
only for the second maneuver is indicated on the diagram.
J. Normal Mission Profile
The various configurations of reliability units constituting the space-
craft subsystems have been described in the foregoing subsections. These
representations indicate, in a general way, that different configurations
may apply to each subsystem at specific points in time throughout the mis-
sion. It is essential, however, that the concept of time-changing require-
ments for unit functions be introduced into the reliability analysis in an
exact manner. For example, the function of the battery charger in the
power supply is fulfilled within two weeks following the second maneuver.
It is then deenergized, but it may be required in a redundant capacity at
encounter. This scheduling of unit requirements must be dealt with in an
explicit fashion if meaningful calculations are to be made.
The most convenient display of such a schedule is a mission time
profile which lists all of the reliability units and states the manner in
which each unit enters the operating picture during each part of the mis-
sion. The mission itself is, accordingly, divided into discrete intervals
marking the occurrence of important events such as maneuvers, acquisi-
tions, switching times, and so on through the actual encounter and post-
encounter events.
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Exhibit 46, comprising the next several pages, shows the exact
mission profile used in this reliability assessment. Information regard-
ing the required or scheduled status of any unit at any time can be ob-
tained from this tabulation. This extends to sufficient detail to differen-
tiate between an in-line or series requirement and a requirement where
the unit is serving in a redundant capacity. The state of energization of
the unit also is shown.
PRC R-362
78
Z
O
O
Z
Z
Z
0
I
X
\
\
\
c c
¢
M
PRC R-362
79
O
qD
\
.A
>.
u _
c
_io,,__
PRC R-36Z
8O
o,.,I
O
X
\
T
u
M
PRC R-362
81
A
a)
,1"1
4.b
0
L_
oo o
oo o
oo O
oO o
oo o
_== OO _.-
I
i
==_= ==
==_= _= ====
"0"0
• __ _
_. - _ _ _o_::. '7
V.
PRC R-36g
82
°,-4
O
v
_D
\
-o-o
m .o
g_
_io,,
¢
PRC R-362
83
A
O
v
\
o o
o o
o
v
o
o o _- A e
'-o-o
o o _
o o
o Q r,- A _ _ •
"-o'-o
A
A
o o _ _ _ _ _
A
o o
o o
• • _ e • • _ e
e _ • G • e • e e
. - u
i"
c
_ _ _._,,
PRC R-36Z
84
"0
0
CD
\
o o =% =---o=E= =---=-- =% _5 _% o =
>
• u
u
'0"o
u
PRC R-362
85
O
_D
v
le le le le le le
_o_oo _ooo oo_ooo_oo_
_o oo....--..ooo_ ¢
PRC R- 362
86
O
_D
v
\
I®
_o_oo_ _ __oo_
c
m u
/:
W
PRC R-362
87
A
O
0 O o 0 o _ 0 o o o w = _ o o o o o o o o o o
0 0 o o o _ o o ¢) o ¢ _ _ o ¢) o o o o o o o o
• >"
u
PRC R-362
88
O
_D
\
o_oQ
w_
_w
ww
oooo w_
oooo_ _w
2 2 2 2222_ _ _ .... m
PRC R-362
89
O
_D
v
x
\
PRC R-362
90
EXHIBIT 46 (Continued): REMARKS
i.
,
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I0.
iI.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Z4.
25.
Z6.
27.
A non-time-dependent unit. Its probability of surviving the inter-
val{s) shown is based on a failure rate per number of expected
cycles for that interval.
3005-I
3005-Z
3006-1
3006-Z
3007-1
3007-Z
3008-1
3008-Z
3009
3010
3011
301Z
3013
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3024*
3026*
3030*
3035*
3037*
3038*
Required for DC-6 and DC-15; redundant to selected units
of the data encoder and Canopus gate.
(same as 2)
(same as 2)
Required for DC-15, redundant to Canopus gate only.
(same as 2)
Redundant to selected units of CC and S
(same as Z)
(same as 7)
Required for DC-27; after t13, redundant to selected units
of CC and S.
(same as 2)
(same as 2)
(same as 5)
(same as 2 and 7)
(same as 7)
(same as 5)
Required for DC-6,
units and CC and S.
(same as 7)
(same as 2 and 7)
(same as i0)
(same as Z and 7)
(same as 7)
Required for DC-6,
encoder.
redundant to selected data encoder
redundant to selected units of data
Redundant to selected units of CC and S.
(same as 5)
(same as 7)
Redundant to Canopus tracking.
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Z8. 3041,
29. 3044* (same as
30. 3045* (same as
31. 3051-2 (same as
32. 3059-I (same as
33. 3066-I (same as
34. 3066-2 (same as
35. 401
36. 4O3
37. 408
Redundant to the probability unit 951, the probability
the solar panels do not degrade to the extent the battery
is required.
7)
7)
i7)
27)
5)
s)
Redundant to 516 throughout mission; redundant to miscel-
laneous commands beginning at t18.
Redundant to miscellaneous commands beginning at t18"
Subject to failure only at the beginning of the time interval
shown.
38. 425 (same as 36)
39. 426 (same as 36)
40. 427 Redundant to
41. 427a (same as 40)
42. 428 (same as 40)
43. 428a (same as 40)
44. 429 (same as 401
45. 429a (same as 40)
46. 430 (same as 40)
47. 430a (same as 40)
48. 431 Redundant to
49. 431a (same as 48)
50. 43Z Redundant to
51. 432a (same as 50)
52. 433 Redundant to
53. 433a (same as 52)
54. 434 Redundant to
55. 434a (same as 54)
DC-17.
DC-I O.
DC-II.
Canopustracking; not needed in normal path.
DC-25.
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56. 435
57. 435a
58. 436
59. 436a
60. 502
61. 503
62. 506
63. 507
64. 509
65. 510
66. 511
67. 513
68. 515
69. 516
70. 517
71. 602
72. 603
73. 606
74. 607
75. 6O8
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
610
612
613
615
616
617
618
620
Redundant to DC-26.
(same as 56)
Redundant to DC-4.
(same as 58}
Redundant to 950, the probability of noncatastrophic
impact and to 951, the probability the solar panels do
not degrade.
Used to t15 +168 hours.
507.
506 and 950.
950.
Redundant to
Redundant to
Redundant to
(same as 64)
(same as 64)
(same as 64}
Redundant to
Redundant to
Redundant to
Redundant to
Redundant to
Re dundant to
Redundant
Re dundant
to 950.
Redundant
Redundant
Redundant
506 and 507.
517 and selected units of CC and S.
516 and selected units of CC and S.
95O.
950.
950 and to inertial
to 950 and to inertial
and energized, related unit 610;
roll control.
roll control.
0, e related
to 608, 607, 606, 510, 511, 513, and 509.
to 613 and cross-coupled with 620.
to 612 and cross-coupled with 621.
Not needed in usual sense; affects failure rates of 612
and 613.
Redundant to inertial roll control.
Redundant to DC- 15.
Redundant to 950.
Redundant to 621 and cross-coupled with 612.
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84. 6ZI Redundant to 620 and cross-coupled with 613.
85. 622 Redundant to inertial roll control.
86. 623 Redundant to Canopus acquisition.
87. 627 Redundant to inertial roll control.
88. 801 Redundant to Canopus tracking.
89. 806 Redundant to Canopus tracking.
90. 813 Redundant to 817, 818, 820.
91. 814 (same as 90)
92. 815 (same as 90)
93. 816 (same as 90)
94. 817 Redundant to 813, 814, 816.
95. 818 (same as 94)
96. 819 (same as 94)
97. 820 (same as 94)
98. 827 Redundant to 831, 833, 834.
99. 831 Redundant to 827, 829, 830.
100. 901 Redundant to 906, 907, 908, 909, 910.
i01. 902 (same as i00)
102. 903 (same as 100)
103. 904 (same as I00)
I04. 905 (same as i00)
105. 906 Redundant to 901, 902, 903, 904, 905.
106. 907 (same as 105)
107. 908 (same as 105)
108. 909 (same as 105)
109. 910 (same as I05)
ii0. 911 Redundant to 928 and 929.
lll. 912 Related to 914, see diagram.
112. 913 Related to 915, see diagram.
113. 914 Related to 912, see diagram.
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EXHIBIT 46 (Continued): REMARKS
114.
115.
116.
I17.
I18.
I19
120
121
122
123
124.
125
126
127
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
915 Related to 913, see diagram.
916 Related to 917, 925, branch 2,
917 Related to 916, 924, branch I,
918 Related to 919, 927, branch 2,
919 Related to 918, 926, branch i,
920 Related to 921 and branch Z,
921 Related to 920 and branch i,
922 Related to 923 and branch 2,
923 Related to 922 and branch i,
924 Related to 917, 925, branch 2,
925 Related to 916, 924, branch I,
926 Related to 919, 927, branch 2,
927 Related to 918, 926, branch i,
928 Redundant to 91 I.
929 Redundant to 91 I.
930 Redundant to 931 and branch 2,
931 Redundant to 930 and branch I,
932 Redundant to DC-Z5.
933 Redundant to DC-25.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
see diagrams.
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IV. NUMERICAL ASSESSMENT
A. Unit Failure Rates
The extensive unit breakdown which has resulted from the analysis
of each subsystem provides the flexibility required to recognize and ac-
count for the many configurations of the system, allowing it to reach at
least some (if not all) of the mission objectives. To conduct a numerical
assessment, it is essential that a failure rate be assigned to each unit.
This is accomplished by enumerating the piece parts which compose each
unit and summing the part failure rates. The details of this parts count-
ing activity are contained in Appendix A, and the component failure rates
which have been employed are listed in Appendix B.
As an aid to interpreting the numerical results presented, a sum-
mary of the estimated unit failure rates is shown in Exhibit 47. From
this tabulation, it is possible to identify those units that significantly de-
grade reliability, and, conversely, those which have little effect on it.
Since this property is sometimes merely a function of the number of parts
embraced by a unit, the total number of parts within each unit also is
given.
B. Classical Reliability
The introduction of worth assignments to account for degraded op-
erating paths is a concept which finds greatest applicability in consider-
ation of a total system charged with the accomplishment of a number of
specified objectives. It generally happens that meeting an objective de-
mands the operability of a group of equipments which cannot be described
by a simple functional name. This is often a set of functional subsys-
tems, or parts thereof, which, operating in combination, produce the de-
sired result. Thus, a system viewpoint of reliability, developed by means
of the figure-of-merit technique, will be concerned with the computation
of reliability of such combinations of equipment.
This tends to leave unanswered those questions (of special interest
to the subsystem designer) regarding the reliability of discrete subsys-
tems or the probability of successful occurrence of interesting events
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EXHIBIT 47 - UNIT FAILURE RATES
Unit
Number
Science Equipment
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Data Encoder
l
Z001
Z002
2003-1
2003-2
2003-3
2003-4
2004-1
Z004-g
2005
2006
2007
2008
Z010
Z011
Z01Z-I
Name
Cover Latch
Hinge and Actuating Spring
Motor and Gearing
Scan Electronics
Recorder Mechanism:
During Mission
At Encounter Only
Record Electronics
Playback Electronic s
Rate Generator
Mode Selector
Switching Circuits (Partial)
Switching Circuits (Partial)
Switching Circuits (Partial)
Switching Circuits (Partial)
PNG "OR" (Partial)
PNG "OR" (Partial)
PNG "A"
PNG "B"
Power Supply
Modulator
Mixer Amplifier
Data Selector
ADC "OR" (Partial)
Number of
Components
1
2
3
223
31
3O
iZl
i,I00
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
.02
1.07a (I)
10.38
35.98
9.80
93.04
15.10
70.16
185 16.03 (2)
99 17.55 (2)
6 3.60
116 11.51 (2)
0 0
0 0
91 5.33 (2)
91 5.33 (2)
188 8.70 (2)
188 8.70 (2)
127 19.25
192 13.12
17 1.6Z
194 I0.00 (z)
15 1.29
Note s : (1) a = actuations.
(Z) Failure rate for series components only. See Appendix A for
computation of rate for remaining components.
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number
Data Encoder (continued)
2012-2
2013
Z014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Z019
ZOZO
ZOZI
2022
2023
2025
2025-i i00
ZOZ5-Z i00
2025-3 100
2025-4 i00
2025-5 100
2025-6 i00
2025-7 100
Z025-8 100
2025-9 i00
2025-10 100
2026 110
2027 200
2028 212
Name
ADC "OR" (Partial)
ADC "A"
ADC "B"
Isolation Amplifier "A"
Isolation Amplifier "B"
I0, iI, and Medium-Speed Drive
Science Selection Circuits
Master Counter
100 Synchronizer
200 Synchronizer
300 Synchronizer
Word Sync Amplifier
100 Sequencer
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Partial)
Sequencer (Same as
i00 Sequencer)
Sequencer (Same as
i00 Sequencer)
Sequencer (Same as
1 O0 Sequencer)
Number of
Components
15
18
18
23
23
86
49
89
29
29
29
14
77
23
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
77
77
77
Failure Rate,
X x 10-6/hour
1.29
2.20
2.20
5.50
5.50
6.30
3.77
5.91
2.56
2.56
2.56
1.00
9.O8
1.92
.78
.78
.78
.78
.78
.78
.78
.78
.78
9.08
9.08
9.08
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Numb e r
Data Encoder (continued)
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2037
g038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
Z052-2053
2054-2063
Name
Number of
Components
i. 5-Volt Bucking Supply
300 Sequencer {Same as
i00 Sequencer)
401 Sequencer {Same as
I00 Sequencer)
1.5-Volt Bucking Supply
4Z3 Sequencer {Same as
i00 Sequencer)
0.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Driver
40, 41, 42, 43 Drive
Low-Speed Deck Position
Indicator
Transfer Register
Digital Word Programmer
Sync Circuits
Event Register, No. 1
Event Register, No. 2
Event Register, No. 3
Event Register, No. 4
Command Detector Monitor (VCO)
Command Detector Monitor
(In/Out Lock)
Event Timer
0.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Low-Level Amplifier
101 Switch, Single Pole
10Z-103 Switches, Single Pole
105-114 Switches, Single Pole
77
77
9
77
12
13
Z4
149
118
342
64
22
22
22
22.
232
42
283
12
57
22
22
22
Failure Rate,
Xx l0-6/hour
1.31
9.08
9.08
1.31
9.08
1.34
.85
1.68
10.09
8.88
Z6.08
5.20
1.59
1.59
1.59
1.59
17.32
2.4Z
16.97
1.34
9.15
4.75
4.75
4.75
EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
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Unit
Numb er
Data Encoder (continued)
2064-2066 117
2068-2076 202
2077-2080 213
2081 -2089 221
2090-2099 300
2100
2101
ZI02-2104
2105
2106
2107
2108-2109
ZllO-ZllZ
2113-2114
2115-ZI16
2117-2124
ZIZ5-ZIZ8
2129-2130
2131
2132-2143
2144-2145
2146-2149
2151
Name
-119 Switches, Single Pole
-Z10 Switches, Single Pole
-216 Switches, Single Pole
-229 Switches, Single Pole
-309 Switches, Single Pole
403 Switch (T), Double Pole
406 Switch (T), Double Pole
415-417 Switches, Single Pole
4ZZ Switch, Single Pole
425 Switch, Single Pole
427 Switch, Single Pole
Zll-212 Switches (T),
Double Pole
Z17-Z19 Switches (T),
Double Pole
401-402 Switches (T),
Double Pole
404-405 Switches (T),
Double Pole
407-414 Switches (T),
Double Pole
418-421 Switches (T),
Double Pole
423-424 Switches (T),
Double Pole
426 Switch (T), Double Pole
428-439 Switches (T),
Double Pole
10-11 Switches, Single Pole
40-43 Switches, Single Pole
Current Generator
Number of
Components
22
22
22
22
22
27
27
22
22
22
22
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
22
22
12
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.75
3.25
3.25
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.75
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
4.75
4.75
i.67
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Failure Rate,
Unit Number of -6-
Number Name Components X x i0 /hour
Command Detection and Decoding
3000 Command Detector (Partial) 79Z 6Z.35
3001 - 1 Command Detector (Partial) 30 Z.Z3
3002 Programming Logic and Counter 3Z1 Z3.84
3003 Shift Register, Stages 1 and 2 4Z Z.IZ
3004-I In Lock Switch (Partial) Il .346
3004-2 In Lock Switch (Partial) lZ 1.76
3005-i Shift Register (Partial) I 1 .68
3005-2 (Same as 3005-1) Ii .68
3006-I (Same as 3005-1) II .68
3006-Z (Same as 3005-i) II .68
3007-I (Same as 3005-I) II .68
3007-Z (Same as 3005-1) II .68
3008-I (Same as 3005-i) Ii .68
3008-2 (Same as 3005-i) ii .68
3009-3020 Shift Register Drivers (Partial) IZ 1.76
307.I*-3046" Decoding Gate (Partial) (3} (3)
3081" Decoding Gate (3) (3)
3047-1 DC-1 Switch (Partial) 5 .223
3047-Z DC-I Switch (Partial) 7 1.35
3048- 1 DC-ZA Switch (Partial) 5 .223
3048-2 DC-ZA Switch (Partial) 7 1.35
3049-1 DC -4A Switch (Partial) 5 .223
3049-2 DC-4A Switch (Partial) 7 I.35
3050-i DC-5 Switch (Partial) 5 .223
3050-Z DC-5 Switch (Partial) 7 1.35
Note: (3} For number of component parts and unit failure rates, see
Appendix A, section 2.
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Numb e r
Command Detection
3051 -I DC-6
Name
and Decoding (continued)
Switch (Partial)
3051 -2
305Z-I
3052-2
3053-I
3053-Z
3054-I
3054-2
3055-I
3055-2
3057-I
3057-Z
3058-I
3058-2
3059-1
3059-2
3060-i
3060-2
3061 -I
3061 -2
306Z-I
306Z-Z
3063-I
3063-Z
3064-I
3064-2
3065-1
3065-Z
DC-6 Switch (Partial)
DC-7 Switch (Partial)
DC-7 Switch (Partial)
DC-8 Switch (Partial)
DC-8 Switch (Partial)
DC-ZB Switch (Partial)
DC-ZB Switch (Partial)
DC-3 Switch (Partial)
DC-3 Switch (Partial)
DC-9 Switch (Partial)
DC-9 Switch (Partial)
DC- 10 Switch (Partial)
DC- l0 Switch (Partial)
DC-I 1 Switch (Partial)
DC- 11 Switch (Partial)
DC- lZ Switch (Partial)
DC- 1 g Switch (Partial)
DC- 13A Switch (Partial)
DC- 13A Switch (Partial)
DC- 13B Switch (Partial)
DC- 13B Switch (Partial)
DC- 13C Switch (Partial)
DC- 13C Switch (Partial)
DC- 14A Switch (Partial)
DC- 14A Switch (Partial)
DC-14B Switch (Partial)
DC-14B Switch (Partial)
Number of
Components
5
7
5
7
5
7
Ii
iZ
16
IX
16
12
16
12
16
IZ
16
12
ii
IZ
Ii
12
ii
12
Ii
12
ll
12
Failure Rate,
X x 10-6/hour
.223
1.35
.223
1.35
.223
1.35
.346
1.76
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.5O6
1.76
.346
1.76
.346
1.76
.346
1.76
.346
1.76
•346
1.76
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number Name
Command Detection and Decoding (continued)
3066-I DC-I 5 Switch (Partial)
3066-2
3067-I
3067-2
3068-1
3068-Z
3069-1
3069-Z
3070-1
3070-Z
3071 -I
3071 -Z
307Z-I
307Z-Z
3073-1
3073-Z
3074-I
3074-Z
3075-i
3075-2
3076-I
3076-Z
3077-I
3077-2
3078-I
3078-Z
3079
3080
DC-1 5 Switch (Partial)
DC- 16 Switch (Partial)
DC- 16 Switch (Partial)
DC-I 7 Switch (Partial)
DC- 17 Switch (Partial)
DC- 18 Switch (Partial)
DC- 18 Switch (Partial)
DC- 19 Switch (Partial)
DC- 19 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z0 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z0 Switch (Partial)
DC-21 Switch (Partial)
DC-Zl Switch (Partial)
DC-Z3 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z3 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z4 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z4 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z5A Switch (Partial)
DC-ZSA Switch (Partial)
DC-Z5B Switch (Partial)
DC-Z5B Switch (Partial)
DC-26 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z6 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z7 Switch (Partial)
DC-Z7 Switch (Partial)
T tans former- Re ctifier
Amplifier and Sync Switch
Number of
Components
16
iZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
16
iZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
ii
IZ
ii
iZ
16
IZ
16
IZ
19
14
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.5O6
1.76
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.506
1.76
.5O6
1.76
.506
1.76
.5O6
1.76
.346
1.76
.346
1.76
.506
1.76
.5O6
1.76
3.44
2.08
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number Name
Command Detection and Decoding (continued)
3082 Control Flip- Flop
3083 Event Logic and Switch
3084 CC and S Alert Logic and Switch
3085 CC and S Sync and QC Logic
and Switches
Central Computer and Sequencer
401
402
403
404
405
4O6
406a
407
407a
408
408a
4O9
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
Transformer -Rectifier
O scillator
l-pps, 25-pps, and l-ppm
Counter
Magnetic Divider (i/ i000)
Launch Matrix
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Input Decoder
Address Register
Maneuver Duration
(Readin- Readout)
Pitch Maneuver Duration
Pitch Polarity Set
Roll Maneuver Duration
Roll Polarity Set
Velocity Maneuver Duration
Maneuver Clock
Number of
Components
22
23
15
35
23
8O
322
92
46
16
2
16
2
16
2
268
89
116
87
18
87
18
89
107
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
1.36
2.88
2.23
5.33
4.60
7.82
25.44
6.33
9.48
1.55
.75
1.55
.75
1.55
.75
23.64
8.26
9.65
7.81
1.18
7.81
1.18
7.97
9.36
PRC R-36Z
104
EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Numb e r
Central Computer and
418
419
420
4ZI
422
424
425
426
427
427a
428
428a
429
429a
430
430a
431
431a
432
432a
433
433a
434
434a
435
435a
436
436a
Name
Sequencer (continued)
Driver
Relay Set Coil
Drive r
Relay Set Coil
Relay Set Coil
Start Pitch Duration Switch
Magnetic Divider (I/Z000)
Master Time Matrix
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Drive r
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Driver
Relay
Number of
Components
20
2
35
2
2
19
i15
73
20
4
17
2
17
2
17
2
17
1
17
1
14
i
21
2
17
1
17
1
Failure Rate,
X x l O-6/hour
1.94
.75
4.77
.75
.75
1.33
8.19
I0.09
1.94
1.50
1.70
.75
1.70
.75
1.70
.75
1.70
.60
1.70
.60
1.46
.60
Z.09
1.20
1.70
.60
1.70
.60
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued}
Unit
Numb er Name
Central Computer and Sequencer (continued)
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
Power Supply
501
502
503
5O4
5O5
5O6
Driver
Relay Set Coil
Pitch and Roll Stop Logic
and Driver
Relay Set Coil
Relay Reset Coil
Driver
Relay Set Coil
Start Roll Duration Switch
Relay Reset Coil
Driver
Relay Coil
Start Velocity Duration Switch
Velocity Stop Logic and Driver
Relay Coil
Driver
Relay Reset Coil
Relay Reset Coil
Driver
M/C Start-Stop Relay
Solar Panel Circuitry
Battery
Battery Charger/Share Protector
Power Distribution and
Switching Unit
2.4-kc Sync
Booster Regulator No. 1
Number of
Components
25
2
13
Z
Z
34
2
19
X
31
I
43
Z7
1
56
2
2
16
6
117
Z0
75
13
62
69
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
2.Z0
.75
1.27
.75
.75
4.60
.75
3.75
.75
4.52
.60
3.13
2.73
.20
6.44
.75
.75
1.41
.93
29.36
14.05
14.86
Z.96
4.49
15.63
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number Name
Power Supply (continue d)
Number of
Components
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
507 Booster Regulator No. 2 71 16.38
508 2.4-kc Main Inverter 44 i 1.44
509 2.4-kc Maneuver Load Inverter 44 i1.44
510 Sync, 400 cycles, 1 phase 60 4.75
511 Sync, 400 cycles, 3 phase 26 2.76
51Z 400-Cycle, l-Phase Inverter 36 5.59
513 400-Cycle, 1-Phase Inverter 25 10.87
515 Booster Backup Sensor 39 5.38
516 LC Oscillator 31 Z.42
517 Sync Source Transfer 25 4.85
Attitude Control
612
601 Time Delay Switch 1 .Z5
602 Acquisition Sun Sensors 8 3.04
603 Sun Gate Sensors and Relay 12 2.42
605 Attitude Control T/R ll 1.94
606 Gyro T/R Z8 7.32
607 Gyro Control 55 8.66
608 Pitch and Yaw Gyros 104 52.94
610 Pitch and Yaw S.A. Compensation 21 2.33
611 Switch Amplifiers and Switches
(Pitch and Yaw) 149
Valves and Nozzles and Gas
Supply (4)
Valves and Nozzles and Gas
Supply (4)
613
32.81
(4)
(4)
Note: (4) For number of component parts and unit failure rates, see
Appendix A, section 2.
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number Name
Attitude Control (continued}
Number of
Components
Failure Rate,
X x 10-6/hour
614
615
616
617
618
619
6Z0
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
Cruise Sun Sensors and
Re gulator
Solar Pressure Stabilization
Canopus Sensor and Electronics
Canopus Gate
Roll Gyro
Switching Amplifier and Power
Switch (Roll)
Valves and Nozzles and Gas
Supply (Roll)
Valves and Nozzles and Gas
Supply (Roll)
Derived Rate Damping (Roll)
Turn Command Generator
CW One-Shot
CCW One-Shot
Relay
Cone Angle Update Circuits
Trajectory Correction
701
702
Radio
801
802
Autopilot and Vane Actuators
Midcourse Maneuver Motor,
Tankage and Plumbing
CS-Z CW Logic
CS-1 CW Logic
16
(4)
169
83
51
72
(4)
(4)
20
34
21
21
5
5O
145
7
(6)
(6)
3.68
(4)
21.96
8.89
26.25
10.22
(4)
(4)
1.54
51Z
Z.43
Z.43
.92
5.71
74.97
206.40c (5)
1.44
1.44
Notes: (4) For number of component parts and unit failure rates,
Appendix A, section Z.
(5) c = cycles.
(6) 161 components divided among ii units,
see
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number
Radio (continued)
8O3
804
8O5
8O6
807
8O8
8O9
810
811
81Z
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
82O
821
823
824
825
8Z6
827
Name
CS-2 CCW Logic
Switching
Transformer -Rectifier
CS-I and CS-Z Magnetization
Circuits
Cyclic Switching Logic
Receiver Transformer-Rectifier
Preamp and Mixers and First IF
Second Mixer, IF and AGC
Receiver Multipliers and Divider
Range Detector
Video Amplifier
Is olation Amplifier
Multiplier s and Amplifier s
Exciter Transformer-Rectifier
CS-5 CW Logic
Isolation Amplifier
Multipliers and Amplifiers
Exciter Transformer-Rectifier
CS-5 CCW Logic
CS- 5 Magnetization Circuits
Transfer Circuits
Auxiliary O scillator
Transfer Circuits
Auxiliary Oscillator
PA-I and Converter
Number of
Components
(6)
1
(6)
1
67
187
160
59
91
18
133
1
(6)
18
133
I
(6)
i
5
14
5
14
59
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
1.44
2.47
.I0
i .44
Z.47
7.00
18.51
15.68
4.56
6.94
1.8Z
14.1Z
Z.47
l .44
1.8Z
14.1Z
Z.47
1.44
.05
.31
Z.65
.31
2.65
Z1.23
Note: {6) 161 components divided among ii units.
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Numb e r
Radio (continued)
8Z9
83O
831
833
834
835
836
837
Pyrotechnic s
901
9O2
903
904
9O5
9O6
907
908
9O9
910
911
912
913
914
915
Name
CS-3 CW Logic
CS-4 CW Logic
PA-2 and Converter
CS-3 CCW Logic
CS-4 CCW Logic
CS-3 and CS-4 Magnetization
Circuits
VCO, Phase Detector, and Loop
Filter
CS-I CCW Logic
Separation Switch
Transformer
Control Rectifiers and Capacitor
Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Separation Switch
Transformer
Control Rectifiers and Capacitor
Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Time Delay Switch
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Number of
Components
(6)
(6)
59
(6)
(6)
155
(6)
1
1
6
8
8
1
1
6
8
8
1
8
9
8
9
Note: (6) 161 components divided among 11 units.
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
1.44
1.44
21.23
1.44
1.44
.I0
16.54
1.44
.12cs
2.20
.76
.64
.64
.iZcs
2.20
.76
.64
.64
.25
1.21
1.43
1.21
1.43
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Numb er
Pyrotechnics {continued)
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
9Z7
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
Name
Relay Eg
Relay KZ'
Relay K4
Relay K4'
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier,
First Maneuver
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
First Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier,
First Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Rectifie r,
First Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Re ctifier,
Second Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier,
Second Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier,
Second Maneuver
Silicon- Controlled Re ctifier,
Second Maneuver
Filter
Filter
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier
Silicon- Controlled Rectifier
Filter
Filter
Hinge s
Spring Actuators
Hydraulic Snubber s
Number of
Components
2
2
2
2
8
8
7
3
3
6
6
3
3
8
4
4
Failure Rate,
k x 10-6/hour
.75
.75
.75
.75
I.gl
I.gl
.99
.99
I.gl
1 .gl
.99
.99
.17
.17
.20
.20
.17
.17
.16a
4.20a
0
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EXHIBIT 47 (Continued)
Unit
Number Name
Operational Probabilities
950 Probability of No Meteoritic Impact
951 Probability of Solar Panels Not
Degrading to the Extent That
Battery Is Required
952 Probability That Wrong Target Is Not
Acquired
953 Operational Probability of Adequate
First Maneuver
954 Operational Probability of Adequate
Second Maneuver
Probability
.9
.75
.9
.9782
.9782
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that are not primary objectives. Inquiries of this nature can be satisfied
by computing the reliabilities of selected subsystems or events in a clas-
sical fashion, conditioned by the assumption that all remaining parts or
subsystems are operating as scheduled. Mathematical models for per-
forming such calculations on Mariner C subsystems were presented in
the interim report.
Except for the effect of variable operating times, the most signifi-
cant factor influencing a classical reliability prediction is the complex-
ity of the equipment under consideration. An estimate of subsystem com-
plexity can be gained by totaling the parts count, although this judgment
must be tempered by knowledge of the parts replication or redundancy
which characterizes the subsystem.
the total parts count, by subsystem,
Science subsystem
Data encoder 6,282
Command subsystem 2,284
CC and S 2,241
Power supply 757
Attitude control 943
Trajectory correction 157
Radio i, 345
Pyrotechnics 191
In this view, it is of interest to list
arrived at in this study.
1,511 parts
parts
parts
parts
parts
parts
parts
parts
parts
The grand total is nearly 16,000 parts, and it must be remembered that
this does not include the data automation system, the scientific instru-
ments, the telemetry transducers, or isolation filters for GSE monitors.
The list affords some insight into the results which can be expected.
Any interpretation of the classical reliabilities predicted here must
recognize the conditions which surround each calculation. In general, it
is assumed that all inputs and externally supplied services needed for the
proper operation of a subsystem are available with a reliability of unity.
In some instances, however, this assumption is not made because partic-
ular segments of one subsystem may function solely for the benefit of
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another subsystem and should, in reality, be charged to that subsystem
from a reliability standpoint. The descriptions given in this subsection
make all such conditions explicit.
The events and subsystem functions considered to be of most inter-
est and importance are listed below, with an effort made to display the
more independent functions first.
Solar panel deployment
Power supply
Command capability
Radio
Central computer and sequencer
Attitude control
Trajectory correction
Data encoder
1. Solar Panel Deployment
The unit configuration needed for this event is that which is
illustrated in Exhibits 43 and 44. The reliability of the separation timer,
unit 911, is included, and it is assumed that signal L-1 is not present.
Basic spacecraft power is assumed to be available. The total operating
time is only a few minutes, and this event can be considered as almost
wholly dependent upon the one-shot units involved.
The calculated reliability is 0.999996, which can be viewed as a
prediction that panel deployment will fail to occur only once in more than
100, 000 trials.
The considerable use of redundancy in the implementation of this
event makes it natural to inquire as to what reliability gains have been
effected by this replication. To answer this question, a system was
postulated which contained one set of eight squibs, a set of eight single
pin latches, two silicon-controlled rectifiers, and one current storage
branch. This effectively removes all redundancy, yielding a calculated
reliability of 0.999200. Thus, the chance of failure has increased to
about once in l , 000 trials. This event, which is so vital to any mission
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success, needs to be extremely reliable, and the extensive use of redun-
dancy has truly effected a significant reliability improvement.
2. Power Supply
The operation of the spacecraft power supply is dependent,
over the greater portion of the mission, upon successful solar panel de-
ployrnent and correct attitude orientation in the pitch and yaw axes. It
has been assumed that conditions have been satisfied except for sched-
uled acquisitions and maneuvers. The only units which enter these cal-
culations, therefore, are the power supply units as configured in Exhibits
28, 29, and 30, together with units 401 and 402 from the CC and S, which
are used to provide a redundant frequency reference. The battery is re-
quired during acquisitions and maneuvers and as a backup to the solar
panels during encounter. The batterychargeris considered as being
needed during periods prior to maneuvers and in the first two weeks of
cruise.
With these conditions established, the power supply reliability was
computed for several points along the mission profile:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
En counte r
End playback
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.996
288 0.955
750 0.954
2,6001 0.871
4,500 0.792
6,000 0.720
6,213 0.711
This can be compared with the estimated reliability of the Mariner R
power supply, which was 0.716 for 2,600 hours.
1
Where predicted reliabilities are tabulated in the sequel, the mission
time equivalent to a Mariner R mission (2,600 hours) is listed for com-
parative purposes. Qualifications for comparing the reliabilities of the
two types of missions and spacecraft also are presented as appropriate.
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3. Command Capability
This capability is determined by the operating condition of
the command detector and decoder and of the radio receiver. Although
receiver reliability is computed separately in a subsection to follow, it
did not appear realistic simply to assume an operable receiver in any
assessment of command reliability. This is justified on the basis that
the receiver is truly needed only for doppler tracking and command re-
ception, and, for most of the mission, this latter function is of great
importance.
The computation made here answers the question, "What is the
reliability of executing a typical command at various times during the
mission?" To perform this execution, a variety of units are required.
Radio units 801, 802, and 803 are required, as shown in Exhibit 38,
along with receiver units 807, 808, 809, 836, and 810 in series, as de-
picted in Exhibit 39. The common units 3079, 3000, 3001-1, 3002,
3003, and 3080 from Exhibit 16 are required, and the units for DC-3 as
a typical command are included. These are shown in Exhibit 17 and con-
sist of units 3005, 3006, 3007, 3008-2, 3009, 3011, 3014, 3015, 3018, 3019,
3023, and 3055-2. These conditions assure that the resultant reliability
applies to a specific command only and is not dependent upon units which
are uniquely as sociated with any other command.
The predicted reliability of a typical command is as follows:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.992
288 0.952
750 0.879
2,600 0.634
4,500 0.457
6,000 0.352
6,213 0.340
This compares, although not directly, with the predicted command re-
liability for Mariner R which was 0.233 for 2,600 hours. The Mariner R
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result covers the execution of all commands rather than a typical com-
mand; hence, it would be expected to be somewhat lower than if it had
been calculated on a basis comparable to that being used for Mariner C.
However, the difference is not estimated to be large.
Extensive effort was expended in this analysis to identify those
failure modes which would inadvertently cause continuous execution of
a command. This is one form of false command failure, and the prob-
ability of such an occurrence has been computed. Two cases of interest
were examined. The first is the probability that any one or more of the
entire command complement might fail in this manner. The probability
of such a failure is estimated to be 0.041 for the entire mission. The
second case, recognizing that false execution of certain commands
might be disastrous, covers the probability that a single (typical) com-
mand might be falsely executed. This is found to be less than 0.0008 for
the entire mission. These false command probabilities were arrived at
by calculating the failure probabilities of units such as 3055-I, shown in
Exhibit 19.
4. Radio Functions
Obviously, the radio performs at least two well-defined func-
tions, since it acts as a receiver and as a transmitter. The reliabilties
of interest appear to be those which characterize the receiving function
alone, the transmitting function alone, and the combination function. For
the receiver only, the unit configuration shown in Exhibit 38 is required
for antenna control, except that Canopus tracking and signal MT-6 are
assumed to be available. In addition, the receiver units, as illustrated
in Exhibit 39, are required, with the exception of units 811 and 812
which perform the ranging function. The predicted reliability of this
combination of units, operating as scheduled on the profile, is listed
on the following page.
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Fir st maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Predicted
Time (hours) Reliability
44 0.997
288 0.982
75O 0.955
2,600 0.852
4,500 0.754
6,000 0.685
6,213 0.675
If, now, one examines Exhibit 40 for the transmitter, it is observed that
three excitation sources can be called upon. One of these, the VCO, de-
mands that the receiver be operating, but the two auxiliary oscillators
are self-contained as far as the transmitter is concerned. The question
to be answered regarding the transmitter is, "What is its predicted re-
liability, including the triple redundancy of the excitation sources ?" For
antenna control, the unit configuration in Exhibit 42 must be operable as
scheduled, but unity reliability is assumed for Canopus tracking and for
the signal MT-5. The exciter units displayed in Exhibit 40 are required,
and presence of the VCO implies that the receiver must operate to supply
this redundancy. {Note that the receiver is not considered in series, re-
liability-wise, with the transmitter. It is needed only for a redundant
excitation source. ) The required power amplifier is supplied by includ-
ing the units diagrammed in Exhibit 41. The calculated reliability of the
transmitter is tabulated as follows:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Predicted
Time (hour s) Reliability
44 "_i.000
288 _1.000
750 -_1.000
2,600 0.998
4,500 0.982
6,000 0.971
6,213 0.970
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This can be compared to the predicted reliability of the noncoherent
transmission mode of the Mariner R transponder which was 0.853 for
2,600 hours. The comparison is not entirely accurate because the
Mariner C transmitter reliability estimate also includes the possibility
of coherent transmission; however, it should be stated that the contribu-
tion of this coherent mode to transmitter reliability is relatively small.
To be precise, if the coherent transmission mode is eliminated, the
predicted reliability of the Mariner C transmitter for 6,213 hours is
0.932.
The combined receiver and transmitter, operating in the coherent
mode only, is the normal or desired state of affairs during the mission.
For this capability, it has been assumed that all units of the receiver
and transmitter, configured as in Exhibits 38 through 42, will be re-
quired for the appropriate time periods with these exceptions: (i) Can-
opus tracking is assured; (2) signals MT-5 and MT-6 are available; (3)
the auxiliary oscillators, units 823, 824, 825, and 826, are not needed;
and (4) the ranging units 811 and 812 are not required. On this basis,
the predicted reliability of the coherent radio subsystem is as listed
be low:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Time (hour s)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.997
288 0.982
750 0.953
2,600 0.844
4,500 0.729
6,00O 0.651
6,213 0.640
This compares quite directly with the predicted reliability of the coherent
transponder of the Mariner R (0.688 for 2,600 hours).
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5. Central Computer and Sequencer
During the early portion of the mission, the CC and S func-
tions to decode and store the quantitative commands and to issue the ap-
propriate signals to accomplish one or two midcourse maneuvers. Al-
though the number of component parts involved in this operation is large,
the operating time is short.
For this calculation, the CC and S units shown in Exhibits 24 and
25 are needed. It is assumed that these units remain energized through-
out the 288 hours required for two maneuvers, with the exception of one-
shot devices, such as relays. It is also assumed that the quantitative
commands are received with perfect reliability. The reliability of this
complement of units is then calculated as 0.994 for 44 hours (first ma-
neuver) and as 0.948 for 288 hours (second maneuver).
Throughout the entire mission, the CC and S also serves in the role
of a sequencer, issuing signals at preprogrammed intervals to the vari-
ous subsystems of the spacecraft. For a typical launch signal, the re-
liability of units 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 408, and 408a was computed
for 16 hours, the longest period over which the launch matrix must op-
erate. For this short operating time, the predicted reliability is 0.9991.
The sequencing functions beyond midcourse maneuver are illus-
trated in Exhibits 26 and 27. They require units 401, 402, 403, 404,
425, and 426, together with a typical driver and relay such as units 427
and 427a. The predicted reliability of this chain of units at various
points in the mission is as follows:
Encounter
End playback
Time (hour s)
750
Mariner R mission 2,600
4,500
6,O0O
6,213
Predicted
Reliability
0.953
0.847
0.750
0.681
0.672
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This cannot be properly compared to the CC and S reliability for Mariner
R (predicted as 0.708 for 2,600 hours). The Mariner R reliability in-
cluded all parts of the CC and S and covered the requirement that all
signals would be given rather than a typical signal. Another fact which
prevents any accurate comparison concerns the failure rate used for
film resistors (see Appendix B). This was the only subsystem on
Mariner P_for which a substantial number of film resistors had been
identified, and a very conservative rate was applied to them. The re-
vised rate now in use would have raised the predicted reliability of the
CC and S on Mariner R to some extent, although the exact improvement
has not been calculated. The CC and S subsystems, at least for the se-
quencing functions, are very similar on the two versions of Mariner,
and it would be expected that their reliabilities would be comparable if
calculated on the same basis.
6. Attitude Control
This subsystem presents the opportunity of posing a number
of interesting and significant questions regarding the reliability of its
operation. Of first importance is its ability to acquire and track the sun,
an operation which must be successful if any worthwhile functions are to
be performed by the spacecraft. In calculating this reliability, allowance
has been made for three sun acquisitions, an initial acquisition and one
after each of two maneuvers. For these acquisitions, the unit configu-
ration pictured in Exhibit 31 is used with the as sumption that the signal
Z-2, which turns on the subsystem, has been received. For all other
time periods, the connection of units shown in ]Exhibit 32 forms the basis
for the calculations. The solar pressure stabilization system operates
after the receipt of signal Z-3, which is given unity reliability. The re-
liability tabulation given below starts with reliability as predicted for
the period ending with acquisition after the first maneuver, and, there-
fore, includes the initial acquisition.
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First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.996
288 0.977
750 0.958
2,600 0.889
4,500 0.823
6,000 0.774
6,213 0.767
Reference to the Mariner R reliability calculations reveals that the sun
tracking function only was predicted to be 0.903 reliable for 2,600 h_urs.
This did not include any acquisitions, however.
The acquisition of the star Canopus is an event of particular signifi-
cance inasmuch as this capability has not been previously demonstrated.
To compute its reliability, the necessity for initial sun acquisition and
sun tracking during Canopus acquisition has been recognized. For roll
axis orientation, the units shown in Exhibit 34 have been included, and
no assumptions regarding reliability of commands DC-15 and DC-21 have
been made. These are the gate override command and the roll override
command, respectively. They have been included at their normal re-
liability, which means that 24 units from the command subsystem and 6
units from the radio subsystem have entered into this calculation. This
is considered justifiable on the basis that these commands implement
important redundant paths that, if ignored, would unduly penalize the
subsystem reliability estimate. On the other hand, if they are introduced
with a reliability of unity, they completely mask the reliability of several
important parts of the acquisition function. Accordingly, it was deemed
most appropriate to allow them to assume normal reliability with full de-
pendence on the radio and the command detector and decoder. For these
conditions, the Canopus acquisition event is accomplished with a pre-
dicted reliability of 0.9995 which reflects, of course, the short operating
times involved. This is equivalent, in a reciprocal sense, to 5 failures
in 10,000 trials.
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Complete orientation of the spacecraft demands that both celestial
references be acquired each time an acquisition is called for and that
they be tracked throughout the mission. Thus, the complement of units
illustrated in Exhibits 31, 32, 34, and 36 is needed in accordance with
the schedule of the mission profile. In addition, unscheduled acquisi-
tions may be required by failure of unit 950. The probability of this
failure is the probability that tracking will not be disturbed by noncata-
strophic impacts with meteorites.
Commands DC-15 and DC-21 are used with normal reliability as
was explained in the calculation of Canopus acquisition reliability; how-
ever, command DC-17, cone angle update, was assumed to have unity
reliability since it is redundant to a CC and S function and not to any part
of the attitude control subsystem. The processing of these update sig-
nals is accomplished within the attitude control by the ring counter, unit
627, and the reliability of this equipment is calculated in the normal
fashion.
The resultant reliability prediction, then, applies to the combined
functions of acquiring and tracking both the sun and Canopus with allow-
ance made for unscheduled reacquisitions. This predicted reliability
for various mission times is as follows:
Fir st maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
End playback
Predicted
Time (hours) Reliability
44 0.994
288 0.974
750 0.946
Z,600 0.824
4,500 0.718
6,000 0.644
6,213 0.635
It is possible to make a reasonable comparison of these results with the
Mariner R results if it is kept in mind that slight differences arise be-
cause the Mariner R calculations were based on tracking only, with
PRG R-362
123
acquisition assured. The reliability of sun-earth tracking on Mariner R
was predicted as 0.317 for 2, 600 hours.
The inertial roll control capability designed into Mariner C is a po-
tentially valuable feature, and it is in order to inquire as to its reliability.
This has been done for a specific set of conditions. First, iris requiredthat
the sun acquisition and tracking function be operable over the whole mission.
Next, it is demanded that Canopus acquisition and tracking be operable through
the time required for two maneuvers (2-88 hours). The free roll mode, com-
manded by DC-Z0, must be available at any time during cruise. Finally,
the inertial control path shown in Exhibit 36 must be operable for the final
phases of the mission beginning 50 hours before encounter. This last re-
quirement implies that the radio receiver and transmitter, and commands
DC-18 and DC-Zl, the incremental roll commands, are part of the attitude
control subsystem for this operating mode. This is justified on the basis
that the attitude control function takes the form of a combination radio/
inertial control when this mode is invoked.
It has been assumed throughout this study that inertial roll control,
although available at any desired time, would not be used continuously until
the important encounter phase was approached.
is through encounter and tape playback.
Time (hour s)
The period of interest, then,
Predicted
Reliability
Encounter 6,000 0.460
End playback 6,213 0.441
7. Trajectory Correction
In considering the success of this event, it becomes clear
that nearly all of the spacecraft subsystems must be functioning satis-
factorily if an adequate maneuver is to be made. The units shown in
Exhibit 37 are obviously required if any controlled maneuver is to be
effected. In addition, the following conditions pertain:
a. The solar array must be deployed.
b. The power supply, including special equipment for the
maneuver, must be operating.
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c. The attitude control must track the sun and Canopus
before and between maneuvers, and reacquire them
after maneuvers.
d. The radio receiver and transmitter must be operating
coherently.
e. Required commands, including quantitative commands,
must be available.
f. CC and S signals, particularly the maneuver signals,
must be present as required.
g. At least the high rate decks, together with all series
elements of the data encoder, must function to provide
a minimal monitoring capability.
A number of probabilities must be computed to arrive at a final
reliability prediction for the maneuver. It must be recalled that a suc-
cessful maneuver is defined as one in which no equipment failures occur
but where operational errors cause the miss distance (in the sense of
missing the aiming point) to be too great or too small. An adequate ma-
neuver is successful in that no equipment failures occurred, and, in ad-
1
dition, the miss distance is satisfactorily small. A failed manuever is
one which suffers an equipment failure.
Because of pyrotechnic redundancy, it is possible to have a failed
first maneuver and still be capable of performing the second maneuver.
For the conditions established above, the applicable probabilities are
calculated as follows:
a. Probability of no equipment failure
during fir st maneuver 0.962
b. Probability of an adequate first
maneuver 0.940
c. Probability of a successful first
maneuver and an adequate second
maneuver 0.016
1
This definition is furnished by JPL.
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d. Probability of a failed first
maneuver and an adequate second
maneuver O.004
e. Probability of an adequate maneuver 0.961
This compares directly with an estimated 0.8 maneuver reliability for
Mariner R, where the single maneuver is accomplished 190 hours after
injection.
8. Data Encoder
This particular subsystem has posed the greatest problem
in arriving at a satisfactory numerical assessment. It has been sug-
gested that the classical reliability might be defined as the probability
that some arbitrary fraction (say 9/10) of the data inputs are reliably
commutated and encoded. An approach of this kind was attempted at
great length; however, the enormous number of computations required
to assess the subsystem made the task infeasible. To appreciate this
problem, it should be noted that the encoder comprises over 250 units
if all significant catastrophic failure modes are accounted for. It was
hoped that properties such as symmetrical unit arrangements or large
groups of identical failure consequences would manifest themselves.
This has not proved to be the case, and it is conservatively estimated
that literally thousands of unit configurations would have to be separately
investigated to produce a numerical result. Accordingly, attention was
focused on other approaches which would give at least some insight into
the classical reliability of this subsystem.
Considering the very vital function of encoding the video and en-
counter science data, it can be observed from Exhibit 15 that the series
circuits are required. These include redundant PN generators. Their
reliability is computed at a time 50 hours prior to encounter and at the
end of tape playback, as these times bracket the period of interest. Re-
liability at the beginning of the period is estimated at 0.629 for 5,950
hours, and, at 6,213 hours, the end of the period, it is 0.606.
To encode cruise science, the series units are needed as for any
other function of the data encoder. In addition, the miscellaneous logic
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depicted in Exhibit 14 is required except for unit 2017, the medium speed
drive. Because cruise science is subframedwith engineering data, the
I00-Ii0 sequencers, units 2025 and 2026, are required in redundant fash-
ion as illustrated in Exhibit 12. This complement of units is needed
throughout the cruise phase of the mission, andits predicted reliability
is listed below:
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
288 0.972
750 0.932
2,600 0.784
4,50O O.656
6,000 0.568
The telemetry of engineering measurements, along with cruise
science, will evidently be governed by the reliability of the units dis-
cussed above for cruise science measurements. Except for unit 2017,
the medium speed drive, this same reliability figure would apply to the
commutated digital engineering data. For commutated analog engineer-
ing data, however, the analog-to-digital conversion units are additionally
required. These units are shown in their redundant configuration in Ex-
hibit 13. This is a switchable redundancy, and it is assumed that com-
mand DC-6, which provides the switching action, is available with unity
reliability. The calculated reliability applies to commutated analog data
as follows:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Encounter
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.995
288 0.972
750 0.932
2,600 0.761
4,500 0.624
6,000 0.530
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The foregoing predicted reliability for engineering data does not
include the effects of commutation. The difficulties associated with
developing a meaningful reliability for all of the commutating functions
as a group have been discussed. It is possible, however, to predict the
reliability of typical channels of engineering data. This has been done
for both analog and digital data channels.
For analog data, consider channel 1 09, a high-rate channel, and
channel 415, a low-rate channel. The unit configuration demanded for
these channels will include, of course, the analog-to-digital converter,
the miscellaneous logic, and the series circuits as calculated above. In
addition, for the high-rate channel, two switches, units 2058 and 2144,
must close in order to gate th_ channel information to the miscellaneous
logic. All of the 100 sequencer, unit 2025, must be operating because
this channel is controlled by the last stage. The redundancy furnished
by the ll0 sequencer is no longer applicable. Again, it is assumed that
services such as power supply and radio are available. For these con-
ditions, the typical high-rate channel reliability is predicted as shown
below :
Fir st maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
Enc ounte r
Predicted
Time (hour s ) Reliability
44 0.995
288 O.964
75O 0.912
2,600 0.725
4,500 0.574
6,000 0.474
The low-rate channel, 415, demands a large complement of units,
including the analog-to-digital converter, the miscellaneous logic, and
the series circuits. Individual units, required in an in-line capacity
for this channel, are 2102, 2034, 2147, 2022, 2037, 2021, 2108, 2049,
2050, 2052, and 2144. Portions of sequencers needed in series, relia-
bility-wise, are 2031-1...6 and 2025-1... 3.
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Sequencers needed in redundant configuration consist of two groups.
The first is the quadruple redundancy formed by units 2030, 2031, 2033,
and 2038, but with units 2031-I'''6 excluded since they have already been
specified as a series requirement. The second group is that formed by
units 2025 and 2026, but with units 2025-I'-.3 excluded since they were
counted above. The reliability of this combination of components for the
data encoder is predicted as follows:
First maneuver
Second maneuver
Mariner R mission
En counte r
Time (hours)
Predicted
Reliability
44 0.993
288 0.995
750 0.890
2,6OO 0.668
4,500 0.497
6,000 0.392
The predicted reliability of this low-rate channel is noticeably less than
that of a high-rate channel, which reflects the additional commutation
equipment required. Each channel is somewhat different, in that the
required sequencer arrangement varies. Moreover, bucking supplies
are needed for some channels but not for others. However, the numbers
listed above are typical of what can be expected.
There are far fewer digital channels than analog channels, and
their reliabilities appear to lie between the values calculated for the
analog channels. Two examples were selected for illustrative purposes.
Encoding of the command detector VCO monitor information re-
quires the series circuits and miscellaneous logic but not the analog-to-
digital converter. Specific individual units required are 2035, 2039,
2040, and 2046, together with the first five stages of the I00 sequencer,
unit 2025.
Event register l requires the same complement of units, except
that unit 2042 replaces unit 2046 and 2035 is not needed. In addition,
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the first six stages of the II0 sequencer, unit 2026, are needed, rather
than portions of the I00 sequencer.
The predicted reliabilities of these two digital words were computed
for three points on the mission profile as given below:
Detector Monitor
Event Register 1
Hours
288 2,600 6,213
0.954 0.663 0.374
0.958 0.691 0.413
The large number of components which comprise the data encoder make
this subsystem a likely candidate for some kind of random failure over
the 6,000-hour mission. Specifically, a simple parts count reliability of
the encoder has been calculated as approximately 0.02 for 6,000 hours.
This number is not believed to be meaningful, however, because many
of the failures which contribute to this low apparent reliability would in-
volve the loss of only one, or at most a few, channels. For this reason,
the analytical emphasis has been placed on the reliability prediction for
the important segments of the encoder and for typical channels within
the commutator.
9. Total System
The reliability of the total Mariner C system (excluding the
data automation system) is a function of the level of performance arbi-
trarily selected as being the minimum which can be tolerated. In making
such a selection, the worth function which has been assigned to each ob-
jective provides a certain degree of guidance. The worth assignments
are discussed in the next subsection, and a study of them will afford some
appreciation for the rationale on which the system reliability was based.
The conditions that were established as being required for a suc-
cessful mission include the following:
a. An adequate midcourse maneuver must be completed.
This involves a requirement for nearly all of the spacecraft subsystems
through 288 hours.
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b. The power supply must operate in a normal manner
throughout the 6,213-hour mission.
c. The attitude control must acquire Canopus and track
it throughout the mission. Inertial control is not considered a satis-
factory operating path because it has been limited (in this study) to op-
eration at encounter only, and cruise science would be lost or degraded
in the free roll condition.
d. The radio transmitter must operate, either coherently
or noncoherently, for all of the mission.
e. The data encoder must operate to the extent that the
series units, miscellaneous logic, and analog-to-digital converter are
working. In addition, the high-rate decks are required.
f. The tape recorder and planet scan functions must be
available through the encounter phase.
g. After 288 hours, the CC and S and command functions
are redundant. This implies that the radio receiver is needed only for
this redundant purpose for most of the mission.
From the foregoing list of requirements, it can be deduced that
some degradation from the normal path is allowed in this definition of a
successful mission. The subcommuted engineering data is not required.
Doppler tracking after 288 hours is not a requirement. This is not to
say that these functions are not desirable, only that they are not essential.
All other objectives are required in full.
Reliability for the spacecraft has been computed at two points in the
mission for this complement of equipment, and the results are given
For 2,600 hours, predicted system reliability = 0.383
For 6,213 hours, predicted system reliability = 0.III
C. System Figure-of-Merit
Recognizing that the classical reliability of a mission, however it
may be defined, is an incomplete measure of reliability for missions as
complex as that of Mariner C, PRC's figure-of-merit (FOM) has been
used in this study. The FOM provides for the use of every state of
below:
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acceptable operation, from the perfect state of operation to the most de-
graded state that can contribute measurable achievement of any mission
objective. To effect this type of analysis, specific values of worth are
assigned to certain mission objectives. Each of these is actually a
weighting function for the probabilities of operating in those states that
will produce a given objective. The worth functions used here were as-
signed by the Systems Design Section of Jet Propulsion Laboratory. This
assignment will be discus sed before the application is detailed.
I. Objectives and Worth Assignments
There are eight main objectives defined for the Mariner C
mission. If all eight were successfully accomplished, the value of the
worth functions at end of tape playback would total I00 percent. The
contribution to this total mission worth of each of the various objectives
is shown in Exhibit 48.
The first three objectives shown accrue worth essentially over the
entire length of the mission. Specifically, cruise science, assigned a
worth of 12 percent, begins to accrue its worth upon injection of the
spacecraft and continues to do so until 50 hours before encounter. Engi-
neering telemetry, with a total possible worth of 3.5 percent, accrues
almost a third of this in the first 43 hours of the mission; the remaining
portion accrues over the next 5,957 hours. Orbit determination, includ-
ing both the ranging and doppler functions, accrues its total worth of 4.5
percent in five different intervals over the 6,213 hours of the mission.
The remaining five objectives are considered "one-shot" since
their total possible worth is accrued at specific instants in time. This
is exactly the case for the first three. Star acquisition will add a worth
step of 1 percent at the end of the first acquisition, or one-and-one-half
1
hours after injection. Encounter, with tracking, is another step function
occurring at 6,000 hours, the time of closest approach to the planet.
Trajectory correction is also a one-shot objective, with a total worth of
lsee mission profile times on Exhibit 46.
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EXHIBIT 48 - WORTH FUNCTIONS FOR MISSION OBJECTIVES
Continuous Obj ective s:
Cruise Science
Engine ering
Telemetry
Worth (percent)
Element Subtotal
Time
(hours)
12.0 0-5,950
3.5
Orbit
Determination 4.5
l.0 0-43
2.5 43-6,000
1.8 0-43
0.7 43 -80
1.0 80-750
0.5 750-5,950
0.5 5,950-6,213
1.5
One-Shot Objectives:
Star Acquisition 1.0
Trajectory
Correction 2.0
Encounter
(with tracking) 6.0
Encounter Science 11.0
Tape Playback: 60.0
Fir st two
picture s
Re m ainde r
Z88.0
6,000.0
6,013.0 (1)
40.0 6,033.0 (1)
Z0.0 6,213.0 (1)
Note: (1) Worth actually accrued over a relatively short interval of
time at encounter.
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2 percent. However, the model used in this study allows for two chances
to correct the trajectory. The worth function for this objective, although
scheduled at two different instants in time {as discussed below), is con-
sidered a step function at 288 hours.
It is of interest to explore in further detail the worth function asso-
ciated with the correction maneuvers. If at the end of the first maneuver,
occurring at43 hours after injection, the trajectory is considered "ade-
quate," the entire step function of 2 percent is accrued. An "adequate"
maneuver is defined as one which insures that the miss distance a_ the
planet will be within tolerance. If the first maneuver was not adequate,
then it either was "successful" or it "failed." A successful maneuver is
one performed according to command, but the predicted miss distance
at the planet is too large or too small, and another maneuver is required.
A nfailed" maneuver results in this model only from hardware failure.
Exhibit 45 indicates that the only hardware failure than can occur and
still allow a second maneuver to be accomplished is a failure of the hard-
ware associated with the maneuver pyrotechnics. Now, to return to the
worth function, if the first maneuver was only successful, a step function
of 0.6 percent is accrued, but not until the time for the second maneuver
has passed (or at 288 hours). Additional worth is accrued at that time
dependent on whether or not the second maneuver is adequate (1.4 per-
cent), successful (1.0 percent), or failed. Finally, if the first correc-
tion failed, possible worth accrues at 288 hours, dependent again on the
outcome of the second maneuver. However, since the value of the worth
function of a failed first maneuver is zero, the worth function for the
second maneuver changes in value: adequate, 2.0 percent; successful,
1.0 percent; and failed, 0.7 percent. It is at the end of the second ma-
neuver, or 288 hours, that the worth is added for the possible outcomes
of trajectory correction.
The last two "one-shot" objectives in Exhibit 48 are not strictly
step functions. Relative to the length of the entire mission, it is conven-
ient to summarize them as such. In the FOM calculations to follow, how-
ever, they actually accrue worth over short periods of time. Encounter
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science, for example, accrues its total possible worth of ll.0 percent
during the 63 hours between 5,950 and 6,013 hours after injection. The
function for tape playback is divided into two intervals. A value of 40
percent, associated with the first two pictures, is accrued over 20 hours,
between 6,013 and 6,033 hours. The final 20 percent associated with the
remaining pictures accrues between 6,033 and 6,213 hours, a period of
180 hours.
Exhibit 49 gives the worth accrual rates for each of the continuous
objectives and these last two "one-shot" objectives. It is apparent from
the table that within each interval the worth accrual rate of an objective
is a constant. In actuality, the rates might well be a continuous function
of time, e.g., cruise science might contribute a diminishing amount of
worth per unit time during the long portion of the mission relative to the
beginning, and then increase in the vicinity of the planet. In order to
make the problem tractable, however, the mission was divided into the
intervals shown, and the accrual rates are considered constant in each
interval. It should also be noted that an attempt to eliminate some of
the effects of this problem of manageability is made in the assignment
of worth functions for Mariner C. That is, encounter science, which
includes many of the same measurements as cruise science, accrues its
worth in 63 hours around encounter. It contributes over half of the 23
percent of worth assigned to real-time science telemetry.
Three other considerations need to be pointed out here; each em-
phasizes differences from the assignment made in the Mariner R assess-
ment. In the FOM calculations discussed below, (i) one-way doppler has
zero worth, (2) loss of sync modulation in transmission has zero worth,
and (3) noncoherent telemetry, or loss of phase lock, has full worth.
2. Accrual of Worth
In the figure-of-merit model, the probability of successfully
achieving each objective is weighted by the worth function of that objec-
tive. As stated earlier, the FOM model considers not only the perfect
state of hardware operation of the spacecraft that produces a given ob-
jective, but various degraded states of hardware operation that would
also accrue the worth assigned for that same objective.
• °
A
0e_
!
o
v
U
L)
0
!
0
o,1
0
°
o
°
o
o,1
o
o
0,1 N
t%l o
o o
0 0
o,,1
o
0
0
0_! 0
o_
o i._
o o
,,0
o _
o
o o
0 o
0 o
_1 0,,1 (',.,1 0 '_
o '_ _t _
_,1 o
o o o
o o o
o,1 o,1
o o
o o
0,,1
o
o
o
0e_ o',
o o
o
0
4-1
o•,.._ (D
U _ ""_ "'_
..._ lcl @ _ "0
¢_ _ _ _ Ill .._
•,,_ ._ ._ 0 _ _0
_ ,.a u 0.,_ _
(._
,--I
0
0
_4
t._
_o
e_
if')
o
o
e_
o _
cv-)
o
o
o
_o
o
,Ii
0
PRC R-362
135
PRC R-362
136
For the one-shot objectives, the average of expected worth of a
mission objective is simply the product of the value of the worth function
assigned to that objective, and the probability that the objective is met.
Therefore, W , the average worth for a single one-shot objective,
a , is
W = wP (1)
(I (I G
where w is the assigned worth for objective a
G
For objectives which accrue worth continuously,
_(t) of worth accrual at time t for objective _ is
the average rate
m
w[3(t) = w[5(t)P[3(t) (2)
where w_(t) is the assigned worth accrual rate for
The total average worth, W-_, accrued during the mission for
objective _ is
W_5 =/w_5(t)P[5(t)dt (3)
where the integration is taken over the complete mission with
for all t where _ is not applicable.
The average worth for a complete mission,
combining the average worths for each objective.
figure-of-merit, W M , is given by
w (t) = 0
_M , is obtained by
Thus, the total mission
(4)
where W'M is an expected value in the statistical sense.
The total average worth for each of the objectives listed in Exhibit
48 will be discussed below; this will be followed by the compilation of the
figure-of-merit for the entire mission. The detail will be concerned with
describing the states of hardware operability that will accomplish each
objective, a tabulation of the resulting probability of success in these
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states, and, finally, the average worth accrued,
ent on the type of objective.
_ or _ , depend-
a. Continuous Objectives
(1) Cruise Science
There is only one major state of the hardware
units that will accrue worth for cruise science over the 5,950 hours as-
signed to this objective. Certainly none of the video data units, planetary
scan, or tape record/playback are necessary. Only portions of the data
encoder are required; the series circuits (Exhibit 15) are required, as
well as the miscellaneous logic (Exhibit 14), except for the 10, ll, and
medium-speed drive (unit 2017). Also needed are the 100 sequencer and
the ll 0 sequencer in a simple redundant configuration. The power supply
units are needed as scheduled on the normal mission chart (Exhibit 46).
The attitude control units are needed as shown on the normal chart with
all of the redundancies shown in Exhibits 31 to 36, with one exception.
In all of the calculations of the FOM model, inertial roll control is not
considered as a possible operating path until tz5 , or 5,950 hours. Since
cruise science stops accruing worth at this point, inertial roll control is
not applicable to this objective. The transmitter may be either in a co-
herent or noncoherent mode of operation; the receiver must be operational
only for commands. No midcourse maneuver is required, since cruise
science worth may be accrued whether the miss distance at the planet is
within tolerance or not. Pyrotechnic units are needed for solar panel
deployment only.
The command detector and decoder must be up for two types of
redundancies, In the series circuits of the data encoder, one PN gen-
erator is in a standby redundancy to a second, with discrete command 6
acting as the switch. A second type of discrete command requiring the
command detector and decoder is DC-17, which backs up the central
computer and sequencer signals that initiate the Canopus cone angle up-
date sequences. This makes the command detector and decoder redun-
dant to the CC and S throughout much of the time interval for this objec-
tive. As was pointed out, whenever a command is required, even in a
redundant capacity, the radio receiver must be operational.
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The valve and nozzle redundancy of the attitude control subsystem
enters the computation as shown in the attitude control diagrams; however,
certain other assumptions concerning this redundancy are outlined here.
The considerations apply each time the valves and nozzles are required
in the following calculations. The pitch and yaw associated valves are
assumed to experience 200 actuations per valve for the redundant system
during sun acquisition. During cruise, the same system experiences four
actuations per valve per hour before t4 and three actuations per valve
per hour after t4 , the time of activation of the solar pressure stabiliza-
l
tion system. The duty cycle of each of the four stepping motors of unit
615 is assumed to be 5 percent for the time required for the system to
effect stabilization within the limit cycle. This stabilized state is as-
sumed to be reached 333 hours after t16 , the time of the final maneuver.
The redundant system of valves, nozzles, and gas that supplies the roll
torques is assumed to experience 200 actuations per valve during star ac-
quisition and four actuations per valve per hour during cruise. Unlike
those supplying the pitch and yaw torques, these continue to operate
throughout the remainder of any mission during which star tracking is
required.
The reliability of the complete cold gas system {units 612, 613,
615, 620, and 621) does not degrade below 0.999 until after t16 + 333
hours due to the extremely low failure rates of the valves and nozzles
and to the assumption of the 5 percent duty cycle for the motors. After
621 hours, the configuration reduces to the simple redundancy of units
620 and 621, with four actuations per valve per hour, and enters into the
calculations as
1 - (1-e -5"6x10
The tabulation of the probability that the configuration of spacecraft
units described above will survive various time intervals of the mission
Isee Appendix A, Section I.
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is shown below. The intervals correspond to intervals in the worth func-
tion with two exceptions. First, 2,600 hours corresponds to the Mariner
R total mission time, and second, 4,500 hours is arbitrarily picked as a
convenient tabulation point during the long cruise period after 2,600 hours
and before encounter.
Probability of Obtaining Cruise Science Data
Hour s P r obability
44.5 0.979
288 0.904
750 0.849
2600 0.530
4500 0.307
5950 0.192
These probabilities are used at the various intervals to determine
the expected rate during these intervals. Both the assigned and expected
rates for these intervals are shown in Exhibit 50. The time integrals of
these curves are given in Exhibit 51. In the latter, the curves represent
the total cruise science worth accrued to time t . The expected contribu-
tion of cruise science to the figure-of-merit is seen to be 6.3 percent.
(2) Engineering Telemetry
The worth assigned to engineering telemetry can
be obtained in either of two states of hardware operability. In the first,
the power supply and attitude control units must be in the normal config-
urations shown in the reliability diagrams of Section III and energized as
shown on the normal mission chart (Exhibit 46). Solar panel deployment
is required but no trajectory correction is needed since engineering te-
lemetry worth may be accrued without consideration of the miss distance
at the planet. The transmitter may be either coherent or noncoherent.
The receiver must be operable in a redundant capacity, along with the
command detector and decoder, whenever a command is needed under
the stated conditions. These are redundant, of course, to signals from
the C C and S.
PRC R-362
140
(£_01 x) a_,e_i
E_
.<
_Z
L)
L)
<
E_
o
L)
H
0
Dr)
D
0
I
o
I.--I
;q
I---4
oPRC R-362
141
c_
o
c_
Z
b=d
U_
c_
I
L_
PRC R-362
142
In addition, the complete data encoder must be operable: the ser-
ies circuits, the miscellaneous logic, the analog-to-digital converter,
and the high-, medium-, and low-rate decks. For the purposes of this
study, however, the many hundreds of thousands of degraded states
within the subcommutating portion of the data encoder were not consid-
ered. This was an arbitrary decision, and tends to inflate the resulting
contribution to the figure-of-merit. However, the relatively low worth
assigned to this objective is one justification for the approximation.
Hence, using only common portions of the encoder and the high-rate
decks, the hardware configuration is complete for this state.
In the second hardware condition of the spacecraft that enables
engineering telemetry worth to be accumulated, just as in the first, a
midcourse correction is not required. In addition, up until t19 , the
limit of the low-gain antenna, star acquisition and tracking may be ig-
nored. This degraded path requires the data encoder, the radio, and the
solar panel deployment as above. The required attitude control units re-
ducetothoseinExhibits31and32; the power supply units reduce to those
required to support the spacecraft with these attitude control functions,
i. e., those shown in Exhibit 28 for one sun acquisition (since a mid-
course maneuver is not required) and those shown in Exhibit 29.
The probability of surviving the first state, together with the prob-
ability of success in the second, weighted by the worth function for this
objective gives the contribution to the FOM. The probabilities of the
two states are shown below for the time intervals of interest.
Probability of Obtaining Engineerin_ Telemetry
Hour s P robability
43 0.972
288 O.844
750 0.750
2600 0.383
4500 0.155
6000 0.078
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The expected accrual rate resulting from these probabilities is
plotted in Exhibit 52. Two points should be noted; (1 } the maximum rate
of accrual changes at t=43 hours, with one-third of the assigned worth
being accrued by that time, and (2} there is an expected communication
blackout between t 19 and t20 , during which no worth is accrued.
The integral of this rate curve is shown in Exhibit 53. Recalling
that this is a slightly optimistic approximation to the expected worth, it
should be noted that the probabilities involved also indicate that on a sys-
tem level the investigation of the many degraded paths in the subcommuta-
tion portion of the data encoder is not warranted since the expected FOM
contribution is 2.0 percent (assigned = 3.5 percent). The inclusion of the
subcommutator would not appreciably affect the accrual of 0.9 percent
during the first 43 hours of the mission. They could only affect the re-
maining 1.1 percent computed for the balance of the mission.
(3} Orbit Determination
The hardware configurations for orbit determina-
tion serve two objectives, ranging and doppler tracking. Considering
ranging first, one possible configuration requires the attitude control
and power supply units to operate in the normal path up to t=80 hours,
the end of accrual of worth for this objective. Solar panel deployment
and either a coherent or noncoherent radio complete this requirement.
A second configuration is similar, except that it drops the requirement
for star acquisition and tracking and the associated power supply units.
This is the same degraded path described for engineering telemetry; its
maximum duration in this application is, of course, 80 hours. The third
path differs primarily in that the receiver VCO is omitted as shown in
Exhibit 39, except for units 807, the receiver transformer rectifier, and
808, preamp 1st IF and mixer. The ranging function always requires
unit 811, the range code detector, and unit 812, the video amplifier.
The two paths for the doppler function are essentially the same as
the first two for ranging. The degraded path that terminates at t19
{no requirement for star acquisition and tracking) is configured in the
same manner, but with a maximum time of 2,376 hours rather than 80
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hours. A midcourse correction is not required in order to accrue the
worth assigned to this function. The second doppler path does differ, in
that after t25 the redundant path including inertial roll control is allowed.
The units involved here are shown in Exhibit 36.
The probabilities computed for these hardware states are listed be-
low for the pertinent intervals of the worth function for the orbit deter-
mination obj e ctive.
Ranging
Probabilities Involved in Orbit Determination
Doppler
Hour s P robabilitie s
43 0.991
80 0.985
43 0.988
80 0.979
750 0.860
5,950 0.367
6,213 0.320
The total expected accrual rate for this objective is plotted together
with the assigned accrual rate in Exhibit 54. It is evident that more than
half of the possible worth to be accrued can be obtained in the first 80
hours and only 20 percent of the total assigned worth is expected after
the first month (t=750 hours). The probabilities involved assure that
the expected worth accrual will be close to the maximum. Exhibit 55,
giving the integrated curves for orbit determination, shows the total con-
tributionof this objective to the system FOM to be 3.6 percent,
the maximum is 4.5 percent.
b.
as a step function.
where
One-Shot Objectives
(I) Star Acquisition
The worth for this objective has been assigned
It occurs at the end of the first 1.5 hours after
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injection. The exceedingly small time interval implies almost certain
1
accrual of worth.
There is only one hardware configuration considered here: the
power supply units as shown in Exhibit 28; attitude control as in Exhibits
31, 32, and 34; a coherent or noncoherent radio; the command detector
and decoder in a redundant configuration as shown in Exhibit 34; the
central computer and sequencer as in Exhibit 23; and, finally, the data
encoder series units, miscellaneous logic, A-D coverter, and one engi-
neering channel to assure that the star has indeed been acquired.
The probability of successfully performing this objective is 0.999.
The contribution of star acquisition to the total FOM is, then, 0.9 percent
since the assigned worth function at t=l.5 hours is 1.0 percent.
(2) Trajectory Correction
The worth function for trajectory correction al-
lows for the maximum worth to be accrued at 43 hours for an adequate
first maneuver or at 288 hours if the first maneuver was not adequate
but the second is. The probabilities computed for this objective are (1)
the necessary hardware successfully survives 43 hours, (2) the ma-
neuver is made with only one possibility of redundant hardware failure,
and (3) the hardware survives the next 245 hours (including the second
maneuver). The one redundant hardware failure possibility is in the
pyrotechnics required for the first maneuver. As Exhibit 27 shows,
there is a redundant set available if the first fails.
The complete hardware configuration for these conditions is as
follows. The power supply units are in maneuver and cruise modes, as
shown in Exhibits 28 and 29, except the probability of meteoric impact
is not considered. The attitude control units are required to acquire the
star and sun and to track both (as in normal mission requirement). The
radio may be either in a coherent or noncoherent mode. The central
1The reader is reminded of the assumption regarding the exponential
failure law given in the Introduction.
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computer and sequencer is required during both data insertion periods
as shown in Exhibit 24, in acqusiition periods as in Exhibit 23, and
during the maneuver periods as in Exhibit 25. The command detector
and decoder is required in this objective, since the quantitative commands
and DC-27 and DC-23 are not backed by CC and S signals. Pyrotechnic
units for solar panel deployment and for maneuver capability are required.
The probability that this hardware configuration survives the correc-
tions must be modified by the operational probability than an adequate first
and/or an adequate second maneuver is performed. These probabilities
are both 0.978. The conditional probabilities involved in obtaining the prob-
ability that the maximum worth will be accrued at 288 hours are shown below:
Probabilities Involved in Trajectory Correction
Hours Probability
43 0.952
0.022
0.005
288 0.825
288 0.974
Condition
First maneuver is adequate.
First maneuver is successful.
First maneuver fails in such a way that
the second is possible.
Second maneuver is adequate.
First maneuver is adequate, or, if not,
the second is.
The total contribution to the system FOM for the trajectory cor-
rection objective based on these probabilities and the assigned worth
function is 1.9 percent.
(3) Encounter With Tracking
This one-shot objective requires an adequate
trajectory correction, either one of the two shown above. After 288
hours, however, there are two hardware configurations to consider.
First, the power supply units are as shown on the normal mission
profile, including those units required for encounter (see Exhibit 30),
the attitude control units are as listed on the normal mission profile,
and either a coherent or noncoherent radio is operating. The command
detector and decoder and the central computer and sequencer are needed
in their redundant capacities.
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The second configuration differs from the first in that star tracking
may be down after t16 (the end of trajectory correction} and inertial roll
control initiated at t25, which is 50 hours prior to encounter. This means,
in addition, that the command detector and decoder must be available at
t25 to invoke the inertial roll control. Although it is recognized that if
such conditions do occur, the inertial roll control equipment would be
exercised at intervals between t16 and t25. This model allows for no
equipment failures during such exercises.
The total probability for these two paths is 0.491; the maximum
value of the worth function for this objective at 6,000 hours is 6.0 per-
cent. Therefore, the total contribution of encounter with tracking to the
system FOM is 2.9 percent.
(4) Encounter Science
Encounter science is tabulated as a one-shot ob-
jective; its expected worth calculation was actually made by allowing it
to accrue the worth over 63 hours, beginning at 5,950 hours after
injection.
As was mentioned earlier, many of these measurements are es-
sentially the same as those for cruise science; the real-time science
worth function, in effect, increases in the vicinity of encounter. There
are two hardware states to be considered. The first is the same as the
cruise science path, except that the engineering subframe has been
dropped, and, therefore, the 100 and 110 sequencer redundancy does
not enter into the calculations. The degraded path is the same as one
described earlier. 1 It involves the loss of star tracking after maneuver,
and the use of the inertial roll control capability after t25 (5,950 hours).
The probability that encounter science can be transmitted at 5,950
hours is 0.248, degrading only slightly over the next 63 hours. The as-
signed accrual rate of 0.175 per hour during this interval is modified by
the probabilities to obtain the expected accrual rate. Integrating this
1
The second path for the encounter objective.
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accrual rate over the 63-hour interval gives the total contribution to
the system FOM for encounter science of 2.4 percent.
(5) Tape Playback
This objective is also one which accrues its
worth during a relatively short period after encounter. It has two dis-
crete intervals in its worth function, with almost 70 percent of its as-
signed worth accruing in 20 hours, between 6,013 and 6,033 hours after
injection. The remaining worth is accrued in the next 180 hours, ending
at 6,213 hours.
This objective can be achieved with two hardware configurations,
similar to those already discussed. There is one major difference; the
planetary instrument scan and video data recording and playback units,
as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2, are now required. For the first configu-
ration, in addition to the video data units, the power supply and attitude
control are required in a normal path after 288 hours. A successful
midcourse correction is required, as well as the series circuits of the
data encoder (see Exhibit 15) over the entire 6,213 hours. The radio
may again be either coherent or noncoherent, with the receiver being
required whenever commands are necessary, either in-line or redun-
dant to CC and S signals.
The applicable degraded state involves the attitude control units; i.e.,
star tracking may be lost after the trajectory correction, with inertial
roll control being employed at t25. Again, this requires that the com-
mand detector and decoder be operable at t25 and that the radio be coherent.
The probability that the hardware demanded under these conditions
survives to 6,213 hours is 0.216. Integrating the expected accrual rate
over the relatively small time interval gives a total FOM contribution of
14.1 percent for the tape playback objective.
c. Total Mission Worth Accrual
As discussed above, worth is accrued during a mission
in two ways. Cruise science, engineering telemetry, and orbit determi-
nation accrue worth over a period of time, while star acquisition, traj-
ectory correction, encounter with tracking, encounter science, and tape
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playback are assumed to accrue worth at specific times. Exhibit 56
shows the average and maximum (assigned)value accrual rates for
the continuous objectives.
The expected worth contributions of the five one-shot objectives
and the three time-dependent objectives (at their final values) are tabu-
fated in Exhibit 57. The integration of the curves in Exhibit 56, together
with the addition of the one-shot objectives, are presented in Exhibit 58.
The maximum curve, it will be recalled, is a plot of assigned worths
and represents aperfect mission, while the average (expected) curve
represents the accrual of worth for an average mission, theoretically
determined over a series of many identically defined missions.
Therefore, given the assumptions discussed throughout this report,
the expected worth accrued for a mission--determined over a totality of
many missions which differ stochastically only due to equipment failures--
is equal to 34 percent of the desired worth, or that worth which would
accrue if all equipment were functioning properly through encounter and
po st-encounter.
The comparable figure for Mariner R was 42 percent. It must be
remembered, however, that the Mariner C mission is more than twice
as long, and more important, the Mariner C worth assignments have
heavily emphasized those objectives which are achieved late in the mis-
sion when reliability is necessarily reduced. On the other hand, the re-
sult given here for Mariner C was arrived at without consideration of
the data automation system, and the inclusion of this complex system
would undoubtedly subtract to some extent from the figure-of-merit.
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EXHIBIT 57 - ACCRUED WORTH FOR MISSION OBJECTIVES
Continuous Objective s:
Cruise Science
Engineering Telemetry
Orbit Determination
One-Shot Objectives:
Star Acquisition
Trajectory Correction
Enc ounte r
Encounter Science
Tape Playback
Totals
Maximum
12.0
3.5
4.5
1.0
2.0
6.0
II.0
60.0
I00.0
Expected
Worth
6.3
2.0
3.6
0.9
1.9
2.9
2.6
14.1
34.3
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V. ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS
The ability to draw meaningful conclusions from a reliability as-
sessment is limited to a significant degree by the availability of a back-
ground of experience upon which judgments can be based. Clearly, no
such background exists if comparisons are restricted to flyby missions
aimed at the vicinity of Mars. The extremely successful Mariner R
1962 program does provide a point of reference that possesses many of
the same design requirements and objectives as the program under con-
sideration here. Despite the fact that the single Venus probe does not
constitute a statistically valid sample, comparisons to it are inevitable
and have been made freely throughout this report. Such comparisons
enter into many of the conclusions discussed in this section.
A. General Conclusions
1. The most significant general conclusion that can be made
about the Mariner C spacecraft is that its reliability is considerably
higher than would be estimated by extrapolating the predictions made
for Mariner R. The possibilities for random failures are certainly much
greater if total mission length is extended two and one-half times, which
is the approximate ratio between the Mariner C and Mariner R missions.
Moreover, the distinct emphasis that has been deliberately placed on end-
of-the-mission objectives operates to bring the figurerof-merit down to
the level of an overall classical reliability. Despite these factors, the
figure-of-merit and the predicted reliability which it implies have re-
mained relatively high.
2. The predicted classical reliability of 0.111 must be recog-
nized as applying to a somewhat arbitrarily defined "successful" mis-
sion in which most, but not all, objectives are completely fulfilled. The
exclusion of thousands of data encoder parts, justified by the knowledge
that they serve a secondary objective, greatly influenced the calculated
reliability. Had these parts been included, it is certain that the pre-
dicted reliability of the remainder of the spacecraft would have been al-
most totally obscured.
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3. Neither measure of spacecraft reliability, FOM or classi-
cal, includes the potentially degrading effects of the data automation sys-
tem. This system must inevitably add several thousand components to
the spacecraft parts complement and, if it were conventionally con-
structed, would lower the predicted reliability to a very noticeable ex-
tent. If the system were comparable to the science data conditioning
system of Mariner R, it would reduce the predicted reliability by a fac-
tor in the order of 0.5. Improved fabrication techniques being employed
in its construction may well operate to prevent any such degradation of
reliability.
4. A broad view of the spacecraft subsystems shows a reason-
ably good balance in the individual reliability predictions. There is no
outstandingly "poor" subsystem and, conversely, there is no dispropor-
tionately reliable subsystem. For this reason, no obvious recommen-
dation can be made that attention be focused on any particular area. In-
dividual subsystems should, of course, be examined at any time for
reliability weaknesses, but it appears that this kind of activity need not
be directed at specially selected functional areas.
5. Regardless of the interpretation placed on the reliability pre-
dictions resulting from this study, the inherent reliability of the parts
and designs should be conserved by proper packaging and wiring techniques
and by close control of fabrication and testing processes. These factors
are included in this study only to the extent that they can be introduced
into individual part failure rates. Reliability cannot be improved, but only
degraded, by assembly and testing operations.
B. Subsystem Conclusions
Consideration of each of the individual subsystems has not neces-
sarily brought to light a significant body of pertinent conclusions in each
case. Nevertheless, certain observations can be made in many instances.
I. Data Encoder
The overall design philosophy of the Mariner C data encoder
tends toward higher reliability than similar data sampling and encoding
systems, such as Mariner R. This is discernible in several ways, the
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most noticeable of which is the provision for A-D converter and PN gen-
erator groups that are redundant by command. Use of complementary
flip-flops in the sequencers (shift registers) tends to insure that the con-
sequences of failure will be a direct function of where the failure occurs.
That is, a complementary flip-flop has a tendency to fail "off," while a
conventional flip-flop is just as likely to fail "on" and "off." Therefore,
the consequence of complementary flip-flop failure in a shift register is
that the associated channel or those following it will no longer be select-
able. Failure of a conventional flip-flop could have the same result, but
in addition--and with equal probability--it could fail "on," resulting in
the switching of more than one input at a time to the common output, thus
in turn resulting in loss of all of the inputs.
Increased reliability is also obtained by shifting through two (and
in one case three) sequencers simultaneously, thus tending to insure that
failure of an entire sequencer will not affect any channels other than those
associated with the failed sequencer. In addition, diode redundancy is
used in the logic throughout the subsystem. Although comparative numer-
ical gains that can be and have been made with such design philosophies
cannot be determined in a study of this scope, it is evident that consider-
able thought has been given to reliable design.
Some negative conclusions can also be made without regard to cal-
culated numbers, however. For example, the probability of getting any
particular digital engineering word can be increased by changing the logic
of a typical selection signal from 10x i15 (for event registers 1 and 2)
to I0 x (I15 + 105). Then, if logic signal ll5 were unavailable because
of failure in the sequencer stage associated with it or in any stage pre-
ceding it, the event register could still be read out by logic signal 105.
In the single-pole electronic switch, one transformer secondary
winding and the resistor across it serve no functional purpose. Although
it is difficult within the scope of the present study to make exact deter-
minations at this level, it would seem that a normal, two-winding trans-
former could be found for this application.
Eight decks of telemetry channels are found to be dependent on unit
2144 {I0 switch), while only two are dependent on unit 2145 (ii switch).
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Thus, failure "off" of the 10 switch would result in a much greater sub-
system loss than the same failure of the II switch. This situation could
be alleviated by some reassignment of the channels. As was stated pre-
viously, the gains resulting from such changes would require more de-
tailed study and perhaps some comparative analyses; for comparative
purposes, calculations would be required for the various alternatives.
Note that in the previous paragraph it was necessary to refer to
"subsystem loss." The figure-of-merit approach to reliability requires
that some consideration be given to success. Considering the subsystem
independently, it could reasonably be stated that, since there will be two
A-D converters and two PN generators aboard, increased reliability
could possibly be attained by a.llowing both PN generators to operate
with one A-D converter and, if possible, with both A-D converters. This
would depend on the availability of at least one command, which, to the
knowledge of the analyst, is available. However, on an overall system
mission basis the engineering data has relatively little worth (3.5 out of
i001. Therefore, consideration should perhaps be given to eliminating
the redundant A-D converter so that its power and weight requirements
could be devoted to higher worth portions of the system.
2. Command Detector and Decoder
It is quite evident that the spacecraft is well protected against
the false execution of commands from outside influence when all of the
command equipment is unfailed. That is, when operating in a completely
unfailed state, a sync subcarrier must be available to lock up the com-
mand detector before a command can be executed. This action must then
be followed by 26 "O's" and the three decoder start bits, "I," "i," "0."
Then, if the next six bits contain an even number of "l's," indicating an
actual command, the command will be executed. Thus the protection
against false execution of commands is extensive.
The design does not include any hardware redundancy, and appears
to be straightforward with respect to design simplicity considering the
complexity of what is being accomplished in the command detector.
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The effect of any failures in this subsystem can be looked upon as
causing a command either to be unexecutable or to be executed continu-
ously. With respect to the latter, the ultimate result of the failure de-
pends on the use of the output at the receiving end.
It is interesting to note that the consequences of subsystem com-
mand failure indicated with an IS switch differ from those involving an
IP switch. Over a long time period it can be said that any failure on the
input side of the transformer associated with a command indicated by an
IP switch results in further inability to execute that command. It is rec-
ognized that, depending on the particular mode of failure, a single execution
indication would falsely appear. However, in many (if not all) cases, the
effect of such an execution could be offset by the proper execution of an-
other command. For example, .if the low bit rate were required and such
a failure as described above caused the bit rate to change to the high rate, a
proper command of low bit rate to the spacecraft would rectify the situation.
For those commands indicated by an IS switch, the results of some fail-
ures are the same as for the IP switch. In addition, though, there are
failures that cause a continuous output. This situation could be helped by
a-c coupling the input to the switch if this can be tolerated in the circuit
design. This would at least alleviate the consequences due to such modes
of failure originating in the active portion of the decoding gates.
3. Central Computer and Sec_uencer
The basic design concepts applying to this subsystem do not
differ extensively from those previously employed. The combined require-
ment for both short- and long-term sequencing functions dictates the neces-
sity for long chains of countdown circuitry. Much of this equipment serves
no primary purpose, after short-term requirements are met, except to
provide an input to the long-term dividers. The number of parts involved
raises the hazard of a random failure and loss of the timing functions at
encounter, when they are so important. Replication of the dividers would
be complex and costly, but a standby long-term clock is desirable. An
astronomical or optical device, actuated by the transit of selected celes-
tial references, might be implemented with less complexity. This would
require study and development.
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4. Power Supply
The division of the principal power supply elements into two
groups and the redundancy afforded by this move represent a major ef-
fort to improve reliability at minimum cost and weight. Advantage has
been taken of the mission profile characteristics, and the design is prob-
ably close to optimum for the type of power source available. The solar
array itself is the area which should be examined if further reliability
improvement is sought. The isolation and overvoltage protection con-
stitutes the largest single contributor to the unreliability of this subsystem.
5. Attitude Control
Elimination of the antenna hinge function has provided a sub-
stantial reliability gain within the attitude control subsystem. The solar
pressure stabilization system, if it performs according to the operational
regime that has been calculated for it, will produce a dramatic reduction
in valve duty cycle for two of the control axes. This subsystem shows
an encouragingly high reliability when compared with the Mariner R sub-
system; however, the acquisition of Canopus may, for operational reasons,
depend upon the availability of commands and, while this has been ac-
counted for in the predicted reliability, it emphasizes the necessity for
devoting sufficient attention to interface problems. Consideration of the
inertial control operating mode reinforces this recommendation. Signals
from the command subsystem should be transmitted in the most fail-safe
manner.
6. Trajectory Correction
The trajectory correction operation shows a relatively high
predicted reliability. The principal reason for this is the short operating
time, but higher reliabilities of the subsystems involved have contributed
significantly to the apparently favorable result. The estimated figure for
operational probability of success is encouraging and suggests a reexami-
nation of the reasons for two maneuvers. This capability has been obtained
with only a modest increase in parts, but the propellant storage problem
raises some question as to the hazard involved in carrying high-pressure
tankage for the full mission.
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7. Radio Subsystem
An obvious conclusion concerning the radio subsystem is that
the reliability of the transmitter is very high for this class of equipment,
primarily due to the extensive application of redundancy. On the other
hand, the receiver, which is more complex, is not marked by any type
of redundancy, either at the component level or in the functional sense.
Replication of the receiver would indeed be costly, particularly in terms
of weight, and is probably not justified because there is no direct depend-
ence on the receiver after the maneuvers. The receiver is required for
command capability, however, and in this redundant sense its role con-
tinues to be important throughout the mission, especially at encounter.
8. Pyrotechnic Subsys'tem
The classical reliabilities predicted for solar array deploy-
ment and maneuver propulsion timing reflect the high level of reliability
of the pyrotechnic subsystem. The redundancy incorporated into the de-
sign is quite complete and should assure proper initiation of these pyro-
technic events. Attention in these areas should be focused on the me-
chanical devices themselves, as these are more likely to fail than the
initiating circuitry.
APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX A
UNIT FAILURE RATES
The piece parts count and resultant failure rate for each reliability
unit used in the assessment of the Mariner C spacecraft are listed on the
following pages. It was necessary in establishing accurate representa-
tions of the spacecraft subsystems to contrive some units which account
for various modes of failure of the component parts° The simple listing
of the parts complement of such a unit is not sufficient to show the man-
ner in which the appropriate failure rates of the unit are derived. There-
fore, a section has been included with this appendix which presents all
details of these specialized unit failure rate computations.
In some instances, parts counts were based on parts lists submitted
with the documentation; otherwise they were taken from applicable sche-
matic diagrams. Wherever diagrams were used to establish a parts
count, the identification of the parts may have been incomplete and occa-
sionally it was necessary to estimate the exact classification of some
parts. This was not generally the case, and it is felt that the parts
counts presented here are quite adequate for the purposes of the study.
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lOl:
l . Unit Parts Complements
Unit
Cover Latch
Latch
Number of
Component s
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.02
102: Hinge and Actuating Spring
Hinge
Actuator
1
1
2
.02a Z
1.05a
1.07a
103: Motor and Gearing
Motor, electrical
Gear box
Potentiometer
1
1
1
3
3.00
6.30
1.08
10.38
104: Scan Electronics
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, ceramic
Resistors, wirewound
Resistors, carbon composition
Diodes, zener
Diode s
Transistors
Transformers, 4 terminals
Transformers, rectifier
Thermistors
Neon lamps
Photo diodes
40
8
4
I00
7
2O
28
2
4
2
4
4
223
O8
01
22
01
26
15
30
8O
2 47
.30
1.00
.38
35.98
iFailure rate given is to be multiplied by i0
unless otherwise noted.
2
a = actuations.
-6
Unit is "per hour"
105:
1 06:
Unit
Recorder Mechanism
Drive belts
Bearing assemblies
Pulley shaft assemblies
Shaft bearings (ball)
Input bearings (ball)
Clutches, spring type
Input pulleys
Tape drive belt
Sp ring s
Pivoted sleeves
Bearings
Ball bearings, pair
Housing and center shaft
Hub assembly, rotating
Tape roller assemblies
Endless magnetic tape (Mylar)
During mission
At encounter only
Record Electronics
Capacitor s
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, metal film
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Transformer
Relay
Record heads
Record motor
Number of
Component s
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8
6
48
8
28
18
1
1
2
1
121
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
Du ring At
Mission Encounter
4 .I0 10.0
2 .50 2.0
2 .01
4 .50 2.00
4 .5O 2.0O
Z 2.50
2 .01
1 .10 i0.0
Z .01
2 .I0
2 .50 2.0
i .05 2.0
l .01
1 .01
6 .5O 2.0
1 .Ol
31 9.8O
3O 93. O4
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.01
.01
.15
.30
.80
.60
.20
3.00
15.10
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107:
Individual
Number of Component
Unit Components Failure Rate
Playback Electronics
Capacitors, tantalum 50
Capacitor, film 1
Capacitors, glass 120
Resistors, metal film 228
Resistors, carbon composition 2
Resistor, variable l
Resistors, film 333
Resistors, wir ewound 2
Potentiometer 1
Diodes, silicon 156
Diodes, zener II
Diodes, power l0
Transistors 168
Transformers, 4 terminals 3
Transformer, 8 terminals 1
Transformer, Ii terminals 1
Relay, magnetic latching 1
Chokes 3
Switches, silicon controlled 2
Rectifiers Z
Playback heads Z
Playback motors Z
Ii00
08
01
01
01
01
01
01
2Z
I .08
.15
.26
.01
.30
.80
1.6O
2.20
.60
.20
.30
l .Z0
.Z0
3.00
70.16
2001: Rate Generator
Capacitors, tantalum 5 .08
Capacitors, glass/ceramic Z8 .01
Resistors, carbon film 90 .01
Diodes, silicon 33 .15
Transistors Z5 .30
Transformer, 4 terminals 1 .80
Relay, latching 1 .60
Rectifier_ Z l.Z0
1
185 16.03
iThis is the failure rate for the series components only; IZ of the 33
diodes are arranged in configurations as shown in (a), (b), (c), and (d).
(See Appendix A, section Z, p. Z3Z.) The reliability of unit 2001 is thus
RZ001 = RsRaRbRcR d
-16.03 x 10-6t
where R = e
s
Similar notation will be used for other units of the Data Encoder where
appropriate.
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2002:
Unit
Number of
Component s
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
Mode Selector
Capacitors, tantalum 23 .08
Resistors, carbon film 32 .01
Diode s 19 .15
Transistors 1 5 .30
Transformers, 4 terminals 3 .80
Re ctifie r s 4 i.20
Relays, latching 3 .60
99 17.55
2003-1: Switching Circuits (Partial)
Relays, latching 6 .60
6 3.60
2003-2: Switching Circuits (Partial)
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Relays, latching
Re ctifier s
4 .08
12 .01
57 .01
22 .15
16 .3O
3 .60
2 1.20
2
116 11.51
2003-3: Switching Circuits (Partial)
No parts
iFailure rate of series components only; 12 capacitors are in the (j)
configuration. (See Appendix A, section 2, p. 232.)
R2002 = R R.
s 3
2Failure rate of series components only; IZ diodes are arranged as in
(a), (b), (c), (d). (See Appendix A, section 2, p. 232.)
R2003_2 = RsRaRbRcR d
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Unit
2003-4: Switching Circuits (Partial)
No parts
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2004-1: PNG "OR" (Partial)
Unit 2004
Capacitors, glass
Capacitor, tantalum
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Unit 2004-1 = 1/2 unit 2004
25 .01
I .08
88 .01
43 .15
25 .30
182 I0.66
91 5.331
2004-2: PNG "OR" (Partial)
Same as unit 2004-I
2005: PNG "A"
Capacitor, tantalum 1 .08
Capacitors, glass/ceramic 21 .01
Resistors, carbon film 76 .01
Diodes, silicon 71 .15
Transistors 19 .30
188 8.702
2006: PNG "B"
Same as 2005
Iseries components only; 30 of the diodes are arranged as follows: IZ as
in (c), 6 as in (a), and 12 as in (d). (See Appendix A, section Z, p. Z3Z. )
R2004_1 = R s 1/2(Rc )3 (Ra)3(Rd )3
2Series components only; 58 of the diodes are arranged as follows: 2 as
in (b), 4 as in (a), 4 as in (e), 40 as in (g), and 8 as in (h). (See Appen-
dix A, section 2, p. 232.)
R2005 = RsRbReRh(Ra )2 (Rg) 5
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2007:
Unit
Power Supply
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, paper
Capacitors, glass/ceramic
Resistors, wirewound
Resistors, carbon film
Diode s
Diodes, power
Transistors
Transformer, 8 terminals
Number of
Compone nt s
15
2
4
35
21
26
8
15
1
127
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
O8
01
01
22
01
15
01
30
1.60
19.25
2008: Modulator
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
30 .01
112 .01
22 .15
28 .30
192 13.12
2010: Mixer Amplifier
Resistors
Transistors
12 .01
5 .30
17 1.62
2011: Data Selector
Capacitors, glass 30 .01
Resistors, carbon film I00 .01
Diodes, silicon 40 .15
Transistors 24 .30
1 94 1 0.001
Iseries components only; 30 of the diodes are arranged as follows: 8 as
in (a), 4 as in (b), 8 as in (f), 6 as in (i), and 4 as in (c). (See Appen-
dix A, section 2, p. 232.)
R2011 = RsRc(Ra)4(Rb)2(Rf)Z(Ri )2
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2012-1:
Unit
Unit
ADC "OR" (Partial)
2012:
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode, silicon
Transistors
Unit 2012-1 = 1/2 unit 2012
Number of
Components
4
14
8
4
3O
15
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.30
2.58
i .29
2012-2: ADC "OR" (Partial)
Same as 201Z-I
2013: ADC "A"
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
2
8
2
6
18
.01
.01
.15
.30
2.20
2014: ADC "B"
Same as Z013
2015: Isolation Amplifier
Capacitor s
Resistors, film
Diodes, zener
Transistors
IIAII
2
i0
3
8
23
.01
.23
.26
.30
5.50
2016: Isolation Amplifier "B"
Same as 2015
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2017:
Unit
1 O, 1 1 and Medium-Speed Drive
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Number of
Components
12
48
14
12
86
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.30
6.30
2018: Science Selection Circuits
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transisors
8
24
II
6
49
.01
.01
.15
.30
3.77
2019: Master Counter
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
18
48
11
12
89
.01
.01
.15
.30
5.91
2020: I 00 Synchronizer
Capacitors, glass
Resistors
Diode s
Transistors
5
11
10
3
29
.01
.01
.15
.30
2.56
2021: 200 Synchronizer
Same as 2020
ZOZ2: 300 Synchronizer
Same as 2020
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2023:
Unit
Word Sync Amplifier
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes
Transistors
Number of
Components
2
8
2
Z
14
Individual
C omponent
Failure Rate
o01
.01
.15
.30
1.00
2025: 100 Sequencer
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode, zener
Diode s
Transistors
12
30
1
12
22
77
.01
.01
.26
.15
.30
9.08
2025-1: i00 Sequencer (Partial)
Capacitors, glass
Diode, zener
Diodes
Resistors, film
Transistors
3
1
2
13
4
23
.01
.26
.15
.01
.30
1 o92
2025-2: i00 Sequencer (Partial)
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
1
2
1
2
6
.01
.01
.15
.30
.78
2025-3,-°., -i0: I00 Sequencer (Partial)
Same as 2025-2
2026: Ii0 Sequencer
Same as ZOZ5
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2027:
Unit
200 Sequencer
Same as 2025
Number of
Component s
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2028: 212 Sequencer
Same as 2025
2029: 1.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Capacitor 1 .01
Resistors 4 .01
Diode s 2 o15
Diode, zener 1 1 .26
Transformer, 14 terminals 1 .70
9 1.31
2030: 300 Sequencer
Same as 2025
2031: 401 Sequencer
Same as 2025
2032: 1.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Same as 2029
2033: 423 Sequencer
Same as 2025
2034: 0.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Capacitor s
Resistors
2 .01
6 .01
IFailure rate divided among four units. This transformer also serves
units 2032, 2034, and 2049.
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2034:
Unit
0.5-Volt Bucking Supply (Cont.)
Diodes
Diode, zener 1
Transformer, 14 terminal
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2 o15
1 .26
1 .70
12 1.34
2035: Driver
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode, silicon
Transistors
2 .01
8 .01
1 .15
2 .30
13 .85
2037: 40, 41, 42, 43 Drive
Capacitors, glass 4 .01
Resistors, carbon film 6 .01
Resistors, film 8 .01
Diodes, silicon 2 .15
Transistors 4 .30
24 i .68
2038: Low-Speed Deck Position Indicator
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Z8 .01
81 .01
20 .15
Z0 .30
149 i0o09
2039" Transfer Register
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
i0 .01
68 .01
26 .15
14 .30
i18 8.88
i
Failure rate divided among four units.
units 2029, 2032, and 2049.
This transformer also serves
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2040:
Unit
Digital Word Programmer
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Number of
Component s
46
192
5O
54
342
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.30
26.08
2041: Sync Circuits
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
8
32
16
8
64
.01
.01
.15
.30
5.20
2042: Event Register, No. l
Capacitor, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode
Transistors
l
3
13
1
4
22
.O8
.01
.01
.15
.30
1.59
2043: Event Register, No. 2
Same as 2042
2044: Event Register, No. 3
Same as 2042
2045: Event Register, No. 4
Same as 2042
2046: Command Detector Monitor (VCO)
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
23
134
45
3O
232
.01
.01
.15
.30
17.32
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2047:
Unit
Command Detector Monitor
(In/Out Lock)
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Number of
Component s
8
24
6
4
42
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.30
2.42
2048: Event Timer
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors
Resistors
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
49
4
13
146
43
28
283
.01
.01
.01
.01
.15
.30
16.97
2049: 0.5-Volt Bucking Supply
Same as 2034
2050: Low- Level Amplifier
Capacitor s, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Capacitor, paper
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
Transformer, 14 terminal
Transformer, 5 terminal
Choke
8
5
1
25
2
13
1
1
1
57
.08
.01
.01
.01
.15
.30
2.80
1.00
.20
9.15
2051: I01 Switch, Single Pole
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
Transformer
3
4
9
Z
3
1
22
.O8
.01
.23
.15
.30
1.20
4.75
PRC R-362
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Unit
2052-2053: 102-103 Switches
Same as 2051
Single Pole
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2054-2063: 105-114 Switches, Single Pole
Same as 2051
2064-2066: 117-119 Switches, Single Pole
Same as 2051
2068-2076: 202-210 Switches Single Pole
Same as 2051
2077-2080: 213-216 Switches Single Pole
Same as 2051
2081-2089: 221-229 Switches Single Pole
Same as 2051
2090-2099: 300-309 Switches, Single Pole
Same as 2051
2100: 403 Switch (T), Double Pole
Capacitor s, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
Transformer
3
5
II
3
4
1
27
.08
.08
.01
.15
.30
1.20
3.25
2101: 406 Switch (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
PRC R-362
182
Unit
2102-2104: 415-417 Switches,
Same as 2051
Single Pole
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2105: 422 Switch, Single Pole
Same as 2051
2106: 425 Switch, Single Pole
Same as 2051
21 07: 427 Switch, Single Pole
Same as 2051
2108-2109: 211-212 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2110-2112: 217-219 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2113-2114: 401-402 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2115-2116: 404-405 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2117-2124: 407-414 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2125-2128: 418-421 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 21 00
PRC R-362
183
Number of
Unit Components
2129-2130: 423-424 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2131: 426 Switch (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2132-2143: 428-439 Switches (T), Double Pole
Same as 2100
2144-2145: I0-II Switches, Single Pole
Same as Z051
2146-2149: 40-43 Switches, Single Pole
Same as g051
2151: Current Generator
Resistors 6 .01
Diode 1 .15
Diode, zener i .26
Transistors 4 .30
12 1.67
3000: Command Detector (Partial)
Capacitor s 8
Capacitors, tantalum 33
Capacitors, glass 108
Diode s 128
Diodes, zener 2
Resistors, composition 168
Resistors, film 222
Resistors 13
Transistors 104
Transformers, 4 terminal 4
Inductor Z
792
.01
.08
.01
.15
_26
01
01
01
30
8O
20
62.35
PRC R-362
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3001-I:
Unit
Command Detector (Partial)
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Diodes
Resistors
Transistors
Number of
Components
3
3
4
16
4
3O
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.08
.01
.15
.01
.30
2.23
3002: Programming Logic and Counter
Capacitors
Capacitors, glass
Diode s
Resistors
Resistors, film
Resistors, composition
Transistors
15
48
79
64
2
8O
33
321
.01
.01
.15
.01
.01
.01
.30
23.84
3003: Shift Register, Stages 1 and 2
Capacitors, glass
Diode
Resistors, composition
Transistors
12
8
20
2
42
.01
.15
.01
.30
2.12
3004-1: In Lock Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see AppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
is equal to XON + i/2 kIND, T for IS. Ii .346
3004-2: In Lock Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see AppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XOF F + I/2XIND, T for IS. 12 1.76
PRC R-362
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Unit
3005-i: Shift Register (Partial)
Capacitors, glass
Diode s
Resistors
Transistor
Number of
Components
3
2
5
1
iI
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.15
.01
.30
.68
3005-2: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-1
3006-I: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-I
3006-2: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-i
3007-1: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-I
3007-Z: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-i
3008-1: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-1
3008-2: Shift Register (Partial)
Same as 3005-i
3009-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3010-I: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-Z
PRC R-362
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Unit
3011-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
3012-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial}
Same as 3004-2
3013-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial}
Same as 3004-2
3014-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial}
Same as 3004-2
3015-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3016-I: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3017-I: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3018-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3019-1: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
3020-I: Shift Register Drivers (Partial)
Same as 3004-2
PRC R-362
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30Z1_-',.-:
Unit
Decoding Gate
For component parts,
Number of
Components
see Appendix A, section 2.
Reliability equation derived on p. 235.
3022,:_': Decoding Gate {Partial)
For component parts, see Appendix A,
Reliability equation derived on p. 236.
section 2.
3022-AI_:-': Decoding Gate {Partial)
For component parts, see Appendix A,
Reliability equation derived on p. 236.
section 2.
3023_-3028':-': Decoding Gate
Same as 3021":'-
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
3029,:-'-3033_-': Decoding Gate {Partial)
Same as 3022_ _"
3033-A2,:-': Decoding Gate {Partial)
Same as 3022-AI_1 -"
3034_1-': Decoding Gate {Partial)
Same as 3022':-"
3034-A2_-': Decoding Gate (Partial)
Same as 3022-AI_: -"
3035_:_'-3044':-': Decoding Gate {Partial)
Same as 3022'_
3044-A4,:-': Decoding Gate (Partial)
Same as 3022-AI;',-"
PRG R- 362
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Unit
3045;_-3046_-: Decoding Gate (Partial)
Same as 3022 _1'
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
3081":_: Decoding Gate
Same as 3021_
3047-i : DG-1 Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see Appendix A,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XON + 1/Z XIND,T of IP.
3047-2: DC- I Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see Appendix A,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XOFF + 1/2XIND, T of IP.
3048-i: DC-2A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-I
3048-2: DC-2ASwitch (Partial)
Same as 3047-2
5 .223
1.35
3049-I: DG-4A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-I
3049-2: DG-4A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-Z
3050-I: DG-5 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-I
3050-2: DG-5 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-2
3051-i:
Unit
DC-6 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-I
Number of
Components
PRC R-362
189
Individual
Component
Failure Kate
3051-2: DC-6 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-2
3052-i: DC-7 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-i
3052-2: DC-7 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-2
3053-i: DC-8 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-I
3053-2: DC-8 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3047-2
3054-i: DC-ZB Switch (Partial)
For component parts, seeAppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XON + I/ZkIND, T of IS.
3054-2: DC-ZB Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see AppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XOF F + I/2XIND, T of IS.
3055-I: DC-3 Switch (Partial)
For component parts, see AppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals XON+ I/ZkIND, T of Decoding
Gate plus XON + I/ZXIND, T of IS.
II
12
16
.346
1.76
.506
PRC R-362
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Unit
Number of
Components
3055-2: DC-3 Switch (Partial)
For component parts, seeAppendixA,
section 2, p. 234. Unit failure rate
equals )_OFF + 1/2kIND, T of ISo 12
3057-I: DC-9 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-I
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
I.76
3057-2: DC-9 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3058-i: DC-10 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
3058-2: DC-10 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3059-i: DC-II Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
3059-2: DC-II Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3060-I: DC-12 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-1
3060-2: DC-12 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3061-i: DC-13A Switch (Partial.)
Same as 3054-i
3061-2:
Unit
DC- 13A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-2
3062-1: DC-13B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-i
3062-2: DC-13B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-Z
3063-1: DC-13C Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-I
3063-2: DC-13C Switch (Partial}
Same as 3054-2
3064-I: DC-14A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-I
3064-2" DC-14A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-2
3065-i: DC-14B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-i
3065-2: DC-14B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-2
3066-I: DC-15 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-1
3066-2: DC-15 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
Number of
Components
PRC R-36Z
191
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
PRC R-36Z
19Z
3067 -i:
Unit
DC-I 6 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-I
3067-2: DC-16 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3068-I: DC-17 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
3068-2: DC-17 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3069-I: DC-18 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-1
3069-2: DC-18 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-Z
3070-I: DC-19 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-I
3070-Z: DC-19 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-Z
3071-I: DC-Z0 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
3071-2: DC-Z0 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
307Z-I: DC-21 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-I
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
Unit
3072-2: DC-ZI Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3073-I: DC-23 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-I
3073-2: DC-23 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3074-i: DC-24 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-1
3074-2: DC-24 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3075-I: DC-25A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-i
3075-2: DC-25A Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-2
3076-1: DC-25B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-I
3076-2: DC-25B Switch (Partial)
Same as 3054-2
3077-i: DC-26 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
3077-2: DC-26 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
Number of
Components
PRC R-362
193
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
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Unit
3078-I: DC-27 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-i
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
3078-2: DC-27 Switch (Partial)
Same as 3055-2
3079: Transformer-Rectifier
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, power
Resistors
Transformer, 13 terminals
Inductors
4
6
6
1
2
19
.O8
.01
.01
2.60
.20
3.44
3080: Amplifier and Sync Switch
Capacitor
Diodes
Resistors
Transistors
Transformer, 4 terminals
i
2
7
3
i
14
.01
.15
.01
.30
.80
2.08
3082: Control Flip- Flop
Capacitors, glass
Diodes
Resistors
Transistors
6
4
l0
2
22
.01
.15
.01
.30
l .36
3083: Event Logic and Switch
Capacitors
Diodes
Resistors
Transistors
Transformer, 4 terminals
2
5
11
4
1
23
.01
.15
.01
.30
.80
2.88
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3084:
Unit
CC and S Alert Logic and Switch
Capacitor
Diode s
Resistors
Transistors
Transformer, 4 terminals
Number of
Components
1
3
7
3
l
15
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.15
.01
.30
.80
2.23
3085: CC and S Sync and QC Logic and Switches
Capacitors
Diodes
Resistors
Transistors
Trans forTe r,
Transformer,
4 terminals
6 terminals
3
9
15
6
1
1
35
.01
.15
.01
.30
.80
1.20
5.33
401: Transformer -Rectifier
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, paper
Diodes, silicon
Resistors, carbon
Transformer, I0 terminals
2
l
16
3
1
23
.O8
.01
.15
.01
2.00
4.60
402: Oscillator
Capacitor, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Resistors, glass film
Transistors
Transformer, 4 terminals
Crystal
i
15
I0
39
13
1
1
8O
O8
01
15
01
30
8O
i 00
7.82
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403:
Unit
l-pps, 25-pps, and 1-ppm Counter
Resistors, glass
Resistors, wirewound
Resistors, glass film
Resistor, carbon
Transistors
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Cores
Inductors
Number of
Components
51
iI
I06
1
46
26
6
42
30
3
322
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
01
2Z
01
01
30
01
O8
15
0
.20
25.44
404: Magnetic - I000
Resistors, glass
Resistors, wirewound
Transistors
Diodes, silicon
Cores
3O
9
12
3
38
92
.01
.22
.30
.15
0
6.33
405: Launch Matrix
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Resistor, composition
Resistors, glass
2
I
15
12
I
15
46
O8
01
15
30
01
23
9.48
406: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Z
8
3
1
Z
16
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
1.55
406a:
407:
407a:
408:
408a:
409:
Unit
Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
Dr ive r
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
Input Decoder
Resistors, glass
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Number of
Components
1
1
2
2
8
3
l
2
16
l
l
2
2
8
3
I
2
16
1
l
2
130
19
3
PRC R-36Z
1 97
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.15
.60
.75
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
1.55
.15
.60
.75
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
1.55
.15
.60
.75
.01
.01
.08
PRC R-362
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409:
Unit
Input Decoder (Cont.)
Capacitor, paper
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Number of
Components
1
84
31
268
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.15
.30
23.64
410: Address Register
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
4
2
41
33
9
89
.01
.08
.01
.15
.30
8.26
411: Maneuver Duration (Readin-Readout)
Capacitors, glass
Capacitor, tantalum
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Diodes, zener
Transistors
15
1
58
24
4
14
116
.01
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
9.65
412: Pitch Maneuver Duration
Capacitors, film
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Cores
3
13
45
3
23
87
.01
.01
.15
.30
0
7.81
413: Pitch Polarity Set
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
2
ii
3
Z
18
.01
.01
.15
.30
1.18
414:
415:
416:
417:
418:
Unit
Roll Maneuver Duration
Capacitors, film
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Cores
Roll Polarity Set
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Velocity Maneuver Duration
Capacitors, film
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Cores
Maneuver Clock
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, wirewound
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Cores
Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diode, zener
Number of
Components
3
13
45
3
23
87
2
II
3
2
18
3
14
46
3
23
89
2
1
6
37
14
18
29
1 07
3
9
1
PRG R-362
199
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.30
0
7.81
.01
.01
.15
.30
1.18
.01
.01
.15
.30
0
7.97
.O8
.01
.22
.01
.15
.30
0
9.36
.O8
.01
.26
PRG R-362
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418:
Unit
Driver (Cont.)
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
419: Relay Set Coil
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
420: Dr ive r
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, glass
Sensistor, silicon
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Transformer, 6 terminals
421: Relay Set Coil
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
422: Relay Set Coil
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
424: Start Pitch Duration Switch
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Number of
Components
5
2
2O
1
1
2
2
I
13
I
12
I
4
I
35
i
I
2
1
1
2
2
11
4
2
19
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.15
.30
1.94
.15
.60
.75
.08
.01
.01
.01
.15
.26
.30
i.20
4.77
.15
.60
.75
.15
.60
.75
.01
.01
.15
.30
1.33
425:
426:
427:
427a:
428:
Unit
Magnetic - 2000
Resistors, glass
Resistors, wirewound
Capacitor, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Cores
Master Time Matrix
Resistors, glass
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Dr ive r
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass film
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Diodes, silicon
Relay, latching
Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass film
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Number of
Components
4O
i0
1
5
1
15
43
I15
19
42
12
73
3
9
5
1
2
2O
2
2
4
2
8
4
1
2
17
PRC R-362
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Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.22
.08
.15
.26
.30
0
8.19
.01
.15
.30
I0.09
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
l .94
.15
.60
1.50
•08
.01
.15
.26
.30
1.70
PRC R-362
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428a:
Unit
Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
Number of
Components
1
1
2
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.15
.60
.75
429: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass film
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
2
8
4
i
Z
17
•08
.01
.15
.26
.30
I .70
429a: Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
1
1
2
.15
.60
.75
430: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass film
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
2
8
4
1
Z
17
.O8
.01
.15
.26
.30
l.70
430a: Relay
Diode, silicon
Relay, latching
1
1
2
.15
.60
.75
431: Driver
Resistors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
8
2
4
.01
_08
.15
431:
431a:
432:
432a:
433:
433a:
Unit
Driver (Cont.)
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Relay, latching
Dr ive r
Resistors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Relay, latching
Driver
Resistors, glass
Capacitor, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Relay
Relay
Number of
Components
1
2
17
l
1
8
2
4
1
2
17
1
I
7
1
3
1
2
14
1
l
PRC R-362
203
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.26
.30
1.70
.01
.08
.15
.26
.30
l .70
.01
.08
.15
.26
.30
1.46
.6O
.60
PRG R-362
204
Unit
434: Driver
Resistors, glass
Capacitor s, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
Number of
Components
9
3
6
1
2
21
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.08
.15
.26
.30
2..O9
434a: Relay
Relays, latching Z
Z
.6O
i .20
435: Driver
Resistors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
8
Z
4
1
Z
17
.01
.08
.15
.Z6
.30
1.70
435a: Relay
Relay, latching 1
1
436: Driver
Resistors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diode, zener
Transistors
8
2
4
1
Z
17
.01
.08
.15
.26
.30
1.70
436a: Relay
Relay, latching l
1
PRC R-362
2O5
437:
Unit
Driver
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, glass
Diodes
Diode, zener
Transistors
Number of
Components
2
2
ii
7
1
2
25
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
01
O8
01
15
26
3O
2.20
438: Relay Set Coil
Diode
Relay, latching
1
l
2
.15
.60
.75
439: Pitch and Roll Stop Logic and Driver
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
2
5
4
2
13
.01
.01
.15
.30
i.27
440: Relay Set Coil
Same as 422
441 : Relay Reset Coil
Same as 438
442: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, glass
Sensistor, silicon
Diodes
Diode, zener
Transistors
Transformer, 6 terminals
Inductor
3
I
13
I
9
1
4
1
1
34
O8
01
01
01
15
26
30
1 20
2O
4.6O
PRG R-362
206
443:
Unit
Relay Set Coil
Diode
Relay, latching
Number of
Components
1
i
2
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.15
.60
.75
444: Start Roll Duration Switch
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes
Transistors
2
11
4
2
19
.01
.23
.15
.30
3.75
445: Relay Reset Coil
Same as 443
446: Driver
Capacitor, glass
Capacitor, tantatum
Resistors, glass
Sensistor, silicon
Diode s
Diode, zener
Transistor
Transformer, 6 terminals
1
1
11
1
11
1
4
1
31
1
4.
01
08
01
01
I5
-) /
30
20
447: Relay Coil
Relay 1
1
.6O
.60
448: Start Velocity Duration Switch
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, fihn
Diode s
Transistors
4
24
li
4
43
.01
.01
.15
._,0
3.13
PRC R-362
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449:
Unit
Velocity Stop Logic and Driver
Capaciors, glass
Capacitor, tantalum
Resistor, film
Diode s
Diode, zener
Transistors
Number of
Components
9
1
5
7
1
4
27
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.08
.01
.15
.26
.30
2.73
45O: Relay Coil
Relay 1
1
.2O
.20
451: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, glass
Sensistor, silicon
Diode s
Diodes, zener
Transistors
Transformer, 6 terminals
7
l
24
1
14
2
6
1
56
•O8
.01
.01
.01
.15
.26
.30
1.20
6.44
452:
453:
Relay Reset Coil
Same as 421
Relay Reset Coil
Same as 419
454: Driver
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, film
Diode, zener
Diode s
Transistors
2
9
1
2
2
16
•08
.01
.26
.15
.30
l .41
PRC R-36Z
2O8
455:
Individual
Number of Component
Unit Components Failure Rate
M/C Start-Stop Relay
Capacitor, tantalum 2 .08
Resistors, film 2 .01
Diode 1 .15
Relay, latching 1 .60
6 .93
501:
1
Solar Panel Circuitry
Diodes 16 .15
Diodes, zener 96 .26
Transformers, Z terminals 5 .40
i17 29.36
502: Battery
Battery cells, silver zinc 18 .75
Transformer, 2 terminals 1 .40
Diode 1 .15
20 14.05
503: Battery Charger/Share Protector
Capacitor, paper 1 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 5 .08
Diodes 26 .15
Diodes, glass 2 .15
Diode, zener 1 .26
Resistors, composition 19 .01
Resistors, wirewound, power 5 .22
Transistors 9 .30
Relay 2 .60
Choke 2 .20
Transformers, 6 terminals Z I.Z0
Magnetic amplifier, i0 terminals _ 2.00
75 14.86
Isee Appendix A, section 2, p. 237, for method of calculating reliability
of unit.
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504:
Unit
Number of
Components
Power Distribution and Switching Unit
Capacitors, tantalum
Diode s
Transformer, 6 terminals
Chokes
2
8
i
2
13
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.08
o15
i.20
.20
2.96
505: 2.4-kc Sync
Capacitors, ceramic 12 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 2 .08
Resistors, composition 31 .01
Diode s 8 .15
Transistors 9 .30
62 4.49
506: Booster Regulator No. i
Resistors, film 2
Resistors, wirewound 17
Resistors, composition 12
Capacitor, paper 1
Capacitors, tantalum 8
Diode s 6
Diodes, zener 5
Transistors 13
Transformers, 5 terminals 2
Transformer, 6 terminals 1
Transformer, 8 terminals 1
Choke 1
69
01
22
01
01
08
15
,26
30
1.00
1.20
1.60
.20
15.63
507: Booster Regulator No. 2
Capacitor, paper l .01
Capacitors, tantalum 8 .08
Resistors, film 2 .01
Resistors, wirewound 17 .22
Resistors 12 .01
Diodes, zener 5 .26
Diodes, silicon 7 .15
Transistors 13 .30
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507:
Individual
Number of Component
Unit Components Failure Rate
Booster Regulator No. 2 (Cont.)
Transformers, 5 terminals 2 i°00
Transformer, 6 terminals l 1.20
Transformer, 8 terminals 1 1.60
Relay, latching l .60
Choke l .20
71 16.38
508: 2.4-kc Main Inverter
Resistors, composition 7 .01
Resistors, wirewound 7 .22
Resistors, film 5 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 6 .08
Diode 8 .1 5
Choke 1 .20
Transistors 5 .30
Transformers, 5 terminals 2 1.00
Transformer, 6 terminals l 1.20
Transformers, 8 terminals 2 1.60
44 l I.44
509: 2.4-kc Maneuver Load Inverter
Resistors, composition 7
Resistors, wirewound 7
Resistors, film 5
Capacitors, tantalum 6
Diode s 8
Transistors 5
Choke l
Transformers, 5 terminals 2
Transformer, 6 terminals 1
Transformers, 8 terminals 2
44 ii
.01
22
01
O8
15
30
2O
00
.20
.60
.44
510: Sync, 400 Cycles, 1 Phase
Resistors, composition 29 .01
Capacitors, ceramic ii .0i
Diode s l l .15
Transistors 9 °30
60 4.75
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511:
Unit
Sync, 400 Cycles, 3 Phases
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, composition
Diode s
Diodes, zener
Transistors
Number of
Components
2
12
6
2
4
26
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.15
.26
.30
2.76
512: 400-Cycle, 1-Phase Inverter
Capacitors, paper
Capacitor s, tantalum
Diode
Resistors, composition
Resistor, wirewound accurate
Transistors
Choke s
Transformers, 7 terminals
8
4
1
12
1
3
5
2
36
.01
O8
15
01
22
30
2O
1 40
5.59
513: 400-Cycle, 1-Phase Inverter
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, carbon
Resistors, composition
Transistors
Transformers, 5 terminals
Transformers, 9 terminals
Choke
5
3
4
6
3
3
1
25
.O8
.01
.01
.30
1.00
1.80
.20
10.87
515: Booster Backup Sensor
Resistors
Capacitor s, tantalum
Transistors
Diodes
Relay
12
2
6
18
1
39
.01
.08
.30
.15
.60
5.38
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516:
Unit
LC Oscillator
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, mica
Capacitor, Mylar
Resistors, film
Resistor, wirewound
Resistors, composition
Diode s
Transistors
Choke
517: Source Transfer
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, paper
Resistors, composition
Resistor, wit ewound
Diodes
Transistor
Transformer, 4 terminals
Transformer, 5 terminals
Relay, latching
Choke
601: Time Delay Switch
Time delay switch, 1 cs
602: Acquisition Sun Sensors
Sun Sensors
603: Sun Gate Sensors and Relay
Resistors, fixed carbon
Capacitor
Transistors
Diode
Number of
Components
4
3
1
12
1
2
4
3
l
31
2
2
5
1
10
1
1
1
1
1
25
8
8
4
1
2
1
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.O8
.01
.01
.01
.22
.01
.15
.30
.20
2.42
.O8
01
01
22
15
30
8O
1 00
.60
.20
4.85
.25
.38
3.04
.01
.01
.30
.15
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603:
Unit
Sun Gate Sensors and Relay (Cont.)
Diode, zener
Relay
Sun gate sun sensors
Number of
Components
l
1
?
12
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.26
.60
.38
2.42
605: Attitude Control T/R
Capacitors
Diode s
Transformer, 5 terminals
4
6
1
ll
.01
.15
1.00
1.94
606: Gyro T/R
Capacitors, tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Diodes, zener
Resistors
Transistors
Transformers, 10 terminals
4
8
2
8
4
2
28
.O8
.15
.26
.01
.30
2.00
7.32
607: Gyro Control
Capacitors
Capacitor, tantalum
Diodes, zener
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Resistors
Relays, latching
Inductor s
9
1
4
14
4
15
6
2
55
.01
.08
.Z6
.15
.30
.01
.60
.20
8.66
608: Pitch and Yaw Gyros
Diodes
Diodes, zener
Resistors
Re sistor s, wir ewound
Capacitor s
18
4
42
2
i0
.15
.26
.01
.22
.01
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608:
Individual
Number of Component
Unit Components Failure Rate
Pitch and Yaw Gyros (Cont.)
Capacitors, tantalum 8 .08
Transistors 12 .30
Inductor 2 .20
Transformers, 5 terminals 2 1.00
Transformers, 6 terminals 2 1.20
Gyros 2 19.60
104 52.94
610: Pitch and Yaw S.A. Compensation
Resistors 5 .01
Diodes 8 .15
Diodes, zener 4 .26
Capacitor s 4 .01
21 2.33
611: Switching Amplifiers and Switches (Pitch and Yaw)
Capacitors, glass 2 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 20 .08
Diode s 28 .15
Diodes, zener 14 .26
Resistors 65 .Z3
Transistors 16 .30
Transformers, 4 terminals 2 .80
Transformers, 5 terminals Z 1.00
149 32.81
612: Valves and Nozzles and Gas Supply 1
Valves and nozzles 4
613:
I
Valves and Nozzles and Gas Supply
Same as 612
Isee Appendix A, section 2, p. 238, for failure rate computation.
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614:
Unit
Cruise Sun Sensors and Regulator
Cruise sun sensors
Resistors, fixed, carbon
Capacitors
Diodes, zener
Number of
Components
8
Z
2
4
16
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.38
.01
.01
.15
3.68
1
615: Solar Pressure Stabilization
Partial components
Resistors
Diode s
Diodes, zener
Capacitors
Transistors
Motor, stepping
Gear box
Zl
Ii
2
17
4
4
4
63
.01
.15
.26
.01
.30
3.70
6.30
43.75
Series units
Diode s 3 .15
Relay 1 .60
Resistor 1 .01
5 1.06
616: Canopus Sensor and Electronics
Diode s 34 .15
Diode, zener 1 .26
Resistors 57 .01
Resistors, wirewound 2 .22
Transistors 11 .30
Capacitors, glass 4 .01
Capacitors, ceramic 17 .01
Capacitors, silver mica 8 .01
Capacitors, tantalum Z5 .08
Inductor 5 .Z0
Transformer, 12 terminals 1 2.40
Transformer, 5 terminals Z 1.00
Isee Appendix A, section 2, p. 237, for failure rate computation.
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616:
Number of
Unit Components
Canopus Sensor and Electronics (Cont.)
Transformer, 4 terminals 1
Photomultiplier tube 1
169
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.80
3.80
Z1.96
617: Canopus Gate
Capacitors 2
Capacitors, ceramic 2
Capacitor, silver mica 1
Capacitors, tantalum 6
Diode s 14
Diode, zener 1
Transistors 14
Resistors 39
Resistor, molded metal I
Inductor i
Relay, latching 2
83
.01
01
01
08
15
Z6
30
01
01
.20
.60
8.89
618: Roll Gyro
Resistors Zl .01
Diode s 9 .15
Diodes, zener Z .26
Capacitor s 5 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 4 .08
Transistors 6 .30
Transformer, 5 terminals 1 1.00
Transformer, 6 terminals I l.Z0
Inductor 1 .Z 0
Gyro 1 19.60
51 Z6.Z5
619: Switching Amplifier and Power Switch (Roll)
Capacitor, glass 1 .01
Capacitors, tantalum I0 .08
Diode s 14 .15
Diodes, zener 7 .Z6
Resistors Z9 .01
Transistors 8 .30
PRC R-362
217
619:
Individual
Number of Component
Unit Components Failure Rate
Switching Amplifier and Power Switch (Roll} (Conto }
Transformer, 4 terminals l
Transformers, 5 terminals 2
72
.8O
1.00
10.22
620: Valves and Nozzles and Gas Supply (Roll) I
Valves and nozzles 2
621: Valves and Nozzles and Gas Supply (Roll} 1
Same as 620
622: Derived Rate Damping (Roll}
Resistors 1 0 .01
Diode s 6 .15
Diodes, zener 2 .26
Capacitor s 2 .01
20 1.54
623: Turn Command Generator
Resistors II .01
Diode s 9 .15
Diodes, zener 3 .26
Transistors 5 .30
Capacitor s 2 .01
Capacitors, tantalum 2 .08
Relays, latching 2 .60
34 5.12
624: CW One-Shot
Resistors 1 0 .01
Diode s 3 .1 5
Diodes, zener 2 .26
Transistors 4 .30
Capacitors, tantalum 2 .08
21 2.43
iSee Appendix A, section 2, p. 238, for unit failure rate computation.
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625:
Unit
CCW One-Shot
Same as 624
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
626: Relay
Diode s
Capacitor
Resistor
Relay, latching
2
1
1
1
5
.15
.01
.01
.60
.92
627: Cone Angle Update Circuits
Resistors
Resistors, film
Capacitors, tantalum
Diode s
Transistor
Relays, latching
13
4
13
16
l
3
5O
.01
.01
.08
.15
.30
.60
5.71
701: Autopilot and Vane Actuators
Capacitors, composition
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors
Diodes
Diodes, zener
Transistors
Transformer, 5 terminals
Relay
Vane actuators, torque motors
17
8
70
i0
6
28
1
1
4
145
01
08
01
15
26
3O
1.00
1.00
15.00
74.97
702: Midcourse Maneuver Motor, Tankage and Plumbing
Engine, rocket (thrust chamber) 1
Tank and bladder, propellant 1
Jet vane s 4
Regulator, nitrogen 1
7
I
c = cycles.
2.0c 1
200.0c
0
4.4c
206.40c
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801:
Unit
CS-2 CW Logic
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, carbon
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Relays
Transformer, 4 terminals
Choke
Number of
Components
15
14
69
42
16
3
1
1
161
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.08
.01
.15
.30
.60
.80
.20
(15.86)
1.441
802: CS-1 CW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
803: CS-2 CCW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
804: Switching Transformer-Rectifier
T-R unit 2.47
805: CS-I and CS-2 Magnetization Circuits
Coil .I0
806: Cyclic Switching Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
807: Receiver Transformer-Rectifier
T-R unit 2.47
I
Failure rate of control logic divided among following units: 801,
803, 806, 816, 820, 829, 830, 833, 834, 837.
802,
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808:
Number of
Unit Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
Preamp and Mixers and First IF
Capacitors, glass 25 .01
Resistors, film Z .01
Resistors, composition 19 °01
Diode s 2 .15
Transistors 4 .30
Transformers, 4 terminals 2 .80
Transformer, 5 terminals 1 I°00
Choke s 10 .20
Filters 2 .22
67 7.00
809: Second Mixer, IF and AGC
Capacitors, glass 68 .01
Resistors, composition 77 .01
Diode, zener 1 .26
Diode s 6 .15
Transistors 16 .30
Choke s 4 .g 0
Transformers, 5 terminals 6 1.00
Transformers, 4 terminals 4 .80
Filter s 5 .22
187 18.51
810: Receiver Multipliers and Divider
Capacitors, glass 66 .01
Resistors, composition 50 .01
Diode, zener 1 .26
Diode s 6 .15
Transistors 7 .30
Chokes 18 .20
Transformers, 4 terminals 6 .80
Transformers, 5 terminals 2 1.00
Filter s 3 .22
C av ity 1 .Z 0
160 15.68
811: Range Detector
Capacitors, tantalum 16
Capacitors, glass 2
Resistors, composition 28
.O8
.01
.01
811:
812:
813:
814:
Unit
Range Detector (Cont.)
Diodes
Transistors
Filter s
Video Amplifier
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, tantalum
Resistors, composition
Resistors, film
Diode s
Transistors
Choke s
Transformer, 5 terminals
Isolation D_nplifie r
Capacitors, glass
Resistors
Diode s
Transistor
Transformer, 4 terminal
Multipliers and Amplifiers
Capacitor, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, composition
Diodes, zener
Diodes
Transistors
Varicaps
Choke s
Transformers, 5 terminals
Transformers, 4 terminals
Transformers, 3 terminals
Cavity
Number of
Components
4
5
4
59
26
5
36
2
g
8
ii
I
91
6
6
4
1
1
18
1
52
38
2
8
6
Z
15
Z
4
Z
I
133
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Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.15
.30
.22
4.56
.01
.08
.01
.01
.15
.30
.Z0
1.00
6.94
.01
.01
.15
.30
.80
i.82
.08
.01
.01
.26
.15
.30
.01
.Z0
1.00
.80
.60
.Z0
14.12
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815:
Unit
Exciter Transformer-Rectifier
T-R unit
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2.47
816: CS-5 CW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count i.44
817: Isolation Amplifier
Same as 813
818: Multipliers and Amplifiers
Same as 814
819: Exciter Transformer-Rectifier
T-R unit 2.47
820: CS-5 CCW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
821: CS-5 Magnetization Circuits
Coil .051
823: Transfer Circuits
Capacitor, glass
Capacitor, tantalum
Resistors
Choke
I
i
2
1
5
.01
.08
.01
.20
.31
824: Auxiliary Os cillator
Capacitors, glass
Resistors
6
3
.01
.01
Ione-half the rate of unit 805.
824:
825:
826:
827:
829:
830:
Unit
Auxiliary Oscillators (Cont.)
Diode, zener
Transistor
Transformer, 4 terminals
Choke
Crystal
Transfer Circuits
Same as 823
Auxiliary Oscillator
Same as 824
PA-1 and Converter
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Resistors
Diodes, zener
Diodes
Klystron
Relay, latching
Transistors
Choke s
Transformer, 15 terminals
Transformer, 5 terminals
Magnetic amplifier
CS-3 CW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count
CS-4 CW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count
Number of
Components
1
1
1
1
1
14
7
2
16
4
16
1
1
5
4
1
1
1
59
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Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.26
.30
.80
.20
1.00
2.65
.O8
.01
.01
.26
.15
I0.00
.60
.30
.20
3.00
1.00
.15
21.23
1.44
1.44
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831:
Unit
PA-2 and Converter
Same as 827
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
833: CS-3 CCW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
834: CS-4 CCW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
835: CS-3 and CS-4 Magnetization Circuits
Coil
.10
836: VCO, Phase Detector,
Capacitors, tantalum
Capacitors, glass
Varicap
Resistors, composition
Diode s
Diode, zener
Transistors
Transformers, 4 terminals
Transformer, 5 terminals
Transformers, 6 terminals
Choke s
Filter s
Crystal
and Loop Filter
2
69
I
48
2
1
I0
6
1
2
i0
Z
1
155
.O8
.01
.01
.01
.15
.26
.30
.80
1.00
1.20
.20
.22
1.00
16.54
837: CS-I CCW Logic
See unit 801 for parts count 1.44
901: Separation Switch
Separation switch, _ cs .IZ cs
I
Redundant contacts.
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902:
Unit
Transformer
Transformer, 11 terminals
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
2.20
903: Control Rectifiers and Capacitor
Capacitor
Diode s i
1
5
6
.01
.15
.76
904: Power Rectifiers and Capacitors
Capacitor s 3 .01
Diode s2 4 .15
Resistor, composition I__ .01
8 .64
905: Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Same as 904
906: Separation Switch
Switch .12 cs
907: Transformer
Transformer, ll terminals 2.20
908: Control Rectifiers and Capacitor
Same as 903
909: Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Same as 904
1
Four of the diodes are redundant in pairs.
2The four diodes are arranged in redundant pairs.
considered.
Only short failure
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910:
Unit
Power Rectifiers and Capacitor
Same as 904
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
911: Time Delay Switch
Time delay switch, i cs .25
912: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Capacitor
Resistors, cornposition
Resistors, wir ewound
Silicon- contr oiled rectifier
1
Z
4
1
8
.01
.01
.ZZ
.30
1 .ZI
913: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Capacitor
Resistors, composition
Resistors, wirewound
Silicon-controlled rectifier
1
Z
5
l
9
.01
.01
.ZZ
.30
1.43
914: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Same as 912
915: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Same as 913
916: Relay K2
Relay, latching
Diode
1
1
2
.6O
.15
.75
917: Relay K2'
Same as 916
918:
919:
920:
921:
922:
923:
924:
Unit
Relay K4
Same as 916
Relay K4'
Same as 916
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
Fir st Maneuver
Capacitor
Resistors, composition
Resistors, wirewound
Silicon- controlled rectifier
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
First Maneuver
Same as 920
Silicon- Controlled Re ctifie r,
Fir st Maneuver
Capacitor
Resistors, composition
Resistors, wirewound
Silicon- controlled rectifier
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
First Maneuver
Same as 922
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
Second Maneuver
Same as 920
Number of
Components
1
2
4
1
8
1
2
3
1
7
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Individual
Component
Failure Rate
.01
.01
.22
.30
i.21
.01
.01
.22
.30
.99
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925:
Unit
Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
Second Maneuver
Same as 920
Number of
Components
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
926: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier,
Second Maneuver
Same as 922
928: Filter
Capacitor
Resistor
Diode
1
1
1
3
.01
.01
.15
.17
929: Filter
Same as 928
930: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Capacitor
Resistor, film
Resistors, composition
Diodes
1
1
3
1
6
.01
.01
.01
.15
.20
931: Silicon-Controlled Rectifier
Same as 930
932: Filter
Capacitor
Resistor,
Diode
composition
1
1
1
3
.01
.01
.15
.17
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933:
Unit
Filter
Same as 932
Number of
Component s
Individual
Component
Failure Rate
934: Hinges
Hinge s 8 .02
8 .16
935: Spring Actuators
Actuators 4 1.05
4 4.20
936: Hydraulic Snubbers
Snubb er s 4 0
Unnumbered Components
Latches and pinpuller s
Squibs
Valves, first maneuver
Bridgewires, first maneuver
Valves, second maneuver
Bridgewires, second maneuver
Total
8 .02 a
16 106.00 a
5 106.00 a
I0 I06.00 a
5 106.00 a
I0 106.00 a
54
950:
951:
952:
953:
Probability of No Meteoritic Impact: .9
Probability of Solar Panels Not Degrading: .75
Probability That Wrong Target Is Not Acquired: .9
Operational Probability of Adequate First Maneuver: .9782
954: Operational Probability of Adequate Second Manuever: .9782
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2. Special Failure Rate Computations
Several of the units defined in the first section of this appen-
dix are of sufficient complexity to be described in somewhat more detail.
These units are involved in four subsystems: (i) the data encoder, (Z)
the command detection and decoding, (3) the power supply, and (4) the
attitude control. Each of these subsystems is discussed below.
a. Data Encoder
Many of these units are composed of various quantities
of NAND and NOR gates, R-S flip-flops, universal flip-flops, relay driv-
ers, and noninverting drivers or amplifiers. The parts counts used for
these are listed below:
(i) NAND Gates
High-Speed NAND
4- or Z-input:
Capacitors, glass 2
Resistors, film 8
Diodes, silicon I (2-input) 4
Diodes, silicon (4-input) 6
Transistors 2
8- input:
Capacitor, glass 1
Resistors 4
Diodes, silicon 2 9
Transistor 1
Low-Speed NAND
4- or Z-input:
Capacitors, glass 2
Resistors, film 8
Diodes, silicon (2-input) 2
Diodes, silicon (4-input) 4
Transistors 2
i
Two diodes of the 2-input gate and four diodes of the 4-input gate are
arranged in various combinations of redundancies.
2Eight of the nine diodes are involved in redundant configurations.
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(z)
(3)
(4)
8- input:
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistor
NOR Gate s
Low-Speed NOR
4- o r Z- input:
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon (2-input)
Diodes, silicon (4-input)
Transistors
R-S Flip-Flops
High-Speed
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes
Transistors
Low-Speed
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Universal Flip- Flops
High-Speed
Capacitors, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
Low- Speed
Capacitor, glass
Resistors, film
Diodes, silicon
Transistors
2
6
2
4
2
4
i0
4
Z
4
8
2
2
6
14
8
2
1
I0
4
2
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(6)
Relay Drivers
Capacitors, tantalum 2
Resistors, film 7
Rectifier 1
Transistors 3
Noninverting Drivers (Amplifiers)
High-Speed
Capacitor, tantalum 1
Capacitors, glass 3
Resistors, film i0
Diodes 3
Transistors 3
Low-Speed
Resistors, film 4
Transistors 4
These parts were entered at the appropriate amount and so listed
in section i. However, the reliability of the redundant configurations of
the NAND gate diodes has been computed according to the following equa-
tions. (For convenience, the equation for a redundant group of tantalum
capacitors is also included here. )
(v) Redundant Configurations in NAND and
NOR Gate s
Z-input gates:
(a) Both diodes in parallel
-6t) Z
Ra(t) =_i - (i - e -°15 x i0 )
(b) Both diodes in series
-6t
-.15 x 10 )2 = e-Rb(t) = (e
4-input gates:
(c) All four in parallel
Rc(t) = <1
.3 x 10-6t
- 15 x 10-6t)4"x_?(1 -e "
(d) Two parallel pairs
- 15 x I0-6t)2Rd(t) =/'\I - {i - e " _j2
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(e) Two in series; two in parallel
-.3x 10-6b( -.isx I0-662)R (t) = (e 1 - (1 - e
e
(f) Four in series
- .6 x 10-6t
Rf(t) = e
8-input gates:
(g) Two in series; three parallel pairs
10-6t) ( 15 x 10-6t)2)3R (t) = (e -'3x 1 - (1 - e"
g
(h) Four in series; two parallel pairs
- 6t)( - 15x 10-6t)£) 2Rh(t) = (e .6 x 10- 1 (1 - e "
3-input gates:
(i) All three in series
Ri(t) = e-.45 x 10-6t
Six parallel pairs of tantalum capacitors
1 - .08 x 10-6t) 2) 6(j) Rj(t) = - (1 - e
b. Command Detection and Decoding
A great many of the units in the command subsystem
are described by component parts whose modes of failure directly affect
the failure rate of the unit. Consider, for example, the components
listed below under the heading IS. The failure rate of unit 3004-I is
made up of the failure rate of two transistors failing short, one resistor
failing open, plus one-half of the sum of the failure rates shown in the
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column "IND'To" The failure rate of unit 3004-Z is made up of the sum
of the rates shown under the column headed "OFF" and one-half of the
column headed "IND'T." Thus, between the two units all modes of cat-
astrophic failure of IS are accounted for.
Listed below are the four combinations of component parts in-
volved in this manner in the command subsystem units.
XON )_OFF X IND'T
Failure Failure Failure
Cause Rate Cause Rate Cause Rate
Component of k x 10 -6 of k x 10 -6 of k x 10 -6
Types Failure hours Failure hours Failure hours
IS Switch
Capacitor,
tantalum
Diodes, silicon
Transistor Short .15
Short .15
Resistor,
film
carbon
film
carbon
T ran sforme r,
4- terminal
Open .008
Short .064
Open o135
Open °135
Open .135
Open .135
Open .15
Open .15
Open
Open
.008
.008
Any failure .800
Total .308 1.7Z0
IP Switch
Diode, silicon
Transistor
Transistor
Resistor,
carbon
film
carbon
T ran sforme r,
4 taps
Total
Short .15
.15
Short .015
Any failure .30
Open .15
Open .008
Open .008
Any failure .800
1.281
Open .004
Short .015
Short .015
Short .015
Short .015
Short .0005
Short .0005
Short .0005
Any failure .01
.0755
Open .135
Anyfailure .01
Short .0005
Short .0005
.1460
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Component
Type s
Transistor
Resistor,
film
film
film
carbon
Total
Capacitor,
glass
Transistor
Resistor,
film
film
film
XON kOFF kIND 'T
Failure Failure
Cause Rate Cause Rate
of k x 10 -6 of k x 10 -6
Failure hours Failure hours
AID (Shift Resister Driver)
Open .15 Short .1 5
Open .008
Open .008
.158 .158
Decoding Gate, Series Components
Short .15 Open .15
Failure
Cause Rate
of k x 10 -6
Failure hours
Short .0005
Anyfailure .01
Anyfailure .01
Short .0005
.021
Any failure .01
Open .008 Short .0005
Open .008 Short .0005
Anyfailure .01
Total .15 .166 .0Zl
The reliability of the decoding gates is not simply the reliability of
its series components listed above. There are three types of decoding
gates defined on the reliability diagrams; two contain six diodes in an
arrangement such that at least two of the six must fail in an open condi-
tion for the unit to fail. The equations of the three types are as follows:
(1) Decoding gate of the type defined as unit 3021"
The reliability of the gate is given by
RDG 1 = R SIR60 + 6R50 (i RDO) ]
where R S = reliability of the series components (use decoding
gate, kON + XOF F + kIND, T)
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that
RDO = probability a diode does not fail open
RDG1 = e-°337t [e -('135)6t + 6e-(°135)5t(1 - e-'135t)]
(Z) Decoding gate of the type defined as unit 30ZZ'_
This type is the same as that of 30Zl _'_except
I
RS = )'OFF + _ kIND'T
RDGg = e- o1765t [e-(.135)6t + 6e -{°135)5t(l-e- .135t)]
(3) Decoding gate of the type defined as unit 302Z-AI_
I
This type is similar, except that R S = ?tON + -_ kIND, T
and there are no diodes as in the other two.
o1605t
RDG 3 = e
Returning for a moment to the four major combinations of compo-
nents and the apportionment of the failure rate between open and short
modes of failure, the basis on which the catastrophic failure rate was ap-
I
portioned was first used by PRC in another study° Unfortunately, not
much data is available to support such an apportionment; it is felt, how-
ever, that this apportionment properly combines engineering judgment
with the available data (see References l, Z, 3, 4, and 5 on page 239).
Fai____l.u.reM.od_es.of E!ectronic Component Parts
Item
Resistors
Capacitors
Transformers
Common Cause
of Failure
Percent of
Total Failure
Short 5
Open 80
Short 80
Open 5
Short 70
Open i0
Ipreliminary Reliability Assessment for the Orbiting Geophysical Ob-
servatories, PRC R-243, 1 February 1962.
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Failure Modes of Electronic Component Parts {Continued)
Item
Relays
Diodes
Transistors
Common Cause
of Failure
Percent of
Total Failure
Open 50
Short I0
Open 90
Short 50
Open 50
c. Power Supply Subsystem
Only one unit of this subsystem needs to be discussed,
unit 501. The components of unit 501 are arranged as shown in the fol-
lowing diagram:
a b c d
Group 1
_Solar _ 6 Zeners _ 4 T/M H I ICells 1 Isolating Diode Transformers Transformer
Group 16
6 Zeners1 Isolating Diode
The failure rate of block a is assumed to be zero. For the normal path,
it is assumed that 14 of the 16 groups of diodes in block b must contain
no shorts during the cruise periods and no opens during maneuvers.
Also, it is assumed that all four transformers of block c must function
for the normal path. A degraded path occurs when it is assumed that a
50-percent loss of block c is not catastrophic up to one-half the length
of the mission. The reliability of 501 is given by
R501 : R501a R501b R501c R501d •
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d0 Attitude Control Subsystem
The solar pressure stabilization unit, 615, exhibits a
simple redundancy. The parts count shown in section 1 is actually one-
fourth of the total number of parts. The four sections are arranged as
follow s:
615e
Series
Units
Pitch
615a
Pitch
615c
Y aw
Therefore, the reliability of 615 is given by
R615 = Re I - (i - R615a)
2
2
where R = series components
e
R = R b = R = R da c
The redundant and cross-coupled valves, nozzles, and gas supply
have been fully covered in the text. See the discussion of cruise science
under "System Figure-of-Merit" (subsection IV.C.2. a(1)) for all the
assumptions involved in the computation. It should be pointed out here,
however, that there are four valves and nozzles in each of units 612 and
613 (supplying the pitch and yaw torques) and two in each of units 620
-6
and 621. The component failure rate used was .7 x i0 actuations.
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APPENDIX B
COMPONENT PART FAILURE RATES
This reliability assessment of Mariner C (Mars) was undertaken
with an agreement to use the same failure rates that PRC used for the
Mariner R reliability assessment. This permits a valuable comparison,
not often made, between the two spacecrafts. Since the assumptions re-
garding failure rates are exactly the same in the two studies, a detailed
discussion of them is not included here. It is considered sufficient merely
1
to list a few of the major assumptions:
i. The severity of space environment is equivalent to that ex-
perienced by ground support equipment.
g. The failure rates of some mechanical components were
modified from the data source to adjust for a less stringent
ope rating mode.
3. All components have been applied at 25 percent of their rated
operating loads.
4. All components are assumed to operate in an ambient envi-
ronment of 35°C.
The component failure rates used in this study are considered to
be conservative in magnitude due to the unknown effects of the several
assumptions made. These component failure rates are tabulated and
identified by source in Exhibit 59. The seven sources from which the
failure rates in Exhibit 59 were obtained are as follows:
Source i: Reliability Stress Analysis for Electronics Equipment,
Proposed MIL Handbook 217 (WEPS), 31 December 1961
Source 2: Minuteman Parts Reliability, Autonetics Report No.
EM-2496-3
I
For a complete discussion, see PRC R-Z93,
the Mariner Spacecraft, 17 December 1962.
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Source 3: Reliability Application and Analysis Guide, M160-54
(Rev. l), The Martin Company, July 1961
Source 4: Compilation and Analysis of Reliability Data on
Selected Flight Control Components, PRC R-235,
Planning Research Corporation, Confidential,
December 1961
Source 5: Reliability Application and Analysis Guide, Avco Cor-
poration, April 1962
Source 6: Reliability Analysis Data for Systems and Component
Design Engineers, TRA-873-74, General Electric,
September 1961
Source 7: Gyro Reliability Data, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Interoffice Memorandum, 28 June 1963
It should be noted that in two instances the failure rates of com-
ponents were changed for this study. The gyro failure rate used in the
assessment of Mriner IR was obtained from a study of data compiled in
the operating records of the Agena equipment. The quantity of data so
obtained was limited and, accordingly, the failure rate was considered
to be high for this reason rather than because of poor operating experi-
ence. A discussion was held with members of the Guidance and Control
Division of JPL, and from this discussion it was agreed to incorporate
the substantial body of bench test data which had been generated at JPL
on this gyro type. The inclusion of'these test results has lowered the
gyro failure rate substantially, but the impact of this on the study re-
sults is not considered to be disproportionate since gyro operating time
is low in any case.
The other instance of change in component failure rate involves the
rate used for film resistors. Relating few film resistors were identified
in the Mariner R study, and the failure rate that was used was based on
data obtained through 1960. Unlike carbon composition resistors, film
resistors have been under continuous development since that time, and
it is recognized that definite improvements in material control and manu-
facturing processes have been made. A large number of film resistors
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EXHIBIT 59 - ESTIMATES OF COMPONENT FAILURE RATES
Item
Acc ele rometer
Actuators, bimetallic
Actuators, spring
Battery cells
Bearings
Bearings, ball
Bearings, sleeve-type
Cadmium sulfide cells
Capacitors, ceramic
Capacitors, glass
Capacitors, mica
Capacitors, paper
Capacitors, tantalum, solid
C avities
Choke s
Clutch
Coil
Cores
Crystals
Diodes, power
Diodes, silicon
Diodes, zener
Engine, rocket, thrust chamber
Gears
Gear box
Gears, helical
Gears, compound
Gears, anti-backlash
Gears, spur
Failure Rate,
kxl0 -6
28.00
.40
1.05
.75
5.00
9.OO
.40
38
01
01
01
01
.08
.20
.20
3.00
10
.00
1.00
.01
15
Z6
2 00
1.20
6.3O
.50
6.30
9.OO
6.30
hours
hour
actuations
hour
hours
hours
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hours
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
hour
cycles
hours
hours
hour
hours
hours
hours
Source
3
3
3
6
5
5
3
6
1
1
1
1
1
6
3
5
5
3
l
1
Z
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
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EXHIBIT 59 - (Continued}
Item
Hinge
Jet vane
Joint, rotary coaxial
Inductors
Kivstron
Lamps, neon
Latch
Louvers
Magamps, windings and cores
(per pair )
Motor, electrical
Motor with gear and brake
Motor, stepping
Photo multiplier tube
Photo diode
Pinion
Potentiometer
Rate gyros
Rectifiers
Regulator, nitrogen
Relays (l actuation per hour or less)
Resistors, composition
Resistors, film, signal
Resistors, film, power
Resistors, wirewound, accurate
Resistors, wirewound, power
Servo motors
Solar panel
Solenoids
Failur e Rate,
-6
_xlO
.0g actuations
.00 hour
75.00 hours
.Z 0 hour
10.00 hours
1.00 hour
.0Z actuations
.00 hour
.15 hour
3.00 hours
16.00 hours
3.70 hours
3.80 hours
.38 hour
l.Z0 hours
1.08 hours
19.60 hours
I.Z0 hours
4.40 cycles
.60 hour
o01 hour
.Z3 hour
1.08 hours
1.03 hours
.ZZ hour
15.00 hours
7.60
(see text}
hours
Source
3
5
3
6
5
3
1
5
5
5
6 (1)
6
5
3
7
3
6
3
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
PRC R- 362
247
EXHIBIT 59 - (Continued)
Failure Rate,
Item X x 10 -6 Source
Squibs 106.00 actuations 4
Switch, time delay .Z5 hour 3
Switch, separation .1Z hour 3
Tank and bladder, propellant 200.00 cycles 6
Thermistor .30 hour 1
Transformer 2.00 hours 3
Transformer-rectifier 2.47 hours 5
Transistors .30 hour 1
Torque motors 15.00 hours 5
Valve, ignition cartridge 106.00 actuations 6
Valve, nitrogen 106.00 actuations 6
Valve, propellant, start 106.00 actuations 6
Valve, propellant, shutoff 106.00 actuations 6
Valves and nozzles .70 cycles 4
Varicap .30 hour 1(Z)
Wormshaft 4.00 hours 5
Notes: (i) Failure rate assumed I0 times that of cadium sulfide cells.
(Z) Failure rate assumed equal to that of transistors.
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have been used in the designing of Mariner C, and the use of the older rate
would have placed an unduly pessimistic emphasis on the failure potential
of the circuits employing them. The updating of film resistor failure data
would have consumed more time than was available; hence, a check was
made of JPL on the ratio of the rates used for the two resistor types. It
was ascertained that the same rate was often used for both types. PRC
did not adopt the JPL rate; however, the rate for film resistors was ad-
justed to be equal to the rate used for carbon composition resistor in the
Mariner R study. The principal effect of this change is to invalidate, to
some extent, the comparison between reliabilities of the CC and S sub-
systems in the two spacecraft. Most of the film resistors in the Mariner
R parts complement were contained in the CC and S subsystem.
